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Editor’s Note
As avid readers surely know by now, the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations is a vibrant organization. Arising from a UNESCO conference in
Austria, it has endured for over a half century, appearing in different forms and on a
variety of continents. Among the many achievements of the ISCSC have been exciting
and challenging discussions and debates, annual meetings, and a stream of publications,
all on the nature of civilizations.
One method that we can use to gauge the persistence of the ISCSC’s focus of concern is
to read the annual Call for Papers and official statements by leaders. The Call for
Papers are issued annually, these days, prior to the meetings and they tend to guide the
next annual conference while helping to shape much of the intellectual pathway ahead
for the discipline of comparative study of civilizations.
I begin here by going back to CCR’s Issue #11 (1984), produced thirty years ago, dated
1985. It is a book entitled Civilizations East and West and was published as a memorial
volume for Prof. Benjamin Nelson, a founder of the ISCSC and its president from the
inception of the organization’s American branch on December 29, 1971, to the spring of
1977. As noted by Vytautas Kavolis, Nelson took “a particular interest in involving
comparative civilizational studies with all of the most vital intellectual developments
and the most perplexing predicaments of the life of the time.” Thus, one of his last
public lectures was entitled “The New Science of Civilizational Analysis: Vico, Mauss,
Weber and Today.” As E.V. Walter wrote in his essay on Nelson,
In the 1970s, Nelson's scholarly interests converged in working out civilization
analysis, a discipline that would seek the common ground of the humanities and
the social sciences in studying symbolic designs of the largest scale as active
forces in their social settings.
In the same issue, Dr. Kavolis, the subsequent ISCSC president, wrote an article entitled
Nelson’s Legacy of Comparative Studies. In it he quotes from Prof. Nelson embarking
on this new direction:
Recently ... I have become curious about several questions related to my
growing interest in the comparative study of civilizations and of
intercivilizational relations. Does the concept "conscience" give us any clue as to
some of the differences in the distinctive patterns of development in various
parts of the world? What are the relations between the structures of conscience
and the tumultuous sociocultural processes of the 20th century across the world?
... it is necessary to work one's way back through questions of this sort if we
hope to work toward a basic foundation for sociology, history, and psychology
and anthropology.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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We are now obliged to do a massive amount of work to get anywhere near these
questions.

Nelson said that “It is only as we see the civilizational complexes in the crucibles of
intercultural process that we can perceive the distinctive thrusts and patternings of
different civilizational and societal structures.” There were two promising approaches:
... describe ways of studying all sociocultural processes and issues within a
distinctive civilization-analytic perspective which proves preferable on general
intellectual grounds (comprehensiveness, depth, compactness) to existing
horizons and approaches in history, anthropology, sociology. The comparative
depth-historical study of process and pattern in civilizational perspective offers
great advantages over current varieties of structuralism, structural functionalism,
schematic Marxism, phenomenology, inductivist empiricism, and so on.
Nelson spoke of the “comparative historical differential sociology of sociocultural
process and civilizational complexes” and of “a polyphonic depth history and sociology
of cultural expression and experience.”
----A decade later the association and its journal had changed a tad, retaining some of the
original motivating orientation but also branching out. For example, in the issue of
Spring, 1995, key articles were on the following topics:
•

Louis Dumont on the National Variants of the Modern Ideology: II (by
Leonidas Donskis)

•

The Ethnic Chameleon: Bakhtin and the Bai (by Lucien Miller)

•

Dialogical Horizons: Latino Voice and U.S. Audiences – E Pluribus Plures (by
Ann McBride-Limaye)

•

Christianity and the Uniqueness of Japanese Religious Mentality (by Don Sull
Choi)

•

The Historical Study of Mental Images (by Olavi K. Fält), and

•

On Civilizational Worldviews (by David Richardson).

And there was a section called “Forum.” In this we find an article by Arthur Iberall
entitled A Characteristic 500-Year Process-Time in Cultural Civilizations. Plus, there
was A Response to Iberall, written by Robert Holton.
Prof. Iberall noted at the beginning of this article that he had been making
“contributions, from the point of view of a social physics, to this social science
community concerned with civilizations” for 16 years. He began to highlight the
findings of his study of a 500 year time scale for culture-civilizational processes as
follows:
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014
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1. Physics is concerned with the laws of movement and change in all materialenergetic systems. Man as an organism and organized into Society is such a
system.
2. All such physical study revolves around some form of the primitive triad of
matter, space, and time. We elect space, time, and action (action: the energytime product devoted to activities) as a form suited to both simple and complex
physical systems.
3. Physics can deal both with the processes within systems at the level of
individual units (i.e., 'atomisms'), or at the level of extensive field collectives of
such units (i.e., 'fields'). Further, it can connect these two levels.
4. Throughout the entire universe, one finds a hierarchical (in the present instance
meaning nested) ordering of atomism and field, from a so-called field vacuum of
fluctuations, through so-called fundamental particles, through atoms-ionsmolecules of our immediate experience, through matter-energy associations
within galaxies (comprising gas clouds, dust clouds, stars, planets,
planetesimals), through galaxies, up to and perhaps through our universe to other
universes. ….
5. Of course, in examining the case of a social physics, we easily surmise that we
are concerned with an extensive hierarchy and heterarchy of processes and
forms.
Next, this “social physics” approach of Dr. Iberall was analyzed by Robert Holton of the
Flinders University of South Australia, a Corresponding Editor of the journal. He
praised the ambitious and important argument of Iberall as a heroic attempt to maintain
that the conceptual and theoretical repertoire of physics can be used to explain social
processes, more specially the emergence and duration of civilizations. In so doing, he
was going way beyond “Comte’s earlier attempt at social physics, drawing on the recent
physics of complex systems.”
But he isolated what he thought were the major problems with Iberall’s paradigm:
He sets no limits as to the usefulness of the theories of physics. The author
extrapolates from his success in explaining aspects of material culture (such as
population density and the energy parameters affecting social action) to all
aspects of human culture. There is a huge leap in faith here typical of theories
that it is believed will in time explain everything.
The theoretical framework is biased to materialism and against the symbolic
domain. To be convincing it would have to explain language and other symbolic
systems, but comments on this are not forthcoming. I do not accept that because
physics may explain aspects of material culture in a non-metaphorical manner, it
can therefore explain all aspects of social organization.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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Perhaps this is the language that Nelson would have used were he to comment on
Iberall’s approach. At any event, the focus on the organization had now changed from
investigation within the social sciences to innovative argumentation as to the validity of
other lines of theory seeking to explain divergences and similarities in civilizations.
-------As time passed, the topics sought for debate and discussion at the annual meeting
perhaps led inevitably to a gradual distance developing, a departure from the initiating
ideas of Nelson (broad social and historical science) and Kavolis (culture in historical
context) through the suggestions of Iberall (social physics) to futures research and
contemporary social problems.
Thus, in the Fall issue, 2007, a Call for Papers was included as an orange-colored flyer
tucked in between pages 66 and 67. This Call for Papers gave as the topic of the
forthcoming conference the following:
Civilizations in the Americas and Around the World: Past, Present, and Future
Exploring Multiculturalism in Globalizing Civilizations
Chairing the program committee for that conference was the well-known American
physicist Stephen Blaha. Like Dr. Iberall before him, Dr. Blaha had spent years
working on the intellectual connections binding physics, mathematics, computer
science, and history together.
The first set of suggestions addressed “Civilization of the Americas.” Sought were
papers on such topics as the following: Collapse of Indo-American Civilizations,
Interplay of Civilizations and Cultures in Canada and the United States, Huntington’s
Clash of Civilizations, Canadian Multiculturalism and the Culture of Nowhere, and
Muslim Integration into the Americas and Europe.
The second set of suggestions was labeled “Asian, Islamic, African, and European
Civilization Topics.” It called for studies on the Efflorescence of Islam in the West,
Religious Wars and Social Collapse, the “Decline” of Western Civilization, and
Multicultural Feminism vs. Western Feminism, among other suggested areas for
research and discussion.
Finally, the organization sought papers on “General Civilizational Topics.” Among the
most intriguing: “Sparks Flying” – Current Hot Topics; Workshop on Retarding/
Reversing the Decline of Civilizations; Workshop on the Possibility of the Conscious
Design of the Development of a Civilization; and the “Contributions of
Civilizationalists – Toynbee, Wittfogel, Braudel, Needham, Landes, Diamond, McNeill,
Frank, Victor Hanson, Barzun, Ortega y Gasset, and Vico.”
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014
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Before the last conference commenced a welcome and introduction to comparative
civilization was offered by Dr. Laina Farhat-Holzman of California. She and her team
selected as the topic for 2013’s conference: How Will Rapid Global Changes
Transform Civilizations?
As the conference began, she proposed in her future-oriented welcome what she
envisioned as the road ahead for scholarship in the field. Many of these ideas for
futures research would constitute a solid research agenda for the discipline, she
indicated..
Dr. Farhat-Holzman outlined issues that lay ahead:
Our theme for this conference is a bold one for us because it involves prediction rather
than historic analysis. As comparative historians, we are far more familiar with the past
and present than the future. But the warning signs are already out there: that our world
is being transformed by technological leaps of such daring that we must try to look for
pitfalls and try to imagine remedies for the problems we see coming.
We are seeing changes in how we communicate, how we work, how we worship, threats
to the continued existence of the nation state, and in our very numbers. We may be
seeing a transformation from population explosion to population implosion, changes
that can affect everything.
In work and the home, our civilizations have moved from the majority in farming and
home industries to manufacturing and ultimately to communications technologies and
service industries. The invention of robotics has implications for all sorts of human
endeavors, both for good and for ill. One concern already seen is the lack of jobs for
working class people resulting in the demise of marriage and stable family life.
The Nation State, which has changed human governance from authoritarian and
imperial to participatory, is facing alternate systems of regional governance that will
change how we identify our civilizations. Could there be in the future an enlarged
United States that includes Canada and Mexico? Or could we break up into
geographically comparable regions that could become new nation states? China and
Russia face the same problems.
Will space travel affect how human beings think and worship? How will the new brain
sciences affect health, crime and punishment, genetics, and once again, religion? What
new energy resource will replace everything from human labor, the horse, steam,
electricity, and hydro-carbons and how will those changes affect nation states and world
economies?
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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As a separate issue, we are also examining the great dispersions of people around the
world, diasporas both voluntary and involuntary. How are strangers in a strange land
surviving? Where do they do well and where do they do ill?
We are merely touching the surface of these contemplations at this conference, but it
will be an exciting start. I would like to see this process continue into our next
conferences, and would really like to hear from more medical doctors, lawyers, and
other professionals----even astronomers----who would jump in to explore the future of
civilization in the face of such scientific leaps into the unknown.
Welcome to you all, and we hope that you have a stimulating conference and that you
make many new friends on this journey.
--Now, in the year 2014, the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations has a new president: Dr. David Rosner of New York. A philosopher, he
led a team which has prepared the Call for Papers for the forthcoming June conference
to be held at Monmouth University in West Long Branch, New Jersey. The selected
topic: Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization?
He began his Call for Papers as follows:
Jonathan Lear, in his book Radical Hope (2006), wrote:
“We live in an age of deep and profound angst that the world itself, as we know
it, is vulnerable and could break down…We are confronted with global
warming, nuclear conflagration, weapons of mass destruction…and even the
demise of civilization itself…events around the world – terrorist attacks, violent
social upheavals…have left us with an uncanny sense of menace. We seem to be
aware of a shared vulnerability that we cannot name.” (p. 7)
What is the way out of this deep sense of contemporary crisis? What exactly is
“wisdom” and how can wisdom be promoted on a global level to deal with a number of
serious crises now facing the future of civilization? What have been some different
definitions of wisdom? This is an ancient topic, but how can it be specifically applied
today? What, if anything, can be done to solve these problems collectively?

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014
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Some applications may be (but are not limited to) the following questions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

What exactly is human nature and how is this relevant to civilizational futures?
What are some possible solutions to overpopulation and the related problems of
over-industrialization, resource-depletion and environmental degradation?
What are some possible solutions to the problem of inequality, economic and
otherwise?
Why do a few have so much while so many have so little? Do rich nations have
any responsibilities to the poor ones?
Is capitalism really working today? What did the “occupy” movements signify?
Why are many Western economies currently floundering? How have
technological advances (especially increasing automation) contributed to the
current jobs crisis?
Does material accumulation really bring happiness? Why/why not?
Is humankind naturally prone to conflict or cooperation? How are organizations
like the United Nations faring with regard to international responses to regional
problems?
What is a Utopia? Dystopia? How are these terms relevant today?
What roles do utopias and dystopias play for the future of society?
Have our leaders run out of inspiration? Is fear now the main rhetoric?
In the 20th century, humanity saw the rise of several grand ideologies:
communism, fascism, liberalism, etc. We also saw the dismantling of many of
the institutions built on these grand visions. Have today’s leaders given up on
grand visions?
Is narrow self-interest and small scaled-down retraction now the trend? If so,
what are the implications of this? Is this ‘realpolitik’ or just the politics of
disillusionment?

And of course, papers concerning all questions relevant to civilizational studies are also
welcome! These could include:
•
•
•

Studies of great civilizationalists, e.g., Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Quigley, etc.
Analyses of particular civilizations and/or comparative studies of civilizations.
Decline and progress of civilizations.
----

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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More than a half century has passed since this society commenced its studies. How may
we measure the changes in this discipline? As I have tried to show, one way is through
such indicia as these Calls for Papers and suggested themes, all intended to guide
scholarly research.
Is there a uniting golden thread of continuity in these writings, these broad aims and
goals? When we look at the half century of work, do we find there a sense of coherence
and direction, a visible trend or trends, pattern and meaning, advancement? Perhaps.
But if we inquire as to the value of the body of scholarship that the men and women
who have analyzed and written on comparative civilizations over the period since 1961
have produced, and if we ask whether there is a future bursting with opportunities for
research in comparative civilizations, the response to both queries must be clear,
positive and unequivocal: Yes, without a doubt.
See you at Monmouth University this summer!
Joseph Drew
Editor-in-Chief
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Southeast Asian Identities: the Case of Cambodia
J. Randall Groves

JohnGroves@ferris.edu
This paper is one of a series of studies on cultural identity and world civilizations. The
focus of most of these studies has been on the civilizations of India, China and the West.
These civilizations are arguably the dominant cultural foci in the world, the centers of
cultural gravity. Adjacent to these dominant or “core” civilizations are cultures such as
the Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese which orbit the Chinese core, and the cultures of
Southeast Asia, such as those of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia,
which orbit the Indian core. The rough pattern in both cases is of the peripheral cultures
being swept up in the expansion of a powerful set of narratives out of the core and into
previously unoccupied narrative space. In this paper I focus on Cambodian identity and
explore how the cultural interaction between core and periphery functions to produce
the Khmer cultural identities that waxed and waned in Cambodia over the centuries.
The concept of identity used in this paper is not essentialist. Studies of identity are not
quests for essences. They are exercises in the narrative organization of facts about the
thing identified. These facts may not present a consistent or even single identity.
Identities are constructed retroactively, narrated into existence. As I have shown
elsewhere, identities are like “narrative centers of gravity,” a term I borrowed from
Daniel Dennett. Dennett applied the concept to the self, but it is equally applicable to
various kinds of identities, historical biography, nations and civilizations.
Cambodian identity sits in a cultural space between China and India, which constitute
cultural centers of gravity pulling Cambodia into their cultural orbits and their identities.
China and India are two culture generating goliaths that overwhelmed nearby cultures,
especially if those cultures had not already advanced far beyond shamanism and
animism into narrative myth. This was the case with Southeast Asia. Before Southeast
Asia had a chance to develop its own set of narratives, Indian narratives stepped into the
void and were never dislodged once there. As Southeast Asia grew out of Shamanism
and animism and began “narrativising” their worldview, they found a world already
narrativised nearby in India. With such a complex and complete set of narratives at
hand, Southeast Asia simply adopted the Indian narratives of Hinduism and Buddhism.
This was true of the Khmer people of Cambodia. Indic culture connected Cambodia to
the Vedic worldview and thus to the Indo-European mythic complex. This influence
indicates that Cambodia has a set of narratives in common with not only India, but also
with the Mediterranean and European cultural worlds. In spite of the exoticism, from a
Western point of view, of the wondrous artistic achievement of the civilization of
Angkor, the mentality of Cambodia has very deep connections with large parts of the
rest of the world.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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Cambodian identity has several layers. It consists of an ancient shamanism, animism
and ancestor worship. Cambodian culture was about to move to the stage of narrative
myth but was stopped short by the introduction of Indic ideas. Instead of indigenous
ideas developing a cultural narrative of their own telos, they are instead merged into
externally introduced narratives. Burial mounds become Buddhist stupas, “and the tree
spirits, blithely integrated into Buddhist observance, turned into Sotapan, followers of
the Buddhist teaching who were set on to the path of salvation.” These Indic ideas with
the remnants of earlier animism tagging along provide the foundation for Southeast
Asian thinking.
The Cambodian civilization of Angkor, then, has deep connections in mythic history
because of its adoption of Indic culture. But a civilization like the Cambodian is more
than a simple extension of Indic culture. It borrows Indian narratives, to be sure, but
they are instantiated into the Cambodian context in a unique fashion. Cambodian
identity comes partly from the specific area of Angkor, around contemporary Siem
Reap, where the rhythms of the Tonle Sap river produce an enormous bounty. This
bounty produced the economic surplus to finance the building of the monuments of
Angkor. The economy of the Mekong not only enables monument and state building,
daily life follows the rhythms of the Mekong river with contributions from the larger
Indian ocean context of monsoon-structured world trade.
There is also the larger geographic identity of connectedness with all of the Mekong
River regions, Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand, Burma. At this level, cultural exchange
between core and periphery can piggy-back on the river trade of the Mekong. The next
level of connectedness and therefore identity, comes from a larger framework that
includes Indonesia, the Indian Ocean trade and cultural network, which overlaps with
the area one would call “Indic,” but one which had economic and cultural intercourse
with Islam, which was an important presence in the Indian Ocean.
We will therefore proceed with a conception of Cambodian identity that is multi-layered
and historical. We will conceive of Cambodian identity as connected to
1) Its shamanistic and animistic pre-history,
2) Its borrowing of Indic culture, which connects Vedic, Hindu and Buddhist (and
therefore Vedic) myth and religion with the previous animism and structures
narrative framework as indelibly Indic,
3) The rhythms of the Mekong River as provided by the periodic reversal of the
flow of the Mekong tributary, the Tonle Sap river, into the Tonle Sap Lake,
4) The economic rhythms of Indian Ocean trade and its monsoons that bring from
all over the world.
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5) A political identity marked by early conflict with its local neighbors, the Chams
and especially the “Tiger and the Crocodile,” Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam
respectively, and, more recently, with distant but internationally active European
powers, particularly France and the United States,
6) Maoist philosophy and its descent into the political terror of the Khmer Rouge,
7) Chinese influence, and lastly,
8) Key personalities: Suryavarman, Jayavarman, Sihanouk and Pol Pot.
This paper will focus more on the dominant Indic aspect of Cambodia and its
connection to its geographic reality, but China has played a significant role in Southeast
Asia as well. J.D. Legge writes: “That influence was felt directly through almost a
thousand years of Chinese rule in Viet Nam, but its effect was felt beyond that. Chinese
trade was carried on throughout the region as a whole, and Chinese political dealings
with Southeast Asian kingdoms extended as far afield as the Indonesian archipelago.”
China has also played an important role in the recollection of Cambodian cultural
memory, since many of the written sources come from China. The most important
account is probably that of Zhou Daguan, with his Record of Cambodia: The Land and
its People.
All this is not to underestimate all the small things that make up Cambodian identity,
which may be, collectively, as influential on daily life as those listed above. One
cannot, for example, travel to Southeast Asia without being impressed with the
abundance and quality of fruit. Henri Mouhot, the first European to see Angkor Wat,
wrote in his diary that,
“The fruit here is exquisite, particularly the mango, the mangusteen, the pineapple, so fragrant and melting in the mouth, and what is superior to anything I
ever imagined or tasted, the famous ‘durian,’ which justly merits the title of king
of fruits. But to enjoy it thoroughly one must have time to overcome the disgust
at first inspired by its smell, which is so strong that I could not stay in the same
place with it.”
These layers constitute the identity of Cambodia, from the lived reality of the taste of
local fruits to geographic location, to socio-economic reality, to folk tales, to borrowed
and altered Indic high culture to important personalities. Civilizations are constructed
retroactively in an act of narration. Civilizational identities are therefore simply
interpretations of a set of facts about the civilization for one purpose or another. These
groups of facts can be organized in many ways, depending upon one’s purpose. The
purpose of the organization given above is to produce a provisional characterization of
Cambodian identity. The usefulness of this conception is that it enables us to compare it
with other civilizational identities, which, in turn, helps us understand both human
mentality in general and the differences between sets of cultural mentalities.
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When one surveys Cambodian history, one is inevitably drawn to its high point, the
civilization of Angkor. But Cambodian identity from a civilizational perspective is not
exhausted by a discussion of Angkor. I will also put this past civilization into
perspective with the history of Cambodia up to the present, with a particular emphasis
on the relatively recent (by historical standards) horror of the Killing Fields of the
Khmer Rouge. In broad outline we speak of Pre-Angkor Civilization, Angkor
Civilization, Post-Angkor Cambodia, the French Protectorate, the Sihanouk era, the
Khmer Rouge Era and the Post-Communist era to the present.
Pre-Angkorian society was rice-based, but not yet the centralized hydraulic society with
a large work force and bureaucracy that Angkor was to become. The two kings most
responsible for Cambodia’s cultural greatness in the Angkor period were Suryavarman
II (1113-1150), who built Angkor Wat, and Jayavarman VII (1181-1218), who built the
Bayon of Angkor Thom, although there were several who contributed to the artistic
heritage of Angkor to a lesser degree.
Angkorian civilization did not last long after Jayavarman VII, so the effort to produce
these monuments may have exhausted the civilization, although it may have been just a
matter or relative weakness with regard to the invaders, the Chams and later, the Thais,
who conquered Angkor. Angkor did not officially end until Ponha Yat abandoned
Angkor and moved the capital to Phnom Penh, but the empire was never the same after
Jayavarman VII, the last king to build grand monuments.
When Angkor declined, it meant the loss of the hydraulic, bureaucratic and monumental
society that Angkor had been. Post-Angkor society had a different form than Angkor
society. John Tully writes, “it seems that a different kind of social and economic
system had supplanted the old model.” The capital was moved from Angkor to the
Quatre Bras region, the monument building ceased and the state-directed public works
fell into decline. By the mid-17th century, Angkor Thom was deserted and the jungle
overgrew most of the monuments of the Angkor era. This era is also characterized by
the loss of land to the Thais, including Siem Reap itself, and Cambodia was buffeted on
all sides by stronger rivals.
It is in the 1850s that the French explorer Henri Mouhot becomes the first European to
see Angkor Wat. Local rivals of the Khmers eventually give way to the European
encroachment into Cambodia, and France establishes a Protectorate in 1867, which lasts
until 1946. Cambodia is granted independence in 1953, at which time it becomes a
kingdom under King Norodom Sihanouk. The Khmer Rouge government rules from
1975-9, and nearly destroys the country with a murderousness borne of ideological
fervor. The Khmer Rouge gives way to a conquering Vietnamese army in 1979 and in
1993 elections bring a Cambodian government to power.
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The subsequent history of Cambodia is marked by misrule and corruption with most of
the perpetrators of the killing fields left unpunished. This history of early greatness
followed by weakness and then horror marks the trajectory of Cambodian history.
Given the amount of time between greatness and horror, there is little connection
between the two societies, which were completely different.
Angkor was animated by the culture of India, Hinduism and Buddhism, while the
Khmer Rouge was the perverse result of a country caught between superpowers, with a
history of colonialism, and in the grip of a strict application of the ideology of Marx,
Lenin and Mao, which was learned in France by some advanced students from
Cambodia. So there was no causal connection between the greatness and the horror,
simply a connection in place and memory. But this connection in place and especially
memory allows us to consider them together, to narrate, as the Cambodians themselves
have done, a connection between Angkor and the present.
Finally, there are the personalities. Suryavarman II, Jayavarman VII, Sihanouk and Pol
Pot are by a wide consensus the most important personalities in Cambodian history.
Suryavarman was the leader who built Angkor Wat, a Hindu temple dedicated to
Vishnu. Jayavarman had the Bayon built. Those accomplishments alone would
establish their importance in Cambodian history, but they did much more, not only
culturally but militarily.
Sihanouk is a larger than life figure in Cambodian politics after the French Protectorate.
Whatever one thinks of Sihanouk and his political maneuvering, there is no doubt that
he was the central figure between the Protectorate and the Khmer Rouge era. And then
there is Pol Pot, a man who will go down in history as the leader of one of the worst
regimes in world history.
Angkor civilization left an artistic legacy that counts as one of the greatest achievements
in world history, an achievement any people would wish to claim as their own. The fall
of such a civilization can only be termed a tragedy in such a people’s understanding.
Cambodia never again reached the level of cultural accomplishment or social stability,
and this long-term instability made it open to the cataclysm of the Khmer Rouge.
Cambodian history thus leaves us with two tragedies. The fall of Angkor was the first
tragedy, but it was destined to be outdone by the second, the tragedy of the killing
fields.
The characterization of Cambodian history as tragic is not new. David Chandler gave
his account of Cambodian history since 1945 the title, “The Tragedy of Cambodian
History.” Another way to think of Cambodian history is that it enters world history
twice, once in greatness, once in destruction. Cambodian history has a Janus face. It
presents both artistic genius and maniacal evil. Neither, of course, is true of Cambodia
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today, which merely wallows in a permanent state of corruption and need for
international assistance.
Cambodian identity is thus a narrated composite of historical memory and socioeconomic and geographical influence. But why look at Cambodia this way? What does
it gain for us? Comparative Civilizationists see the world differently than area
specialists. For area specialists the goal is to arrive at a picture of their particular area in
all its diversity and uniqueness. For comparativists, any picture of a given area must be
drawn in terms of how it fits with the rest of the world and over the course of its history.
We incorporate into our comparison the historical dimension, changes in the world’s
civilizations over time. The trick is, of course, doing this without losing the accuracy
and sophistication of area studies.
The two approaches give us different kinds of methodology, and ultimately, different
ontologies. Certain properties of civilization emerge only in comparative context. The
specialist is most attuned to the diversity of an identity, while the comparativist is more
interested in the balance of similarities and differences between a civilization and all
other civilizations. This description of this balance gives us a set of properties that is
beyond the purview of the specialist. These are the properties that concern the
comparative civilizationist.
The first thing to note is that area specialists often disagree. When this happens, the
comparativists learn the arguments of both sides and decide for themselves which is
more convincing. Even better, however, is keeping as many of the various perspectives
in play as possible, especially since comparativists should temper their adjudications of
arguments in proportion to their own mastery of the given area. But how does one carry
on such a balancing act? A civilizationist cannot paper over the differences among area
specialists. When we appropriate the work of area specialists for our purposes it is
important for us to carefully represent the dialectics of disagreement. Interestingly, this
dialectic often proves more valuable than a monolithic account anyway.
From the historical perspective, Angkor looms as the most important of the societies
that have inhabited the area of Cambodia. What is Angkorian identity in the context of
Cambodian civilization? Angkorian identity is ultimately the collection of true
statements one can make about the civilization of Angkor. What do we know about
Angkorian civilization? Quite a lot, really, but there is much that we “know” that is
contested, and what is contested lies right at the heart of what is meant by Angkorian
Civilization.
The first question that arose in the early literature on Southeast Asia relevant to
comparativists was the extent of indigenous and external contributions to the culture of
the area. George Coedès’ early work set the stage for this argument with his claim that
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the Angkor Civilization of Cambodia was an extension of a larger “Indic” civilization
centered in India. He downplayed the indigenous contribution.
The second question concerns the proper division of study. Should we speak of
Angkorian Civilization? Cambodian Civilization? Mekong Civilization? Southeast
Asian Civilization? Indic Civilization? This question is related to the first. My answer
to this question is to combine these influences into an overall historical identity. Which
part of this identity we refer to will depend on the questions we ask of it.
Charles Higham, taking issue with Coedès on the first question, argues that the answer
to the second should be Angkor Civilization, thus asserting the uniqueness of Angkor
Civilization not only as part of Asia or Southeast Asia, but within the Mekong Valley.
Discussing the tendency to ignore the indigenous Cambodian contribution to the
monuments of Angkor, Higham writes, “Many uninformed guesses were subsequently
offered as to the nature of the monuments and their origins, virtually none of which
gave credit to the Cambodian people.”
Higham is an archaeologist who is less interested in the art and religion than in an
accurate description of the archaeological evidence, which he does rather well. It is not
surprising that these artifacts give a more unique picture of Angkor than we get from an
analysis of its art and religion. Higham makes a point of emphasizing rice cultivation as
key to Angkor civilization. He is convincing in arguing that rice production governed
the everyday forms of life in large parts of Cambodia. But the parameters of rice
production and consumption are dependent on the Mekong’s ecological geography,
which makes rice production so significant.
Many parts of India were equally dependent on rice, however, so the comparativist is
less interested in this aspect of Cambodian life. Higham is opposed to the idea that
Angkor, the civilization of Cambodia responsible for the temple complexes in Siem
Reap, is best characterized as an Indic civilization or part of a larger Indic civilization.
He wishes to understand Southeast Asia on its own terms rather than in terms of its
relation to the culture of India. This is a reasonable position in its own context, but it is
less useful for determining Angkor’s and later, Cambodia’s identity.
Higham is surely correct that Angkor is unique in many ways, but he misses much of
what there is to say about Angkorian Civilization at the level of comparative civilization
because he resists what he regards as an ”outsider” perspective. And this is as befits an
archaeologist. For comparative purposes, however, Higham spends too little time on
the stories portrayed on the walls of Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom for the
comparativist because this is where we see the importance of Indic mythology.
It is the stories on the walls of the Angkor monuments, particularly Angor Wat and
Angkor Thom, that account for the deep connection between India and Angkor.
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Angkorian culture reached a pinnacle of greatness rarely matched before the modern
era, but the essence of that greatness was more “Cambodian” to Higham than it was to
that great interpreter of Southeast Asia, George Coedès, who emphasized the
Indianization of Southeast Asia.
In support of Coedès’ interpretation, the stories of the Ramayana and other Indian texts
we find on the walls of Angkor Wat tell us a great deal about Angkor. Notice that every
god, demon, bodhisattva or monster mentioned or portrayed on the walls of the various
Angkorian temples is Hindu or Buddhist. A large percentage of the inscriptions are in
Sanskrit. While they do exist, there are very few artifacts that indicate a purely preHindu/Buddhist narrative, idea or image. There is thus ample evidence for the Indic
interpretation of Angkor.
Narratives that have been rationalized over the centuries tend to be more appealing than
non-rationalized narratives, and so this put native narratives at a competitive
disadvantage with Indic narratives. The abstraction achieved by the rationalization of
language is equally important. If we consider the linguistic character of Mon-Khmer,
but also Tai and Cham, we find a paucity of abstract terminology. “Khmer is a
remarkably concrete and down-to-earth language, and thus poor in abstract terms, which
it has been constrained to borrow from Indian languages.”
The import of Indian abstract terms into Khmer brought with it Indian myth,
philosophy, art and religion at the cultural moment when Southeast Asia moved beyond
shamanism into myth and religion. Once these abstract terms were incorporated,
Southeast Asia could borrow the mythic narratives of India, and we see these Indic
narratives on the walls of Angkor Wat. A quick glance at the stories displayed on the
walls of Angkor Wat, which I have inspected personally, makes a strong case. Here is a
list of the stories on the walls of Angkor Wat:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Battle of Kurukshetra (Mahabarata)
The Battle of Lanka (Ramayana)
Army of King Suryavarman II
Judgment of Yama
Churning of the Ocean Milk
Victory of Vishnu over the Demons
Victory of Krishna over Bana
Battle of Gods and Demons
Two scenes from the Ramayana

All these narratives are Hindu except those portraying the army of Suryavarman, which
was just a glorification of the king. This exception to the thoroughly Indic nature of the
temples, the descriptions or portrayals of battles of Angkorian kings, particularly against
the Chams and Thais, is hardly a clear exception. These inscriptions and pictorials are
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sometimes right next to Indic narratives; I believe in an attempt to ennoble them and
provide connectivity between Cambodian and Indian religious and mythic culture.
We also know that Angkorian crowning rituals were a centerpiece of an Indic
legitimation process for the kingly order. Further, the Chams and Thais were
themselves carriers of Indic civilization, so the variation in the rule of the particular
groups did not change the mythico-religious background. Critics of the Indic thesis,
such as Higham, argue that Indic culture was brought in by elites for their own purposes
rather than being a society-wide adoption of Indic culture. While this may have been
true in the beginning, Indic culture eventually becomes the dominant narrative set of
Cambodian culture among all social classes, a dominance that remains to this day in
spite of the near civilization-ending actions of the Khmer Rouge. To summarize just
how much influence India had upon the civilization of Cambodia, let’s consider
Michael D. Coe’s list of what Indianization brought to the region:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Hindu religion, its mythology and cosmology, its ritual and the cults of
Shiva and Vishnu
The Sanskrit language
Buddhism
The Indic (Brahmi) writing system, stone inscriptions and palm-leaf books
The Hindu Temple Complex, and an architectural tradition of brick and/or stone
based upon Gupta prototypes
Statuary representing gods, kings and the Buddha
Cremation burial
Rectilinear town and city plans
Artificial water systems, including rectangular reservoirs and canal systems
Wheel-made pottery

This is a not-insignificant list. In fact, it is testament to the profound influence of India
on Cambodia. Every single god, goddess, demon, bodhisattva and so on that we see on
the walls of Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom is a Hindu or Buddhist character. The
architectural styles are Indic. We also see it in the worldly practices such as water
systems and town plans. Even non-cultural practices were borrowed, such as water
control, writing and burial.
The same is true of the ruins of Burma, Laos, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Viet
Nam, with its closer proximity to the other narrative behemoth, China. As we saw
above, the only other people portrayed at Angkor Wat or Angkor Thom were the king
and soldiers fighting battles. So not only were the architectural and sculptural styles
derived from Indian predecessors, so were many secular practices.
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While we have emphasized Cambodia’s cultural connection to India, we should not
think that these religions develop unchanged in the Southeast Asian context. The
Hinduisms and Buddhisms that took hold in Southeast Asia are genetically related to the
Hinduism and Buddhism of India, but there are doctrinal, social and artistic differences
between Angkorian and Indian culture.
The pre-Angkor adoption of the Hindu religion seems to have acquired Hindu myth
more than Hindu social arrangements. Nor did it adopt the Indian practice of coinage—
Cambodia remained a barter economy until the coming of the French. So although
Angkor absorbed the myth of India, its social structure and its economy were its own.
Although it is far too simple, it is tempting to say that Southeast Asia is India without
caste. “A kind of Brahmanism without India’s strict rules of caste and society,
flourished in some of the Indian colonies, and Hindu deities supply the iconography for
a good deal of Southeast Asian art.”
The caste system, so central to Hinduism in India, was a non-factor in Southeast Asia.
Yes, the Brahmins claimed and received special status; indeed, the origin story of
Angkor concerns a Brahmin from India marrying a Khmer princess. But Khmer society
was not organized into the four castes. One can argue without too much exaggeration
that Hinduism without caste is quite a different Hinduism.
On the other hand, it is testament to the power of Indian religious and cultural ideas that
they were so influential in spite of being separated from their connection to caste. The
reason caste did not move out of India is that caste in India was certainly more a result
of contingent historical events -- like the Indo-European conquest of the Indian
subcontinent and the attempt to maintain status distinctions after assimilation -- than it
was a result of a theological rejection of Indian social practices. Indic culture entered
Southeast Asia through elites borrowing Indic culture for the legitimation of elite rule
rather than as a result of colonization or mass religious conversion.
Mary Somers Heidhues writes, “This reception of Indian influences is all the more
remarkable when it is realized that there was no known colonization of the area.” And
De Casparis and Mabbett write, “it is now generally thought that the influence of Indian
civilization, including religion, should mainly be attributed to endeavors by some
Southeast Asian elites to assimilate important elements of Indian culture.” This
Hinduism without caste brought in by elites is distinctive of Southeast Asia and thus an
important component of Cambodian identity.
It is important to note that Khmer appropriation of Hindu mythology was selective. The
Churning of the Ocean Milk plays a prominent role in Angkorian myth, and several
stories from the Ramayana are featured. This subset of Hindu stories gives Cambodian
mythology much of its content. Given this overlap in narrative content, one could argue

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

23

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 70 [2014], No. 70, Art. 15

Comparative Civilizations Review

19

that we should jettison our concept of India altogether when we study the culture of
South and Southeast Asia.
The borders of “Indica” are much wider than any political border that characterized any
Indian state. Khmer temple styles, although unique in important ways, are continuous
with Hindu and Buddhist temples in India and elsewhere in the Indic world. If we
compare temples from India, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia, we see
overwhelming similarities. All are based on the myth of Mount Meru. All have the
shapes that ultimately derive from the Buddhist stupa or the Hindu temple or a
combination of the two.
This is not surprising since the same artists sometimes worked on both Hindu and
Buddhist temples. All have many stylistic similarities linked to deeper meanings of the
architecture. This creates difficulties in accurately identifying the referents of temple
sculpture. Specialists sometimes determine whether a temple is dedicated to a particular
god by the direction the temple faces. Facing east, for example, may indicate the prime
god of worship at a given temple. But there are many exceptions, so other evidence is
used. The results are often inconclusive as we see even in the case of the famous
Bayon.
The Bayon has many interpretations and these vary to such an extent that specialists
often just accept a certain Hindu/Buddhist indeterminacy regarding the face towers of
Bayon. But this ambiguity, Coedès argues, is actually reflective of the syncretic nature
of Angkor myth. The faces on the Bayon towers, so utterly iconic, are not
representationally singular; they are available equally to the Buddhist, Mahayana or
Theravada; Hindu; Vaishnaivite; or Shiite.
It is probably true that the builders did have just one interpretation in mind, but as the
years have gone by and the faces were embraced by several sects with their own
substitute referent for the image, the faces themselves lost anything like a definite
referent. But this indeterminacy of interpretation gives us yet another hint of the
character of Angkor. Angkorian culture is syncretic. When Hinduism and Buddhism
enter Southeast Asia the two religions are not always kept separate. A monument like
the Bayon of Angkor Thom has relief sculpture from both Hindu and Buddhist
traditions. It also mixes the Hindu sects, at one point even worshipping the combined
Shiva and Vishnu as a different god, Harihara.
This combining of different sects even extends to the borrowing of sculptural
techniques. The bronzes of Angkor include one of the Buddhist Maitreya with extra
arms, like a Hindu god. There is no Indian scriptural basis for the extra arms; it is an
artistic innovation by Cambodian artists who probably worked on bronzes of both
religions. Angkor civilization’s synthesizing nature combined notions from both
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religions to cross their representation. Cambodia also let Chinese culture influence their
bronzes.
“There should be no hesitation in making the case, for instance, that the shift in
Cambodia (and Thailand) from Buddhist images in which only the right hand performs
a significant gesture to those in which the two hands have equal importance was directly
due to Chinese influence.” Cambodia and Southeast Asia generally was subject to a
Buddhist “pincer movement” as one strain, typically Theravada, arrived from India via
Sri Lanka and Burma, as well as a southern maritime route via Indonesia, and another,
primarily Mahayana, arrived via China, which, in turn received its Buddhism via the
Silk Road, where it picked up Greek and Persian influence among other influences.
“Thus the two jaws of a giant pincer meet in this area (Southeast Asia).”
A civilization is more, however, than the sum of its cultural narratives and symbols. It
is also reflective of the geography it inhabits, which constitutes the third layer of
identity listed above. The Mekong river is so productive that it would be surprising if it
did not produce some significant high culture. Civilizations require a rather significant
surplus, and the Mekong and the Tonle Sap provide it.
The Tonle Sap Lake is the most productive lake in the world, even out-producing the
North Sea. It was probably inevitable that some monarch would turn to monumental
architecture with such a surplus available to those who could gain control of it; it was
just a matter of which Mekong river kings would spend his riches on doing so. This is
not to say that there is no variation in Southeast Asian climate and ecology. Higham’s
account in his magisterial Early Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia makes it clear that
there was significant variation across Southeast Asia. This variation, however, does not
undermine the claim that the Mekong and especially the Tonle Sap Lake area yielded a
surplus that could be had by whoever was the strongest at any given moment in
Southeast Asia.
Higham widens the focus a bit when he focuses on three rivers, the Mekong, the Red
River, and Chao Phraya instead of the single river, the Mekong, which is at the core of
my thesis. By including the two other rivers Higham takes in a wider area, Southeast
Asia as a whole rather than just Cambodia, and there is surely value in conceiving of the
three rivers as a set. However, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake and its regular and
predictable annual flooding make its surplus greater than that produced by the other two
rivers, and thus Cambodia was most likely to end up with the greatest monumental
architecture.
My perspective toward Angkor Civilization is that it is best seen as the highpoint of the
Indic civilization of the people living around the Mekong River, but with wider
connections to the Indian ocean and its monsoon rhythms. Mekong Civilization is
culturally Indic, which means the most of its governing narratives are borrowed from
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India. While Mekong Civilization has its own economic, political and social logic, a
result of the ecological conditions along the Mekong, its religion, art and architecture
are Indic.
The Mekong River provides the daily rhythm of life in Cambodia while India provides
the cultural superstructure. It is the combination of this daily rhythm with Indic culture
that produces what we now call the civilization of Angkor. The Mekong river was the
central organizing principle of Southeast Asia the way the Tigris-Euphrates was in the
Middle East, the Yangtze and Yellow rivers in China, and the Ganges and Indus rivers
were in India. Several groups at different points in history dominated the area fed
(literally) by the river and the Tonle Sap lake.
Looking at the civilization of Angkor as a stage in Mekong Civilization is the same sort
of geographical approach Braudel used so well on the Mediterranean and that many
scholars have used on the Atlantic Ocean and the Silk Road. Trade routes and especially
rivers are particularly good organizers of civilizations. The Mekong River provides the
local geography of Southeast Asian culture, but it is the yet wider context of Indian
Ocean trade that is the broadest context relevant to understanding Cambodian identity.
Mekong culture only becomes complete with reference to the larger geographical
context of the Indian Ocean. The Mekong “pulse” is, of course, related to the
interaction between the Mekong River and the Indian Ocean, primarily through the
rhythm of the monsoon.
Because of this wider framework, we can get a better sense of the cultural identity of
Indic civilization by looking at Borobudur/Prabanam, Ayutthaya, Bagan and Angkor
Wat/Angkor Thom temple complexes. These four temple complexes are testament to
the viability of the concept of an “Indic” civilization stretching from India proper to
Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, southern Viet Nam and Indonesia. Interestingly, Indian
culture traveled as much, if not more, by sea than it did by land. It is most likely that
Indic culture followed the paths created by the Indian Ocean traders. In fact, the
Indonesian complex containing Borobudur and Prabanam in Indonesia, which of
necessity came by sea, was actually 300 years earlier than the Angkor complex.
A key aspect of Indic civilization in Cambodia is the (sometimes not-so-peaceful) coexistence of Hindu and Buddhist artistic and religious traditions. Hindu and Buddhist
temples were often being built in the same area and around the same time. Borobudur, a
Buddhist temple complex and Prabanam, a Hindu complex were both built within a few
miles of each other in the 9th century, Prabanam being a Hindu response to the Buddhist
Borobudur. The same is true of the Cambodian complexes of Angkor Wat, a Hindu
temple complex, and Angkor Thom, a Buddhist work, although they were a bit further
apart in time.
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The locations of Borobudur, Ayutthaya, Bagan and Angkor Wat give us a larger
geographical framework, the Indian Ocean trade network, within which to understand
Angkorian civilization. Once we see Indic civilization layered over four different
cultures we become clearer about what it means to be Indic. It also enables us to see
how the variations between the four locations reflect the range of Indic expression. The
fact that Angkor was one of several states over a large area that had Indic (Hindu or
Buddhist) artistic traditions is probably the most important fact about it for the
comparative civilizationist.
So should we speak of Angkorian Civilization? Cambodian Civilization? Mekong
Civilization? Southeast Asian Civilization? Indic Civilization? Do any of these have
more reality than others? When it comes to this sort of question, it is best to go with
operationalism. We use the term that is most useful for us given the questions we are
asking. If we are looking at Angkor in all its uniqueness, then Angkorian Civilization
works best. If we are interested in the breadth of artistic styles and religious motifs,
then Indic Civilization would be better. If we take a larger geographical view, a
compelling perspective is the one that organizes Southeast Asia around the Mekong
River and the Indian Ocean.
If we add in the various political groups that dominated the Mekong area at one time or
another, we get a picture of a single contested and very productive land. The Khmer,
Thais, Laotians, Chams and Vietnamese all had turns dominating the region. The fall
and disappearance of Angkor civilization came with the rise of its rivals, the Thais,
Chams and Vietnamese. From this perspective Angkor Civilization becomes one phase
of a series of phases of emergent high civilization. Angkor is generally considered to be
the greatest of the various political entities to dominate the Mekong, but it was not the
only one.
Throughout Southeast Asian history the Mekong River is the primary engine of trade
and commerce for Cambodia, Viet Nam, Laos and Thailand. The Mekong’s source is in
China, which makes great use of the river. As far back as the pre-Angkor period we see
that the Mekong Delta facilitated the trade between the interior of Southeast Asia and
Indonesia (Java) and South Asia, thus connecting Angkor to the whole of world trade.
The Mekong is the economic beating heart of Southeast Asia.
But civilizations exist in time, and Cambodia goes through significant changes in the
modern era. It is with this fact in mind that I consider the meaning of Angkor, the
Mekong and Indian ocean trade in the context of later Cambodian history as well as the
tragedy of Cambodia’s Year Zero. With the fall of Angkor we have a period of disunity
and subordination to the other Mekong regional powers until the French arrive. The
colonial period, in turn, gave way to the Kingdom and eventually the cataclysm of the
Year Zero, the rule of the Khmer Rouge that issued in the killing fields.
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The question of the connection of the Khmer Rouge to the earlier history of Cambodia
is one of cultural rejection and civilizational suicide. The cultural losses of the Year
Zero were profound. The Cambodian version of the Chinese cultural revolution was
just as, if not more, horrific than the original Chinese version. Cambodia lost a
significant percentage of its population while attempting to rid the country of its
“decadent” prior culture, which meant the loss of most of its elites and intellectuals.
Ideologically, the rise of the Khmer Rouge marks the introduction of Chinese
communist ideas that, in turn, originate in the Marxist thought of the West. One can say
without exaggeration that this borrowing was a disaster. While the earlier incorporation
of Indic culture gave rise to great cultural accomplishments, the introduction of Western
ideas in the form of Marxism proved horrific. This is not to elevate India or denigrate
the West. It is simply to note that Cambodia ended up with one of the more pernicious
Western ideologies and that the result was terrible.
For contemporary Khmers, the overwhelming historical fact was the rule of the Khmer
Rouge. The Khmer Rouge is responsible for two million deaths. The Khmer Rouge
came into power five years after the 1970 coup that deposed Sihanouk. Lon Nol, the
leader who took over after Sihanouk, never stabilized the country and faced a
determined Khmer Rouge insurgency. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge take Phnom Penh and
begin the systematic destruction of the country in the name of Maoist re-education.
Decimating the educated and moneyed classes, forced emptying of the cities for the
sake of an ideal rural purity, wrecking the economy by, among other things, eliminating
money and wrecking agriculture with reckless disregard of agricultural science, the
country is quickly reduced to a shell of its former self.
Pol Pot also suppressed religion, particularly Buddhism and Catholicism, and engaged
in ethnic cleansing. Rarely in human history has a culture tried to remake itself so
quickly and with such disregard for the pain and suffering caused. Countless books and
films have addressed the horrors of that time, and the rule of the Khmer Rouge ranks as
one of the worst periods of governance in world history. Nearly every single
Cambodian knows of family members and friends killed, tortured or starved by the
Khmer Rouge. Such collective memories make a permanent mark on the psyche of a
nation.
The theme of Cambodian civilization can then be summed up with two words:
Greatness and Horror. It is a compelling irony that the same area of the world can reach
the heights of civilization and at a different time, descend into a horrific episode of
genocidal destruction followed by endemic corruption. Cambodia was not the first
country to descend from the heights of civilization to the depths of genocide--Germany
is just one example that this has happened more than once, but we can hope it is the last.
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The combination of Cambodia’s geographical predicament with the cultural connections
it entails along with its history of greatness and tragedy gives Cambodia a very unique
identity. It is Angkor Wat and Hinduism. It is Angkor Thom and Buddhism. But it is
Tuol Sleng and stacks of skulls too. Cambodia is an Indic culture that picks and
chooses what parts of Indian culture it will adopt, but it is mostly Indian culture that it
adopts. Cambodia is subject to the monsoons of the Indian Ocean and the annual
reversal of the flow of the Mekong. Cambodian economics are the economics of the
Tonle Sap lake, the Mekong River and the Indian Ocean. This is Cambodia big and
small, beautiful and horrific with a greatness that was sullied by the killing fields, but
never eliminated. The temples of Angkor remain the biggest attraction in Cambodia, as
they should, but the suffering and death that took place in that beautiful realm will
always tarnish the story of Cambodian civilization.
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Civilizations: Which Constitutes Africa’s Most Effective Choice?
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Introduction
We tend to believe that civilizations are positive and that what is civilized is not coarse
or pedestrian. Civilizations empower and ennoble human beings, because a civilized
social or political environment is a reflection of an enlightened mind. Civilizations can
be seen as higher levels of a harmonized state of affairs (Targowski, A. 2009: 85-89).
However, if there is any drama to be demonstrated at the dawn of the 21st century, it is
the absence of any meaningful transformation of the world to a higher level of
civilization than was the case in the 20th century. This is particularly so with respect to
the underdevelopment into which many Third World states have fallen.
Civilizations are judged by their capacities to create enduring legacies from which other
societies can learn to elevate themselves. In medieval Europe, divine rule reduced the
rights of citizenship to a subservient status. The words of the ruler constituted
unquestioned law; opinions of citizens were immaterial, and decisions of the ruler were
arbitrary and capricious while the liberties and rights of the citizens were crushed
beneath the heel of the ruler’s ambitions.
But European civilization travelled a long distance as it has evolved into the current
democratic culture where citizens reign supreme. Today, the state occupies its loftier
space at the behest of the citizenry, and rulers arise from the conciliatory consensus of
the citizenry. Tyranny is in retreat as European states inch toward democratization.
Why did some civilizations, such as that of Egypt, assume specific qualities and develop
as they did? What are the inherent characteristics that made them evolve and flourish
into awe-inspiring civilizations? The answers to these questions may be found in the
character and historical experiences of the regions within which specific civilizations
arose. The challenge for scholars is to craft methodological and theoretical approaches
that are free from cultural biases and provincial prejudices.
Even primitive societies are not created in a void. They began by creating means for
securing existence and finding effective ways to solve problems. And in the process of
solving challenges, societies create differentiation of labor, consistent rules, routinized
approaches to conflict resolution, and institutions of varying capacities to ensure their
continuity. Scholars have argued these are important characteristics in the stages of
civilizations.
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Theorists of political development take their cue from Aristotle. They believe in the
organic metaphor of the stages of civilizations. They argue that civilizations begin with
conception and progress to birth, growth, and maturity, and they then reach a terminal
decay. Scholars group civilizations according to the cultural, political, linguistic, and
aesthetic legacies that they mustered in their time (Toynbee, 1946; Quigley, 1979;
Sorokin 1959; Modelski, G. 1972). The organic metaphor process is clearly described
by Quigley as involving seven phases of civilization: these he characterizes as mixture,
gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay and invasion (Quigley, C.,
1979: 146). Historians and sociologists also subscribe to the organic metaphor analogy.
Targowski identifies eight civilizations, with 16 subcategories. These parallel those
identified by Quigley, but Targowski is a globalist who shares the idealist school’s
temperament. He counts on human “wisdom” assisted by the skillful manipulation of
information technology to generate endless possibilities for a peaceful global
civilization. This article will defer the definition of civilization in favor of an analytical
approach that focuses on the behavior of societies as expressed in their domestic and
global political aims as indicators of their civilizations.
The central task of this work is to consider what civilization is best for Africa to
consider today. The thesis is that past civilizations have been influenced by the political
systems that penetrated and directed their organic and natural heritage.
To understand civilizations we should first identify factors of civilization that have
triggered the rise of civilizations. The term is used here to mean the societal and
environmental circumstances that brought peoples, communities, and societies together.
Factors of civilization include the capacity of specific communities that evolved into
interactive processes enabling the integration of social, psychological, political and
economic intents and habits that are normalized as literary, scientific, artistic, legal, and
administrative components for an orderly pattern of developing and progressing as a
civilization.
Thus, factors of civilization refer to the scientific, socio-political and cultural
ingredients that launch a specific civilization. In attempting to understand the rise and
decline of civilizations, it is also critical to observe the political methods of the
societies, and the level of effectiveness and efficiency of political centralization.
The political and social values that inspire citizens to the articulation of their civilization
arise directly from their political system. Ideology as a political belief also plays an
integral role in determining the birth, growth, and maturity of civilizations. Institutional
legitimacy, capacity in governance and societal coherence within the borders of a
sovereign state are essential for the creation of a civilizational identity.
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Historical narratives supported by detailed analytical interpretations integrating the
culture, language, and artistic expression of the society, as well as the challenges and
experiences of governing institutions, are aspects of the factors of civilization. They
indicate the broad spectrum of the civilization’s trajectories.
For the purpose of this work, those areas where political scientists have crafted their
debates to explain possible avenues for global peace and conflict resolutions seem to fit
nicely with the theoretical constructs of historians.
Civilizations through the Lens of Political Theory
Let us first consider political science approaches that are regarded as impartial and
replicable in their analytical perspectives. As we study areas such as cultural
commonalities, political ideology, and the democratic values of freedoms that are
essential for harmonizing the values of civilizations, political theory seems to be more
amenable to the theoretical and methodological positions fruitful for civilizational
analysis.
Within the field of international relations theory, the realists and the idealists stand out
as sharing common perspectives with historians, sociologists, and anthropologists in
their characterization of civilizations. The perspectives of both the realist and idealist
schools can contribute to the analysis of civilizations. Which approach proves most
useful for societies that may seek to emulate thriving civilizations?
Realism envisions a global atmosphere of restlessness. Restlessness is a harbinger of
“the Anarchic Society” (Bull, H. 1966). At the same time, it can create a balance of
power where peace is maintained by states that can defend themselves but cannot hope
to be dominant enough to initiate hostilities. It buys time for a civilization with sound
cultural attributes to flourish and for those civilizations that may be toxic and
detrimental to freedom, equality, and universal justice to be exposed for their antihuman rights values.
The world of realism is a world of “uneasy” peace and a testing ground for civilizations
to be sorted out on the basis of their compatibility with Natural Rights. The realistidealist perspective is further categorized into low and high politics.
•

Low politics deals with domestic politics and the workings of the political
system where members of civil society interact with the state to generate policy
inputs.
Aspects of low politics include the formulation and implementation of public
policies, their impact on society, and the ideological and cultural basis that
sustain political participation from the grassroots level to the national stage.
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Values, beliefs, ideas, and attitudes -- elements of political culture -- form the
factors of civilization and civilized societies are measured by the virtues of their
political culture and the visuals of their accomplishments.
•

Taking the analysis further, the capacity of the political environment to permit
and tolerate democratic practices based on individual and collective choices is a
reflection of low politics. The more democratic a society is, the more its
domestic politics will reflect the civilizational values aspired to by those who
lack them.

Civilizations are dynamic. They evolve and progress driven by the strength and
creativity of their societies. The inner strengths of civilizations are visible in the
political and cultural foundations that originally spawn the civilization’s beginning.
The establishment of governance with political and socio-economic rules and laws are
the ultimate indicators of great civilizations. These requisites affect the nuclear family,
the village, the community, and the administrative and associational routines that had
established the identity of the society. They, among many other variables, form the
components of low politics.
Low politics are directly related to civilizational characteristics of societies. More than
to high political capacities, the qualitative aspects of civilization are expressed in low
politics including, but not limited to, the management of such domestic affairs as
political culture, socialization, constitutional provisions, contestation politics, balancing
multiparty party systems, and pluralist interest group politics. By contradistinction, high
politics offers the testing grounds for the state’s capacity to survive in the competitive
arena of the realist game of one-upmanship.
The challenges of war, peace, diplomacy, alliances, balance of power and deterrence,
and global economic relations are areas of high politics for which the state must
maintain credible diplomatic resources to navigate successfully.
Comparing the realist and idealist perspectives, the realists are more vocal and
aggressive in the promotion of their civilization without surrendering ground in the
realms of low politics. Realists are provincial and isolationist on matters of low politics
and expansionist on matters of high politics. This is critical in the sense that the
postulate stands the test of objectivity at the positions where realists of diverse
ideological faiths converge and markedly contrast to the cosmopolitan, liberal, and
inclusive posture of idealists.
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Communists, Nazi fascists, capitalist imperialists, and Islamic jihadists are starkly clear
as they seek to dominate areas beyond their borders. All of them are realists, but they
differ in the sense that, at least until recent years, Islamic jihadists were restrained by
political Islam in its secular applications by such Middle Eastern Republicans as Kemal
Ataturk and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Bill, J and Springborg, R. 1999).
The realist perspective is flexible and may be applied in many parts of the globe. It
defines rigid and conservative ideologies in the liberal Judeo-Christian tradition as well
as in those civilizations that do not share common political, historical, and social
background. Both are rightists, both are traditionalists, both are hegemonic and
expansionist.
Ideologically-driven civilizations such as Islam look at the world from a universalistic
perspective and aim to expand their influence on the basis the civilizational factors
created from their own beliefs. Similarly, communists express their factors of
civilization in dogmatic exclusionary manner. Liberalism, Islam, and communism:
which bears the prospects for alleviating the broad maladies of the Third World in
general and Africa in particular?
Realism
The realist and idealist schools stand as protagonists when they consider human
behavior as a catalyst for war or peace. The realists are particularly vocal and assertive
on several fronts. In the first place, they are traditionalists. In their high mindedness
with respect to the defense of the state, the realists are rigidly dedicated to tradition as
an authentic factor of civilization. They resist changes that they consider to be
deviations from the original factors of civilization that witnessed the birth of their
civilization. Their resistance to change is due to the prospects of imminent cultural
decay that are bound to ensue if and when low politics are infiltrated with ideologies,
beliefs, or cultural attitudes that are not based on the first principles that brought the
liberal state to its lofty democratic heights.
Additionally, the realists as traditionalists are uncompromising and dogmatic. They
stand firmly as immovable defenders and bastions of the state in its classical, traditional,
and sacred characteristics. They view the state as a macrocosm of their whole
civilization. The rise or decline of their civilization is contingent on the vitality and
survival capability of the state. In a global setting where each state is a master of its own
destiny, a state must “necessarily seek safety by relying on its own power and viewing
with alarm the power of its neighbors” (Dougherty, J. E. and Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 1981: 87).
Accumulation of power and tailoring diplomatic and geostrategic goals for the
protection of the state in order to protect the civilization is the declared commitment of
the realist tradition.
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Another area where the realist school is distinctive is in the area of law and order.
Realism is traditional and conservative in the application of legal, statutory, and
religious rules and practices. It aims for the empowerment of a heroic and valiant state,
but also one that upholds a tempered culture of democratic tolerance as well as a “world
of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.” To
ardent realists, the preservation of the “first principles” is considered as the best
safeguard for the preservation of traditional civilization, because civilizations atrophy
when their branches are not nurtured by their roots. Essential to upholding traditional
tenets is the realization that administrative and legal innovations are better safeguarded
by a state that can exploit scientific and technology breakthroughs and innovations to
ensure the survival of its civilization.
Ever since the end of the dark ages, realists in the Western tradition have always been
eager and willing to embrace technological innovation. Civilizations thrive on their
merit in the global competition for technological innovation and scientific
breakthroughs that could serve as resource input for the survival and sustenance of the
civilization. Technology adds values and leverage to civilization. The state at the top
of the global hierarchy where order and cohesive global aims are unpredictable, yet
needing the assertive stand of a confident and dominant civilization complemented by
the rich outputs of science and technology will survive. It will stand as a torch bearer of
the type of civilization it deems is its own to uphold and, on realist terms, convinced
that its civilization embodies the ultimate truth.
Idealism
Let us now turn to idealism.
The idealists in global politics are utopians, the optimists of the global political
environment. They are partakers, forward looking, cosmopolitan and well meaning.
They advocate for a state whose diplomats and statesmen are willing to maintain
harmonious relationship without second-guessing the motivation of their interlocutors.
They argue for the peaceful settlement of disputes without worrying about the stigma of
being accused of pacifism or regarded as permissive by real or potential adversaries.
Arnold Toynbee was a prominent idealist. He suffered criticism for faulting Western
Civilization on its realist rigidities, for putting its ideals forward as a panacea for global
ills. He objected to the militancy of the realists when he condemned their theory as a
“cardinal sin.”
Even though Toynbee may have been reticent in exceptionalizing Western Civilization,
it is doubtful that he refrained from crediting it for its dedication to Natural Rights. It
appears, based on his stated misgivings about Western Civilization, that he may have
been displeased by the realist tendencies of mixing the defense of the state’s mundane
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deeds of colonialism with the defense of civilization. To him, the state is a regimented
entity always braced to do battle when battle must be enjoined, but it also must keep
peace as a priority and opt for diplomatic options when prudence demands it, according
to Alfred Milner in his “reminiscence” of Toynbee.
Idealism such as his, he always felt, could only justify its existence by energetic
devotion to the good of mankind. . . .Nothing was more abhorrent to him than
apathetic mysticism. He would have repudiated the name of mystic. His faith,
however transcendental, was a rational faith and he would prove it by being as
sober, as practical and as effective as any rationalist Utilitarian.
Quincy Wright was another idealist. He recommended a prudent and low-key state
unmoved by the prospects of hostilities as long as skillful diplomats and statesmen
diligently sought peace. According to Wright,
Conflict, as noted, may be physical, biological, or philosophical, as well as
social. International conflict may exhibit all of these characteristics. War is
fought on the military, economic, propaganda, legal, and political fronts.
Armies, like physical entities moving toward one another, seek to occupy the
same place at the same time, each attempting to annihilate or capture the other.
Generals, like game players, seek to devise and carry out strategies which will
out-calculate the enemy’s response with a minimum of cost and risk of defeat
and a maximum probability of victory.
Wright pointed out that the realist’s single-minded preoccupation with the task of
mobilization is a reflection of geopolitical developments that were allowed to escalate.
Lack of diplomatic commitment, misperceptions, and miscalculation of events often
lead to piecemeal escalation of hostilities. Invariably, hostilities are indicators of
diplomatic incompetence or political recklessness.
Realism and High Politics in Geopolitical Perspective
Realists who utilize the theory of international relations are vigilantes and in the
vanguard at the same time. They are perpetually preoccupied with high politics as they
envision a world of hostilities where power and might determine the survival of states.
In the world of the realists:
[I]nternational behavior is totally self-regarding. Considerations of expediency
alone determine policy. No rights whatever are attributed to other members of
international society. Moral scruples have no admissibility at all. The assertion
of self-interest by means of the instrumentalities of power is wholly
untrammeled. At the other pole lies an absolute idealism. Here all policy is
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directed to self-abnegation and the subordination of all self-regarding claims
totally to the claims of theirs” (Taylor, T. 1979: 29).
This approach places the realists at the center of the global arena not necessarily to
aggress and foment crisis, but to prevent aggression and disruption to the first principles
of a civilization.
According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the primary focus of the realist school is the
promotion and defense of national interests. National interests are subject to threats of
potential adversaries. The uncertainties of the “security dilemma” force states to
envision an ever-present danger which they must be ready to confront.
Robert Jarvis’s analysis makes the security dilemma clearer in its historical contexts of
colonialism. He observed:
In order to protect themselves, states seek to control, or at least to neutralize,
areas on their borders. But attempts to establish a buffer zone can alarm others
who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set or who
believe their own vulnerability will be increased. When buffers are sought in
an area empty of great powers, expansion tends to feed on itself in order to
protect what is acquired, as was often noted by those who oppose colonial
expansion.
The central focus of the security dilemma is lack of trust. States do not have faith in
each other. They must increase their security, because their adversaries will also be
prompted to increase theirs. This leads to enhanced defense expenditures on all sides. It
results in the security dilemma -- a vicious cycle of uncertainty perpetuated by fear.
Fear takes hold of the state of mind of the governing elites.
Is There A Practical, Edificatory Scale Measuring the Value of Civilizations?
The realist school in the United States was tested during the Cold War. The precarious
balance under the bipolar system between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was capable of
sparking nuclear holocaust. Mutual assured destruction preserved the balance of power
under the security dilemma. British and Western European scholars opposed
totalitarianism and braced for a joint affirmation of Western Civilization’s resilience but
equally aggrieved Eastern European scholars responded with their own sense of history
and political experience.
In Eastern Europe, the rampages and the onslaught caused by totalitarianism and
fascism drove prominent scholars away from Eastern Europe, forcing them to settle in
American and British universities and research institutions.
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Amongst the outstanding modern scholars of the realist school, whose ideas garnered
widespread acceptance among policy makers during the Cold War years, were Hannah
Arendt, Reinhold Niebuhr, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, and
Raymond Aron. They conducted outstanding research, invigorated NATO’s scientific
aptitude in negotiations with their theories of deterrence, and preached realist paradigms
in the defense of Western civilization. Intellectuals such as Henry Kissinger and
Zbigniew Brzezinski served as outstanding advocates for a strong American power and
they defended Western civilization.
These scholars represented authoritative voices of the realist school at the critical period
when the balance of terror was at its most precarious hours. They expanded the
analytical horizon of international relations theory, enriching the field in its technical
capacities, but also wedding the ideology of liberalism to the realities of realism. They
brought liberalism and realism together as tools for the analysis of global alliances,
international law, the balance of power, deterrence, decision-making, diplomacy and
negotiations.
The totalitarian states -- and their intellectuals – stood in stark contrast. They exhibited
sanctimonious attitudes and violent intolerance against opponents at home and dogmatic
allegiance to the fascist and communist lines. Totalitarian systems rely on blind
allegiance and deadly fanaticism to compensate for the glaring weaknesses of their
systems. The totalitarianism of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao each had their own scholars,
intellectuals who apparently felt at home in the thick of the totalitarian onslaught. Hitler
even brought to the fore scholars who rationalized the Nazi plan of exterminating whole
races and groups based on irrational and racist postulates.
As millions of their fellow citizens perished, Russian, Chinese, and other communist
scholars abdicated their intellectual responsibility. They chose to endorse the worst
human rights abuses, perpetrated to strengthen a “civilization” that would reveal itself in
a totalitarian and supremacist world. The ideological fervor of these scholars was
superficial, but the theoretical rationalization that had been put forward to justify the
systemic and sweeping abuses of human rights were described as ways for introducing
“a new man” and a new civilization.
Unfortunately, similar tendencies prevail today in many parts of the world.
Two Contending Civilizations and Their Implications for Africa and the Third
World
What civilizations offer models for Africa and the Third World today? Western and
Islamic civilizations are both extrovert civilizations. Given the idealist-realist
differences noted above, both are realist. Yet both foresee different and competing
outcomes. In their diplomatic pursuits, they will reach out to other states if they
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calculate the endeavor will elevate their strength. Extrovert civilizations breach
diplomatic and general interests of the status quo in order to conquer and spread their
civilization.
Liberal realists expect a global system hospitable to the ideals of individual freedom.
They believe any civilization that does not give utmost regard, respect, protection, and
priority to the will and conscience of the individual is far short of being called a
civilization. Civilizations are not only the general image, culture, behavior, and deeds
of a society; they are also expressions of civilized behaviors far removed from the
tendencies to barbarism. Individual freedom of conscience, action, and untrammeled
liberty for the citizen are virtues of civilizations.
Advocates of the Islamic Civilization, however, do not separate secular from sacred.
They assert that Islam is supernatural, complete, and perfected in its ancient text. The
laws and the examples set by its founder, the Prophet Mohammad, would work, they
believe, if only societies would embrace the faith and accept its communitarian edicts
while abandoning individual autonomy and freedom (Allawi, A., 2009).
Which of these two options constitutes the best choice for Africa and the Third World?
Which will equip them to recover and extol their own civilizations?
The Islamic Option
Islamic realism struggles for a universal Islamic state. It is the Caliphate to which all
inhabitants of the earth are to submit. It favors a totalitarian state guided by religious
texts and by the testimonials and character witnesses of its founder’s disciples.
This is in stark contrast to the liberal tradition. The liberal realists of Western
Civilization yearn for the predominance of Natural Rights. Islamic realism does not
subscribe to Natural Rights; it deems Natural Rights as antagonist to Quranic and Sharia
law. Islam means submissive to a unitary authority that will dictate quietude and
abnegation of individual rights before the collective state.
Islam is hegemonic. As a faith it seeks a single global community, one that is to be
governed by a global government. Based on its authoritative texts, Islam sees a global
governing state, an Islamic state. With the Umma, the global community of believers,
we arrive at the religious supra-state. Every believer of the Islamic faith in all corners
of the world, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, is obliged to belong. As to the rights
of full citizenship, only the community of Muslim believers is acceptable.
The ultimate fulfillment of Islam’s divine purpose would be the caliphate. It symbolizes
Allah’s purpose of an Islamized universe. It is defined functionally as the dar al Islam,
meaning the abode of Islam, the abode of peace. It is also a fighting force battling nonhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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Muslims everywhere in order to bring them to the Islamic fold. It is a valiant warrior,
always armed to do battle against the dar al Harb, the war zone inhabited by
unbelievers or infidels.
Further, all those who do not believe in Islam are type-caste as unbelievers. The calling
of every Muslim is to undertake active and passive jihad to expand Islam by converting
followers from the dar al Harb. Even Christians and Jews are regarded as unbelievers,
although they are to be treated with tolerance.
The state of Islam, according to the interpretation of Islamic scholars, is a state of peace.
To maintain its strength and guarantee its eternal survival, Islam must wage relentless
struggle, seeking to expand its writs and its territorial reach by breaching the borders of
the non-Muslims. Bernard Lewis describes authentic Islam as it is envisioned by its
fundamentalist followers. According to him:
As the Muslim fundamentalists see it, the community of Islam has been led into
error by foreign infidels and Muslim apostates, the latter being the more
dangerous and destructive. Under their guidance or constraint Muslims
abandoned the laws and principles of their faith and instead adopted secular—
that is to say, pagan—laws and values.
All the foreign ideologies—liberalism, socialism, even nationalism—that set
Muslim against Muslim are evil, and the Muslim world is now suffering the
inevitable consequences of forsaking the God-given law and way of life that
were vouchsafed to it.
The answer is the old Muslim obligation of jihad: to wage holy war first at
home, against the pseudo-Muslim apostates who rule, and then, having ousted
them and re-Islamized society, to resume the greater role of Islam in the world.
The return to roots, to authenticity, will always be attractive. It will be doubly
appealing to those who daily suffer the consequences of the failed foreign
innovations that were foisted on them.
Just as a Christian fundamentalist would look for a hegemonic Christian state that
would exert its dominance over the world in accordance with the teachings of Christ,
the fundamentalist Muslim yearns for an Islamic state of the type established by the
Prophet Mohammed and his successors. These were the first born of the faith, the
Caliphs, otherwise known as the Rightly Guided.
Whereas Christianity no longer represses the secular world totally and is now generally
removed from acting as a state on political and spiritual matters, Islam in its orthodoxy
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is at unity with the state. True Muslims are fulfilled when there is a caliphate state and
the orthodox and authentic teachings of Islam are elevated as governing laws and rules.
Transforming earthly ways of life to replicate heavenly visions here on earth is a
daunting task, particularly when aspects of the texts may prove to be impractical or
irrational, due to man’s inability to measure Allah’s intent. Establishing ordered,
civilized, and harmonious living in societies where the elites claim to read Allah’s mind
and to speak on His behalf encourages cultism. Cults rely on earthly means to
hoodwink and beguile their followers into false hopes and delusional aspirations.
Justifications for Institutional and Civilization Legitimacy of Islamic Civilization
and Western Civilization
Western and Islamic civilizations both consider of their own values superior to those of
the competition. They both use ideology to justify the legitimacy of their civilizations.
In the end, both Western and Islamic civilization exhibit attitudes that are self-centered,
and both are unafraid to take risks in order to maximize their power and influence.
They are both convinced of the rightness of their ideals, of the correctness of their
actions, and of the superiority of their cultural and civilizational foundations.
Islamic Justification and Legitimacy
Islamic Civilization is dynamic in the sense that it exhibits an assimilative and
hegemonic character when it demands unconditional submission to Islam and rejection
of other civilizations with all of their values. The justifications used to validate the
Islamic Civilization are scriptural. They are based on the Quran, with a hint of the
Talmudic laws and rules. The inviolable rights of the individual in the Islamic
civilization are subject to the ordinances, limits, and guidelines of the Quran and the
supportive anecdotal narratives, such as the Sharia and the Hadith.
Islam in its scriptures observes universal equality of all Muslims with two exceptions:
non-Muslims and women. In practical terms, the Islamic Civilization is hierarchical.

In historical fact, however, Islam has had to equivocate in the process of integrating the
variegated ethnic groups, sects, and doctrinal differences the faith has confronted. Thus,
Islam has failed to consolidate its various ethno-linguistic components, as is visible in
the Middle East where the Arabs foster nationalist sentiments which no amount of
scriptural injunction is able to cure. The Egyptian, Saudi, Yemeni, Gulf, Syrian, Iraqi,
North African Arab and Maghreb Muslims have a lot of scriptural commonalities that
could have brought them together as one Umma, one people united in faith and
entrenched in Islamic politics. But in a practical sense, they are far from united as
Arabs, Muslims or both.
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The Arabs of Mecca and Medina, as the founders of the faith, have implicitly assumed a
position of seniority relative to other converts to Islam. The first followers or converts
from Mecca, the Prophet’s birthplace, were known as the Muhajirun: companions or
fellow sojourners. The Muhajirun were those who undertook the initial struggles that
overcame persecution, who demonstrated valor in frequent battles, and who came out
victorious to rule over Arabia and far beyond. They were the first converts to Islam, the
first persecuted, the first to preach the Prophet’s teachings, and the first to sacrifice their
lives on the mission of spreading the message. They were the firstborn of Islam with
special privileges that were not available to those converts who joined the community of
believers at subsequent periods.
The converts of Medina were known as the Ansars – helpers, facilitators, welcoming
hosts of the persecuted Prophet and his Muhajirun/companions. Before their conversion
to Islam, they were tightly knit Jewish clans who practiced Old Testament and Orthodox
Judaism. Through pressure, persecution, and maneuvers by the Prophet himself and his
followers, they were converted to Islam. The manner of their conversion and
integration to the fold of the Muhajirun was traumatic and humiliating. As new
converts to Islam, the Ansar were equal in faith but junior in governance of secular and
religious affairs.
The same is true for other converts. All believers that are not from the inner circle, who
are outside the Prophet’s community of origin, remain outsiders. The status of
Muhajirun was an exclusive birthright for those who began the revolution and began
spreading the faith.
Thus, in keeping with the Prophet’s example and tradition of living and teaching, the
traditional precedence of the Arab’s undeclared implied prestige prevails today, even
though the overt verbal, assertion about the message is the professed commonality and
equality of all believers under the umbrella of the faith.

Similarly, women fall under a separate category. Scripturally, the Islamic text is
equivocating. At times the scripture implies a subordinate status for women. On the
other hand, it is equally implied that women are scripturally categorized as a special
class of Muslims. Their role is purely feminine, uniquely designed by Allah on the
basis of gender attributes that may appear unequal, but fit for a role that is scripturally
ordered and defined. This classification of women’s spiritual identity is translated into
political inequality. There are legal, social, and political differences; women fare worse
than men. Since this inequality is scripturally sanctioned, Islam sees no reason to
equalize the extant inequalities women face.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

43

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 70 [2014], No. 70, Art. 15

Comparative Civilizations Review

39

Institutionalization and Islam
Islam as a panacea for civilizational decay, as a solution that can bring civility, unity,
equality and justice, may be inferred from its history and from the institutional practices
of its administrative functions. Islamic history is replete with internal and regional
wars. Any Third World or African region adapting Islamic practices in order to
establish political, religious, ethno-linguistic and social harmony is bound to encounter
the same rough and restless trajectories that Islam has encountered throughout its
history. Its embedded legal and religious foundations are unbending, unable to adapt to
political and religious circumstances where equality of faith and citizenship in the
community of the Umma is extended to all regardless of confessional or ideological
differences.
The pattern of dividing followers into class and gender categories is an aspect of Islam
that was absorbed throughout its activist and extroverted history. At times, the
inequality between the Muhajirun, the Ansar and non-Arab Muslims boiled to the
surface. This was particularly so while dividing and allocating war spoils. The
precedence of establishing social and political hierarchy yet maintaining religious unity
became an historical and continuing source of crisis for Islam.
It was intensified during the succession dispute when Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law,
wanted to democratize and equalize the divisive practices. He was murdered by the
founders of the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750 A.D.) from Mecca, the birthplace of the
Muhajirun. The Umayyad and the Abbasid (750-1519 A.D.) dynasties were the first
global caliphate empires. They emerged at the end of the 7th century and were defeated
by the Mongol and Ottoman invasions (Kennedy, p. 82-- 199).
The political division that had surfaced after the Prophet Mohammed’s death was never
settled. Its effect was a violent legacy where conflicts are resolved by explosive
outbursts of violence and bloodletting. Three of the Prophet’s immediate successors,
“the Rightly Guided” or Caliphs, were murdered in succession disputes. All of the Arab
states in the Middle East today share the same language, the same ethnicity, the same
history, and the same religion. The hierarchy that is embedded in the founding of the
Islamic Civilization at its beginning prevails today to preclude the emergence of a
united Arab or an Islamic state. Thus, Islam as a civilization combining religion,
politics, and military affairs has not found the means to balance the administrative
aspects of its claim.
Western Justification and Legitimacy
Like Islam, originally Western Civilization and Western democracy did not tolerate
equality. Over time, Western Civilization’s rigidity with respect to race or gender
inequality was weakened by relentless revolutionary campaigns for “liberty, equality
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15

44

Review: Full Issue

40

Number 70, Spring 2014

and fraternity.” In this sense, what Western Civilization offers in its liberal realist
expressions offers more hope to Third World and African societies than the tumultuous
prospects that can be expected from the embrace of Islam.
Western Civilization’s aspirations are derived from the principles of Natural Rights.
The inviolable rights of the individual and the universal equality of all human beings is
the fundamental teaching of Natural Rights. Even though the meandering path to
universal equality traverses rough terrain, the aspiration for universal freedom must be
fulfilled in order for Western Civilization to maintain its integrity as a democratic one.
The irony of the realist-idealist dichotomy is that, in the final analysis, the aspiration of
Western Civilization, over time, can be transformed into an idealist trend. At the
highest reach of its internal and practical maturity, Western Civilization will be
egalitarian. Its low politics are tolerant, because its key institutions are designed for the
maintenance and promotion of universal equality and justice.
The core values of Natural Rights on which Western Civilization is founded are the
practical and ideational elements of liberalism. Western democracies made claims to
these core values ever since the philosophies of Adam Smith, John Locke, Thomas
Hobbes and Rousseau were translated into a functional system of government by
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison in their founding of the American
Republic. It was stillborn in the destructive turns and diversions of the French
Revolution of 1789. French political culture oscillated between Voltaire’s advocacy for
popular tyranny and Bonaparte monarchism that had roots neither in royal blood nor in
the sanctity of popular will.
At its most ardent state of realism, the psychological state of mind of Western
Civilization is combative, territorial, and militant in order to preserve and to safeguard
democratic rights. Orthodoxy and steadfastness are seen as means to democratic ends
by which the citizen is empowered in a political environment of civility. More than the
idealists, the realists will reflect the orthodoxy of liberalism in its purest form while the
idealists will tend to attenuate democratic values when they extend their tolerance even
to anti-democratic forces. The problem is that it is the realists who struggle to guide
and steer Western Civilization to the utmost reach of its maturity: they are dead-set to
use power and aggression to reach the zenith of undisputed power.
When faced with an equally determined adversary with a different ideology or religiouspolitical belief, realists will resort to power and abandon all idealist dreams. Realists
entertain a dogmatic attitude, believing that Western Civilization with its principles
rooted in Natural Rights constitutes the only way to sound governance and an equitable
role of citizenship irrespective of socio-linguistic, religious, or economic differences.
In Western civilization, orthodox adherence to natural rights overrides orthodoxy in
faith. Even though Biblical scriptures are used to justify the legitimacy of natural rights,
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Biblical orthodoxy to entrench undemocratic religious rules is never condoned in liberal
states. This has opened up wide the pathways to democratization, human rights,
abolition of slavery and women’s rights. The virtues of a faith, in this case,
Christianity, are modified, interpreted, and rendered adaptable for the ingrained spirit of
progressivism.
Traditional realists express their ideology as an element of Judeo-Christianity. It is
argued that Western Civilization supports a progressive and evolving faith that enables
societies to outgrow their shortfalls and to curtail the destructive effects of life
unanchored in tradition. It has enabled individuals to channel their aspirations via
measures that aim for the maximization of a fair, just, equitable, and peaceful political
system.
During the medieval era, European societies internalized into their consciousness, the
liberating spirit of Christianity. According to Fredric Cheyette:
Christianity and the remains of classical learning reached everywhere, touching
the poor and illiterate, as well as kings and prelates. To villagers, these two
influences eventually provided the lever for prying a modicum of independence
from their lords. To the inhabitants of the fast-growing towns, they provided the
“civic spirit” whose origin and influence (offered) a justification for a life that
was neither clerical nor knightly” (Cheyette, F. L., 1968: 9).
This illustrates the enlightening and the liberating values of the liberal tradition and also
reveals the secularization of the sacred basis of the liberal tradition. The liberal
revolutions such as the 1688 revolution in Great Britain and in subsequent decades in
the United States and in France contributed to abandoning spiritual rule in favor of the
secular political state. The liberation of the mind was delegated to the secular political
sphere while the religious and spiritual nature was left up to the individual.
In the seventeenth century, the prospects for democratization and quests for human
liberties became tangible through the writings of Locke, Hobbes, Montesquieu,
Rousseau, and the ultra-secular atheist, Voltaire. Democratic systems began to appear
with the rise of economic growth and industrialization. The more industrialization
progressed, the more freedom, liberty, and economic well-being expanded. These
developments were spinoffs of the tenets of democratic culture that had put the
individual at the forefront within the writ of a democratic state (Voeglin, E. 1997:205207).
With the widespread endorsement of democratic philosophies, liberal states reflecting
popular will thrived in pluralist and contested political environments. They maximized
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the factors of civilization by leaving the door open for debates where differences of
opinions and policy disagreements could be discussed and debated democratically.
Liberal systems are not perfect. Their histories are not without human rights infractions
and they cannot be exonerated when their legacy of colonialism and slavery is recalled.
Nonetheless, even when slavery, gender discrimination against women, and colonialism
were manifestly practiced, the liberal tradition foresaw eventual democratization, and
the development of democratic routines always aimed at the most equitable political
systems where the lines of ethnic, religious, and sectional differences would be erased.
So, Which Option for Africa?
The substantive and ideological contrast between Western Civilization and Islamic
Civilizations is stark: there are differing ultimate visions. They share some
commonalties in their aspirations, even though the results they anticipate are vastly
different. Both are activist and transformative, with built-in rules to spread their
influence as vigorously and widely as possible.
But they do differ. African totalitarianism, Chinese mercantilist imperialism and
Islamic centralism without individual freedom reflect the difficulties facing African
civilization.
African civilization is a multifaceted expression of unique identity that has been
overlooked ever since the beginning of colonialism. Before colonialism, moreover,
Africa’s history and civilization was not clearly understood by Western scholars.
To begin with, European explorers arrived in Africa after African civilizations such as
those of Egypt, Nubia, Ethiopia and the Northern African “Bible Belt” of St.
Augustine’s parishes had all expired into antiquity.
Second, the passivity of Africa is like no other continent in the catalogue of
civilizations. Asian civilizations can boast of the factors of civilization represented in
the technological and industrial transformations of Asian societies. They possess the
educational infrastructure to safeguard their civilizations and integrate their ancient
traditions with the modernized aspects of their current national characteristics. Africa is
as old as Asia and Europe, older, but its requisite resources that would articulate African
civilizations are anemic.
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The Best Choice and the Rationale:
In the long run, civilizations evolve ideologies. These become guides for national
action and driving forces of factors of civilizations. The ideological trend that is
emerging to influence African societies is a competition: totalitarianism or liberalism.
The totalitarian ideology is represented in Islamic universalism and in Chinese
communism. Nearly all totalitarian ideologies in their dogmatic features exhibit
sanctimonious attitudes and intolerance. Taken to the level of blind fanaticism, they can
be barbaric and self-aggrandizing with nothing to contribute to the democratization of
societies or to the enshrining of systems of universal equality and justice.
Hitler’s Fascism and Stalin and Mao’s totalitarianism shared such characteristics. They
justified their systemic and sweeping abuses of human rights as ways of introducing “a
new man” and a new civilization.
Unfortunately, in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, the spirit of
totalitarianism has been persistent since the early 1960s, when decolonization was still
ongoing. It is now being reinforced by Chinese ventures for resources accumulation.
The Chinese used to accuse the West of exploiting the Third World but they are now
exploiting Africa in far more extensive and debilitating ways. As they do so, they
provide economic rationalization for African dictators to refrain from the liberal
ideology, because, they argue, democratization is a fiction that has no basis in reality.
This antidemocratic line of ideological reasoning arises even amongst homegrown
political elites; they badmouth democratic institutions designed to protect human rights.
It is never for any lofty deeds and superior accomplishments that they disparage
Western Civilization. It is often out of frustration. The inferiority of the totalitarian
ideology and ideals is obvious to all. They criticize democratic civilizations now,
ignoring, as President Kennedy said, that “those who foolishly seek power by riding on
the back of the tiger, end up inside.”
If Chinese totalitarianism and the political culture of tyranny are bound to undermine
African civilization, the Islamic inspiration does not have any visible testimonial either.
What about Islam is adaptable or provides a hopeful vehicle for rejuvenating African
civilization? Islam does not neglect civilization in those areas that it conquers. Islam
actively works to remove it and replace it with its own symbols. Islam is an activist and
extrovert civilization that demands total devotion by abandoning the elements of all
preceding civilizations, doctrines, or cultural artifacts.
Any civilization that does not agree with Islam does not have the legitimating claims to
exist. If and when there are civilizations and cultural artifacts that may complement or
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support Islam, they are not needed, because Islam is all-sufficient, a complete order of
heavenly and earthly life.
Western economic imperialism and the misdeeds of colonialism did inflict damage on
Africa and the rest of the Third World during colonial times. Those abuses were
subjected to the corrective and restorative virtues of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). This is a testimonial to a civilization that has looked back at
its history and made amends and vowed to not repeat its transgressions. Often,
totalitarian systems would rather look at the past centuries and simply vituperate against
liberal democracy to justify themselves. They consider the secular ventures of
colonialism as well as the missionary campaigns that accompanied colonialism, as
collaborative, damaging acts of Christianity and colonialism.
But it was far from collaboration. A careful review of history tends to show that most
missionaries were prohibited from evangelizing and proselytizing by the colonial
powers, particularly in Islamic societies. Even today, European, Australian, and North
American societies restrain their religious institutions from proselytizing.
Conclusion
Western Civilization constitutes an evolving identity of cultural, political, and social
factors that have built-in capacity to adapt to the highest forms of democratization.
Clearly, it stands out as a best option for African societies to adapt in order to rejuvenate
their civilizations. The difficulties that they are bound to experience as they attempt to
rediscover their civilizations are those which threaten the vital sinews of the Western
civilization itself.
From the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution forward, Western civilization has
utilized science to rationalize politics and religion. The result has been phenomenal
industrialization, economic prosperity, and democratization. Industrialization appears to
be phasing out and a “post industrial” phase is creating new challenges.
The ability of the Western industrialized societies to progress and to correct socioeconomic and political ills must be credited to their civilization. We can look at their
stellar achievements in material riches as well as at the decay and the toxicity they may
experience when their commitment to the principles that catapulted them to the heights
diminishes.
Scholars foretell of societies decaying when they become negligent, reckless in their
devotion to their civilizational heritages and legacies. Oswald Spengler asserted that
“Immense superiority . . . is enjoyed for generations . . . by those states which manage a
tradition longer than others.”
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This is particularly true of the liberal democracies whose good intention to correct
gender and racial inequalities have created ripple effects, arousing anti-traditional value,
anti-family, and anti-nationalist convictions and shaking the very foundations that
support the edifices of Western Civilization.
One of the significant characteristics of civilizations is their transferability. The
influences they can project onto other societies that possess their own unique
civilizations are immense. This is particularly evident on matters of low politics.
Political participation, individual rights, community freedoms, social and religious
tolerances all flourish in environments of liberal traditions. Accountability, rule of law,
and predictable institutional functions as factors of civilization enhance national
wellbeing.
Africa -- of all the options available today, look to Western Civilization. Countries
which need inspiration, that desire to rejuvenate vital attributes, make the best choice
when they opt for the democratizing values of Western Civilization. Remove
totalitarian tyranny and introduce universal freedom for all of African societies, now!
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Essay: An Observation on the Universal Significance
of Western Civilization
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During the youth and women’s revolutions of the mid-1980s, we heard attacks on
Western Civilization, particularly about the traditional educational focus on the great
figures of Western history. It became chic to call all of our progenitors, the likes of
Shakespeare, Socrates, and our Founding Fathers, “Dead White Men.” Academic
institutions and the popular media hastened to get on board, deeming Western
Civilization overblown in importance (at a minimum) and deserving of obliteration (at
best).
The new feminist movement trotted out its injured pride, based on women having been
ignored in history and abused for centuries (all of this true). Then the various denizens
of identity politics weighed in with the outrage that their particular ethnicities were not
given a proper place in the textbooks or in society itself. This also had some truth in it.
However, this was a case of tossing out the baby with the bathwater. The “dead white
men” who created the wonders of the modern world’s Western Civilization gave us
values that benefit those very women and minorities in a way rarely found in any other
civilization.
What appears to be unique in Western Civilization is the recognition of the individual,
not just the king. We have this heritage from ancient Greece and even before that, from
the earliest Indo-Europeans, the ancestors of most Europeans and Persians. It is also a
heritage from one ancient tribe, the Hebrews, ancestors of the world’s Jews, and
continued into the development of Christianity. Even in today’s world, the idea that
individuals matter, that they can be judged as virtuous or bad, that they can play a
serious role in their own governance, is still revolutionary. In the cries around our
world today for “freedom,” the idea of freedom does not include responsibility nor does
it include women and children, who are too often seen as property, not individuals.
The dead white men of Ancient Greece gave us the first glimmer of democracy and the
birth of philosophy (a system outside the bonds of religion). They gave us the individual
(the very concept missing in most of the rest of the world’s social orders). The Roman
dead white men gave us a model of written law, secular law separate from religious law,
still the basis of how we regard justice. The dead white men of the medieval Catholic
Church gave us contract law and the distinction between religious and secular rule.
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They also gave us academic independence, a right not enjoyed by much of the
developing world today. Priests and popes did not rule kingdoms. In the 13th century in
England, our dead white ancestors took on a tyrannical king, King John, and forced him
into recognizing power-sharing in a document called the Magna Carta.
Dead white men gave birth to the Scientific Revolution that, from the moment the
telescope was invented, rushed to refine, invent, and explore all other aspects of our
world. When the telescope was given as gifts to the other great civilizations of the 17th
century (Ottomans, Moghul Indians, and China), none of those empires found science
worth pursuing.
Dead white men came together to create and fight for a United States of America, that,
for all its faults, has mechanisms for self-correction, a division of powers among
administrators, legislators, and judges, and a process forever enlarging the participation
of its citizens. We are still a work in progress.
Dead white men addressed the horrors of black slavery, something that still exists in
Islamic Civilization, particularly across North Africa, which has a much longer history
of slavery than Europe. This slavery began with Egypt and flourished in the Muslim
world even at a time when early Christianity had abandoned the practice. The dead
white men came to it later, and slavery never quite sat well with them.
Dead white men abolished slavery; first, English Quakers; next a Tsar in Russia; and
finally under Abraham Lincoln’s leadership during a civil war that nearly split the
United States permanently.
Dead white men gave in to the clamor of Women’s Suffrage in 1920, and from then on
shared power and participation with women. In many parts of the world, this is still
inconceivable, and contrasts starkly with practices that horrify us in the West.
An examination of current Afghan culture is illustrative of what the polar opposite of
Western Civilization can be. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday, May
19, 2013: “Afghanistan: Religious lawmakers block women’s rights legislation.”
Conservative religious lawmakers in Afghanistan blocked legislation aimed at
strengthening provisions for women’s freedoms, arguing that parts of it violated Islamic
principles and encouraged disobedience.
This fierce opposition highlights how tenuous women’s rights remain, even a dozen
years after the ouster of the hardline Taliban regime, whose strict interpretations of
Islam once kept Afghan women virtual prisoners in their homes.
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Khalil Ahmad Shaheedzada, a conservative lawmaker for Herat province, said the
legislation bolstering women’s freedoms was withdrawn shortly after being introduced
in parliament because of an uproar by religious parties who said parts of it are unIslamic. “Whatever is against Islamic law, we don’t even need to speak about it,”
Shaheedzada said.
Afghanistan’s Law of Elimination of Violence Against Women has been in effect since
2009, but only by presidential decree and never enforced. It is being brought before
parliament now because lawmaker Fawzia Kofi, a women’s rights activist, wants to
cement it with a parliamentary vote to prevent its potential reversal by any future
president who might be tempted to repeal it to satisfy hardline religious parties.
The law criminalizes, among other things, child marriage and forced marriage, and bans
baad, the traditional practice of exchanging girls and women to settle disputes. It makes
domestic violence a crime punishable by up to three years in prison and specifies that
rape victims should not face criminal charges for fornication or adultery.
The child marriage ban and the idea of protecting female rape victims from prosecution
were particularly heated subjects, said Nasirullah Sadiqizada Neli, a conservative
lawmaker from Daykundi province. Neli suggested that removing the custom--common in Afghanistan---of prosecuting raped women for adultery would lead to social
chaos, with women freely engaging in extramarital sex safe in the knowledge that they
could claim rape if caught.
As a woman, now with the power to fully participate in my governance and with the
ability to study and participate in every human enterprise, I feel my debt to the dead
white men who produced Western Civilization. This is no small gift for me----nor is it
of negligible importance to the rest of our world’s civilizations. There is not one of the
world’s civilizations not influenced enormously by the civilization that our ancestors
created.
The great advances in science and medicine are major contributions of Western
Civilization, advances that have doubled our lifespan in just one century. The invention
of contraception, for example, has lengthened the life of myriads of women who,
without it, would have been destined for early death, as they are in many places in the
world, because of unremitting childbirth. Giving women some control over their
biology has enabled them to be as productive and free as the great men who produced
our civilization.
The new findings in astronomy, for example, have sent us out on the next voyages of
discovery, a capability that will cause much rethinking of our ancient religions. The
concept of the divine will be infinitely enlarged by these discoveries.
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The rapid advance of brain science will finally determine what differences there are
between male and female brains---and will throw into a cocked hat our notions of
human responsibility, crime, and punishment. Our justice systems will never be the
same.
Western Civilization has elements unique to it that are not intrinsic to any other of the
great civilizations: the sanctity of the human being in the concept of human rights,
sanctity of private property, attempts at universal education, attempts at a justice system
that works at fairness, and enormous and continuous creativity in arts and industries.
If there is any doubt about the universality of Western Civilization, we need only watch
the celebrations of the New Year, our New Year, around the globe. We need only note
that the time zones and latitude demarcations used globally are Western in origin. The
global language of international air travel is English. Imagine the chaos if it were up to
everyone and anyone to select their own language.
Although there are still some holdovers from the dead end of the hippy social revolution
who defame the dead white men, they have not yet produced themselves anything
worthy of defending. The movement to dethrone Western Civilization has not
succeeded in making its case. The proof is that the world votes with its feet; those who
can flee to the West do so.
I salute the “dead white men” who gave us all of this.
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The Paradox of Thinking and The Unthinkable:
An Axial Age Update For Modern Civilization Studies Through A Synthesis of
Chinese Aspect/Perspective Philosophy With Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophy of “As
If” And His View Of Knowledge as “Fictions.” 1

Walter Benesch

wbenesch@alaska.edu
I would introduce my discussion of the metaphysical and epistemological paradoxes
associated with thinking the unthinkable in philosophy, science, and religion as it has
been effectively identified by three 20th Century philosophers. The first philosopher is a
historian of Chinese Philosophy, Professor Fung Yu-lan:
Since the universe is the totality of all that is, therefore when one thinks about it,
one is thinking reflectively because the thinking and the thinker must also be
included in the totality. But when one thinks about that totality, the totality that
lies in one’s thought does not include the thought itself. For it is the object of the
thought and so stands in contrast to it. Hence the totality that one is thinking
about is not actually the totality of all that is. Yet one must first think about
totality in order to realize that it is unthinkable. One needs thought in order to
be conscious of the unthinkable just as sometimes one needs a sound in order to
be conscious of silence. One must think about the unthinkable yet as soon as
one tries to do so it immediately slips away. This is the most fascinating and
also most troublesome aspect of philosophy. 2
The second philosopher is a physicist, John Archibald Wheeler:
…in the quantum principle we’re instructed that the actual act of making an
observation changes what it is that one looks at. To me, this is a perfectly
marvelous feature of nature…. So the old word observer simply has to be
crossed off the books, and we must put in the new word participator. In this way
we’ve come to realize that the universe is a participatory universe.” 3

1 Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) was a German philosopher who constructed his own “Philosophy of As If”
or fictions. Vaihinger clearly saw the utility value of fictions in all intellectual endeavors. However, the
problem is that once one has accepted fictions and myths in philosophy, religion, science, one tends to
forget that these are fictions and treats them as absolute truths. As he noted again and again, the facts of
one age are the fictions of later ages. If one can view absolutes as useful fictions, then one can modify
them or adopt others without conflict.
2
Feng Yu-lan: A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, Macmillan Free Press N.Y. 1948 p. 337
3
Paul Buckley and F. David Peat: Conversations in Physics and Biology, University of Toronto Press,
1979, p. 53-4
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The third philosopher is Nobel physicist Erwin Schroedinger who emphasized that there
are no longer any identities which proclaim their reality apart from human
consciousness:
…we are faced with the following remarkable…situation. While the stuff from
which our world picture is built is yielded exclusively from the sense organs as
organs of the mind so that every man’s world picture is and always remains a
construct of his mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence, yet the
conscious mind itself remains a stranger within that construct. It has no living
space in it; you can spot it nowhere in space. 4
The paradoxes to which these philosophers refer arise in perceiving and conceiving and
in synthesizing attending (attention) and intending (intention) in experiencing.
The first example from Professor Fung Yu-lan occurs in a process tradition in which a
discussion of “thinking” as processing is not reducible to an abstract
thought/thing/name. This is the point of the opening lines of the Tao te Ching. This is
a tradition without a linguistic ‘existential identity principle’ which might seem to
isolate a particular term or thought apart from the process of thinking and naming, e.g.
exists/ existence. 5 This impossibility can be illustrated in two propositions by Hui Shih
in the 4th Century BCE: “A chicken has three legs.” “The wheel never touches the
ground.” 6
The second example occurs in an object tradition which is “substantively based” and
one in which identity was historically equated with an abstraction of the verb “to be” as
“exist” or “existence” which corresponded to the real or res as thing. As Parmenides
insisted in the 5th Century BCE, there is but “…one word by which to express the [true]
road: Is. …Surely by now we agree that it is necessary to reject the unthinkable,
unsayable path as untrue and to affirm the alternative as the path of reality and truth.” 7
Other examples of absolutes connected to concepts of identity and existence are
provided by Aristotle’s “three laws of thought” and the synthesis of Aristotle’s
categorical syllogistic with classical physics and biology as well as monotheistic
theology.
4

Erwin Schroedinger: Mind and Matter, “The Tarner Lectures”, October 1956,
Cambridge University Press 1959, p 44
5
A.C. Graham: The verb “to be” is one of the most striking peculiarities of the Indo-European group,
performing a variety of functions which most languages distinguish sharply. The metaphysical roles
which it raises have been important through the history of Western philosophy, from Parmenides to the
Existentialists. Classical Chinese deals with the various functions of “to be” by means of at least six
different sets of words and constructions, several of which have functions outside the scope of “to be”
Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, SUNY Press, 1986, p. 323
6
Wing-Tsit Chan: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy” Princeton University,1963, p. 235
7
Wheelwright, Philip The Pre-Socratics “The Eleatic School” Macmillan, N.Y. 1985, p.97
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Physicists and biologists in the 20th Century have begun proposing that terms like
“exist” and “existence” are meaningless or without reference. The physicist Sir Arthur
Eddington suggests: “It is a primitive form of thought that things either exist or do not
exist; and the concept of a category of things possessing existence results from forcing
our knowledge into a corresponding frame of thought.” 8 And Sir Arthur’s colleague,
the English Physicist James Jeans notes: “The old philosophy ceased to work at the end
of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth-century physicist is hammering out a new
philosophy for himself. Its essence is that he no longer sees nature as something
entirely distinct from himself. Sometimes it is what he himself creates or selects or
abstracts; sometimes it is what he destroys.” 9
In relating these ‘identity paradoxes’ in the following paper, I would propose a
comparative synthesis of Chinese process philosophy with the As If philosophy of the
20th Century German Philosopher, Hans Vaihinger—using Vaihinger’s analysis of the
nature and use of fictions in philosophy, science, mathematics, theology and in the
construction of political and social institutions. Such a synthesis offers a practical
approach to the sources and nature of paradox, East or West, and treats paradoxes as
useful fictions.
Section One: Process Philosophy Of Levels, Aspects And Perspectives
In The Chinese Tradition
Minding as Attending and Intending.
To facilitate the understanding of both Vaihinger’s and the Chinese views, I would
propose that one consider thinking as a continuum consisting of two related but
different aspects: attending and intending or attention and intention.
An illustration of this distinction is made whenever we try to relate ‘act’ and ‘intent’ in
terms of individual behavior, e.g. in courts of law. Both terms, attention and intention,
are derived from the Latin tendre which means to stretch. Tendons, for example, in the
body are essential for physical stretching.
Attention (attentus, pp of attendere) means the act of applying the mind to or stretching
toward an object, thought, or sense observation. Intention (intentus, pp of intendere)
means stretching at understanding, connotation, significance, volition. I would refer to
this internal stretching at as minding. Consistent with the Confucian philosopher, Hsun
Tzu 4th Century BCE, I would propose that we can view minding/mind as empty,
unified and still, i.e. the possibility of minding is never reducible to any specific
8
9

Ibid

Sir James Jeans: The New Background of Science, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1959, p.2

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15

58

Review: Full Issue

54

Number 70, Spring 2014

thought, name, symbol intention or attention. Attempts at such reductionism are the
source of many paradoxes like that of Socrates knowing that he did not know, or the
liar’s paradox---I always tell lies, or the name (ming) that can be named is not the name
(ming) from the Tao te Ching.
Minding as Aspect and Perspective
In the term aspect, two related but different ideas are associated: The first is implied in
its root meaning of ad (to), and specere (to look), that is, to look at or toward. The
second meaning is implied when we use the term to indicate the specific empirical
color, texture, smell, tone, taste, etc., that is sensed.
Minding is interpreting of aspect into concept and context. Interpreting and awareness
of interpreting is then minding as perspective. For example, a bad-tasting medicine
regarded from the aspect of its taste, is bad; regarded from the aspect of its ability to
cure, is good. Good and bad, like all adjectives in Chinese, reflect the perspective of an
observer who uses them.
The term perspective combines specere with the prefix per which means through or
throughout. Thus a perspective is seeing through. Neither of these terms is separable
from the other in aspective/perspective knowledge. Knowledge is a synthesis of aspects
of knower with aspects of the ‘known’ with aspects of the knowing processes. This
mixture is the source of a knower’s perspectives on his/her knowledge. It is especially
important to note that we do not see things or wholes, only sense aspects, although
identity as a whole, a thing, a concept can be used in minding to interpret and identify
the aspects which are actually sensed. The idea of aspect would also seem to suggest an
openness to sensing, i.e., an awareness that in sensing one has sensed certain but not
other aspects of the sensed experience.
Chinese Philosophizing As Aspect/Perspective
One of the aspects of traditional Chinese philosophizing is the fundamental
presupposing that human beings are aspects of nature. Nature itself is a continuum and
human beings are that aspect of the nature continuum which is aware of nature as
changing dynamic process. Thus, naturing as human minding is capable of perspectives
upon naturing in science, philosophy, religion, and art. Any observation or
description/definition of the world reflects at least two aspects of the world: (1) as that
particular aspect of experience which is its focus, and (2) as an aspect of the world as
the ‘possibility of focusing and observing’.
In the words of the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming, speaking of the
principle of nature: “What is called your mind is that which makes seeing, listening,
speaking, and moving possible. It is the nature of man and things; it is the Principle of
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Nature.” 10 This view is quite different from that of Plato and Aristotle and monotheistic
religions which see human beings as in nature but not of nature, for a special un-natural
spiritual essence had been inserted into their natural and physical bodies.
The Chinese aspect/perspective tradition presupposes the world is a cyclic, flowing
process of aspects in which orderly change is the way of Yin and Yang. As a result,
objects do not possess aspects; they are aspects of naturing and minding. The idea of
aspect/perspective is perhaps most clearly expressed in the first chapter of Tao te Ching:
The Nameless (having no name) is the origin of Heaven and Earth (Naturing)
The Named (having name) is the mother of all things. (Minding)
Therefore let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety,
And let there always be being so we may see their outcome,
The two are the same. 11 (Naturing/Minding, Aspect/Perspective)
In the last Chapter of the Chuang Tzu, (c. 399 – 295 BCE), one finds the following
criticism of his time: “…the world is in great disorder, the worthies and sages lack
clarity of vision, and the Way and its Virtue are no longer One. So the world too often
seizes upon one of its aspects, examines it, and pronounces it good. But it is like the
case of the ear, the eye, the nose, and the mouth: each has its own kind of
understanding, but their functions are not interchangeable. In the same way, the various
skills of the hundred schools all have their strong point, and at times each may be of
use. But none is wholly sufficient, none is universal.” 12
The Chinese philosophical tradition evolved a view of the universe as a naturing--minding process continuum. Different philosophers and schools emphasize various
aspects and perspectives within this continuum. According to the 4th Century BCE
Confucian philosopher Hsün Tzu: These emphases create dichotomies which then as
distinctions can become obsessions.
The ten thousand beings are only one corner of the Way. One species of being
is only one corner of the ten thousand beings. The stupid man is only one corner
of one species. He himself believes that he understands the Way, though of
course he does not. Shen Tzu could see the advantages of holding back, but not
the advantages of taking the lead. Lao Tzu could see the advantages of
humbling oneself, but not the advantages of raising one’s station. Mo Tzu could
see the advantages of uniformity, but not those of diversity. Sung Tzu could see
the advantages of having few desires, but not those of having many. 13
10

Wang Yang Ming: Instructions for Practical Living (Wing-tsit Chan trans), Columbia University 1964,
p. 80
11
Wing-tsit Chan: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, 1969, p. 139
12
Burton Watson (trans.) The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia Univ. Press, 1968, p. 364
13
Burton Watson (trans) Hsün Tzu, Basic Writings, Columbia Univ. Press 1966, p. 87-8
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The variety of aspects and perspectives is reflected in Chinese views of language and
symbols. Prof. Fung Yu-Lan in his discussion of the Chuang Tzu explains that from the
Taoist perspective:
The sounds of man consist of the words (yen) that are spoken in the human
world. They differ from such “sounds of earth” as those caused by the wind,
inasmuch as when words are said, they represent human ideas. They represent
affirmations and denials, and the opinions that are made by each individual from
his own particular finite point of view. Being thus finite, these opinions are
necessarily one-sided.
Yet most men, not knowing that their opinions are based on finite points of
view, invariably consider their own opinions as right and those of others as
wrong. “The result,” as the Ch’I Wu Lun says, “is the affirmation and denials of
the Confucianists and Mohists, the one regarding as right what the other regards
as wrong, and regarding as wrong what the other regards as right.” 14
One of the perspectives on different aspects of the naturing—minding process
continuum with which philosophers of the Warring States period would agree is that
language is a useful tool, a matter of convention, but certainly not the natural or mental
experiencing to which terms refer. As the Tao Te Ching notes in its first chapter,
having no name is the origin of heaven and earth while having a name is the mother of
all things. And Hsün Tzu wrote “Names have no intrinsic appropriateness. One agrees
to use a certain name and issues an order to that effect, and if the agreement is abided by
and becomes a matter of custom, then the name may be said to be appropriate…. Names
have no intrinsic reality.” 15 (This is a Chinese version of the modern insight that
’universals’ have no ‘existential import.’)
Combining these views of the nature and limit of language with the different
perspectives of the various schools on aspects of the naturing---minding process
continuum, Chinese philosophy has evolved a ‘continuum logic’ of aspects and
perspectives on levels. This continuum logic begins with the unthinkable and
unspeakable whole or totality beyond all distinguishing and then proceeds with levels of
‘having name, knowledge, and understanding’ emphasizing minding and having a name
as separate aspects of naturing, but ends at its final ‘knowledge’ level with a return to
the unthinkable totality with which it begins.
This continuum philosophy, rather than focusing upon value dichotomies, relates
aspects of experiencing on different levels with perspectives upon them.
14

Fung Yu-Lan: A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, (Derk Bodde, editor) Macmillan – Free Press,
1966, p.110-11
15
Burton Watson (trans) Hsün Tzu…. P. 14
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Aspect and perspective represent levels of awareness and reflection upon experiencing
of naturing and minding. The terms in Chinese which are usually translated as
existence or being are wu and yu. Wu in Chinese, however, means not having and yu
means having.
These two ideas of having and not having are the key to the meanings of both aspect
and perspective.
And this philosophy of aspects and perspectives relates the multiple aspects of minding
and naturing in sequential levels of having and not having. Each of the levels in the
logic both follows from the levels before it and leads into the next level---ultimately
returning to the level of the un-nameable whole.
Summary Of Chinese Aspect Perspective Philosophizing
1. Nature (ing) is a process. Opposites are complementary because they are
aspects of the total process and thus flow into one another, produce one another,
complete one another.
2. Human minding comprises a unity with nature (ing) and is both an aspect of
nature (ing) and a source of the self-recognizing of nature (ing), just as in nature
(ing) minding recognizes itself. The world appears to mind as aspect and mind
appears in the world as perspective.
3. As a consequence in the unity of nature and mind three kinds of distinguishing
in experiencing are manifested:
a. Those distinctions which come into being as aspects of the changing
world. The 10,000 things are in this sense aspects and not separate
identities as some philosophers and scientists presuppose. 16
b. Those distinctions which come into being as aspects of human minding.
These are impressions of and thoughts about the infinite distinctions of
which the restless mind is capable.
c. Those distinctions that come into being by way of the mind’s use of
symbols. These are the distinctions which permit us to stabilize and
store our experiencing, preserve the answers to our questions and name
the world into compartments, categories and relationships.

16

“The ten thousand things are really one. We look on some as beautiful because they are rare or
unearthly; we look on others as ugly because they are foul and rotten. But the foul and rotten may turn
into the rare and unearthly and the rare and unearthly may turn into the foul and rotten. So it is said you
have only to comprehend one breath that is the world. The sage never ceases to value oneness.” Burton
Watson: The Complete Works of Chaung Tzu, Columbia U. New York, 1968 p. 236
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4. Implicit in these three assumptions which connect the distinguishing mind to the
unity of a naturing of 10,000 aspects is an inferential process of aspect to
perspective to knowledge to understanding to attitude to action/response. In this
sequence an aspect is always accompanied by a perspective which becomes an
aspect until action/non-action response follows
An Aspect Perspective Process Logic Of Levels 17

Level I: Naturing and Minding as a Process Continuum of aspects and perspectives
This is the level of the ultimate presuppositions of a tradition and its original views of
the unity of nature and mind (naturing/minding) as the context of the whole of human
experience. The aspects of Tao that are identified before distinguishing from minding
will be reflected in the perspectives developed in the other levels:
Level II: Minding versus Naturing as a Process Continuum of aspects and
perspectives
This is the level where distinguishing and distinctions arise which reflect the theories
and assumptions that have been involved in distinguishing minding from naturing in
order to analyze and/or know and talk about nature---e.g., as yin and yang, or in aspects
of metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, and ontological contexts.
Here
perspectives on distinguishing reflect possibilities for distinctions as aspects of
experiencing.
Level III: Minding as a Process Continuum of Intending and Attending aspects
and perspectives
This is the level where minding, using the distinguishing contexts and assumptions of
level II as a foundation, establishes relevant intentions and attentions in various
disciplines, and value fields with their corresponding technologies, methodologies, and
categories for focusing intentions and attentions in observing, exploring, and controlling
human behavior and relating it to nature in philosophy, the natural and social sciences,
and religion

17

For a comprehensive overview and applications see: Benesch & Wilner, “Continuum Logic, a Chinese
Contribution to Knowledge and Understanding in Philosophy and Science”, Journal of Chinese
Philosophy, Blackwell Publishing, Volume 29, #4, Dec. 2002, pp. 471-494
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Level IV: Minding as a Process Continuum of Knowing and Understanding
knowledge and wisdom aspects and perspectives
On the fourth level, the other three levels merge as aspects of knowing and perspectives
into understanding within the spectator/participant contexts created by these levels,
i.e.,
I.
II.

III.

The context of an ultimate view of the totality of nature/mind;
The contexts created by the presuppositions which were used to distinguish
mind from nature and to provide the possibilities for mind’s contemplation and
knowledge of nature: for example: yin/yang, metaphysics-epistemologyaxiology-ontology;
The contexts created by the application of I and II in conceptual and perceptual
experiences of nature as aspects and perspectives in intending and attending in
the sciences, philosophy, religions, etc.

On this level too, via the contexts established on Levels II and III, the human intellect or
minding acquires knowledge within a combination of five aspects of experiencing:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

knower, interpreter, explainer;
the known, interpreted, explained;
the process of knowing, interpreting, explaining as in applying methods,
testing, experimenting, observing;
the knowledge, interpretations, explanations that emerge in statements,
sacred texts, papers, statistics, etc., that can be distributed and published;
and
the fifth aspect is the aspect of understanding on this level whereby the
intellect reflects upon and develops perspectives into the interrelationships of the other four aspects.

Aspect # 1: The context of the knower-observer: … What perspectives, experiences,
intentions, assumptions, and potential interpretations from levels II and III do observers
bring to an event or object, which will influence their intentions and attentions? Are
there personal intentions and conditions that are relevant, for example, attitudes toward
race, gender, profession, etc.? How aware are observers of their theories and concepts
and how these can influence the ‘conceptualizing’ that arises in observations?
Mencius, applying this perspective in an ethical sense, argued that “Men must be
decided on what they will not do, and then they are able to act with vigor in what they
ought to do.” 18

18

Legge: The Works of Mencius, Book IV a, VIII, p. 310
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The importance of this self-awareness is illustrated in the Creation of the Gods, a Ming
novel dealing with the fall of the Zhang to the Chou. One of the most effective weapons
in the Chou arsenal was the Topographical Diagram of the Kingdom. This was a magic
map which once one had entered it seemed to reproduce all of one’s inner thoughts in
the external world. If one thought of a mountain, it appeared, etc. The Zhang General,
Yuan Hong, was tricked into the map which his spirit filled with his memories and
desires. The map-trap was then rolled up and taken to headquarters where the general,
captured by his own illusions, was put to death. 19
To the degree that past experiences and intentions influence and determine present
observations and interpretations, every observer enters the Topographical Diagram of
the Kingdom. It is essential that one be aware of the contexts that this paradox creates.
Aspect # 2: Context of the known-observed… Since every event or object represents
emphasis and focus upon limited aspects within a totality of potential characteristics and
causes, what were or are the relevant and irrelevant aspects and characteristics of the
observed that one accepts or rejects? Under what conditions and in what circumstances
is/was the observed event or object experienced? What was included or excluded in
terms of circumstances and characteristics….and why? Are there relevant connections
to other observations which are being considered or ignored? For example, one of the
Buddhist theories of observation is that ‘one sees what one sees by not seeing that
which surrounds what one sees. The focus of the observer or knower is limited, but it is
critical that one remember that these limits are arbitrary.
As Chu Hsi noted in his discussion of the totality of the Principle of Heaven and Earth,
“ nothing exists in isolation…” 20 And Yang Wang-ming cautioned his disciple that
‘useful’ and ‘useless’ will determine what we ‘see’ when we look at weeds and
flowers. 21
Aspect # 3: Context of knowing-observing processes... In addition to the senses, what
techniques, methods, instruments are employed in observing and how do these affect
observing? For example, to measure a phenomenon means to introduce some sort of
measuring device, whether as instrument or statistical method. A class being tested is
not a class not being tested. What limits to observing are incorporated in or determine
the act itself? How do direct versus indirect knowing and observing relate? Which is
given preference?

19

Creation of the Gods 2 volumes (Gu Zhizhong trans.), New World Press, Beijing, 1992, volume II, p.
399
20
Wing-tsit Chan (trans), Chu Hsi & Lu Tsu-ch’ien: Reflections on Things at Hand, Columbia
University, 1967, p. 22
21
Wang Yang-ming, pp. 222-3
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The problem with distinguishing, as Hsün Tzu warned, is that it in turn can lead to
obsession. 22 Mencius might ask if the observer in observing is ‘forcing’ that to appear
which she/he wants to see that is helping the rice to grow, as in the case of the man of
Sung who pulled up his rice helping it to grow. 23 It is with this aspect of the knowing
and observing process that one must be aware that distinguishing creates distinctions
and not the other way round.
Aspect #4: Context of the ‘knowledge—observation product’: Since it is the
knowledge as ‘observation’ or ‘explanation’ that is symbolized and communicated, it is
important to consider what linguistic, categorical and/or cultural constraints will
determine the expression of the observation. This aspect is a categorical and/or
conceptual synthesis of #1, #2 and #3. This level combines syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics. To what degree is the ego of the observer included or excluded in the
symbolized and verbalized observation? Is the observation to be expressed in a
combination of natural and artificial languages and if so, how will the languages used
and their structures inter-relate and influence what is said or written---this question is
particularly relevant to the uses of statistics and polls.
As Albert Einstein cautioned: “As far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality,
they are not certain, and in so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” 24
What are the purposes of our observations and to whom are they to be communicated?
One of the most fundamental concerns within the history of Chinese philosophy is with
the rectification of names, that is, making sure that the terms that are used in
communication are agreed upon. This means, of course, that meaning is relative to the
user and the listener. There is no correspondence of name to thing; rather, there is
correspondence to linguistic agreement: “The Way has never known boundaries; speech
has no constancy. But because of [the recognition of] ‘this,’ there came to be
boundaries.”
For Chuang Tzu these were left, right, theories, debates, divisions, discriminations,
emulations, and contentions. 25 And Hsün Tzu emphasized that “Names have no intrinsic
appropriateness. One agrees to use a certain name…and if the agreement is abided by
and becomes a matter of custom, then the name may be said to be appropriate. Names
have no intrinsic reality.” 26
Aspect # 5: Context of the perspectives upon #1 - #4. It is as this stage where, as Chu
Hsi suggested, the student must first of all know how to doubt in order to reflect and
22

Hsun Tzu, Basic Writings, Burton Watson trans., Columbia University, 1963, p. 122
Mencius, D.C. Lau trans., Penguin Classics, New York, 1970, Book II a, 2, p. 78
24
Herman Weyl, Philosophy of Natural Science, Princeton Univ., 1949, p. 135
25
Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Watson trans., pp. 43-4
26
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question, because “People who do not doubt simply have not devoted themselves to
concrete practice. If they have concretely practiced, there must be some doubts.” 27
With the fifth aspect, the knower, observer, and/or interpreter begin reviewing the interrelationships of the first four aspects. For example, does the observed take priority over
the observer? Does observing alter the observed and thus the observations? How do the
observations verbalized and conceptualized relate to the observed and influence
observing? What was included or excluded in observing? What was included and or
excluded in symbolizing the observation? How do name and named relate in their
origins? What are the most important definitions involved in stating the observation?
What terms remain indefinable in stating the observation? What pre-conditions were
placed upon observation by stated and unstated assumptions of the observer and/or the
condition and circumstances of the observed?
The function of the fifth aspect of the knowing process is to provide an understanding
of the basic perspectives and questions at the level of immediate experiencing which
will carry reflexive self awareness back into the other levels of the logic and finally to
the unity of naturing and minding at Level I. At this level of continuum logic we begin
to discover and understand the experiential paradoxes and problems of the human
intellect as both spectator and participant in the world. Here we become aware of the
priorities that we accept and or assign and the influences that these have in turn upon
our claims to knowledge and understanding.
The Danish Physicist, Niels Bohr, seems to have summarized the critical function of
this level with its five aspects: “Scientific research in many domains of knowledge has
indeed time and again proved the necessity of abandoning or remolding points of view
which because of their fruitfulness and apparently unrestricted applicability, were
regarded as indispensable for rational explanation.” 28 The French Anthropologist,
Georges Devereux, in his Ethnopsychoanalysis, seems to have had the same objective in
mind: “The simple fact is that a human phenomenon which is explained in one way only
is, so to speak, not explained at all ...and this even---and, in fact, chiefly---if this
phenomenon’s first explanation has made it perfectly comprehensible, controllable and
foreseeable in terms of its own specific frame of reference.” 29

27

Wing-tsit Chan, Chu His & Lu Tsu-ch’ien Reflections on Things at Hand…, p.85, 94
Niels Bohr, The Philosophical Writings of..., volume II, Ox Bow Press, Woodbridge,
Conn, pp. 67-8
29
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Section Two: Hans Vaihinger And Fictions: ‘As If’ In Philosophy, Science,
Mathematics, Religions
The Axial Age
Aspect and Perspective Versus Greek Principles of Identity
That which facilitated the transition from sensing to static concepts and fixed identities
in Plato’s Eidos and Aristotle’s Categories was the presupposition of the existence of
an unchanging reality of things and /or ideas (res). This Greek view was later coupled
with a belief in a monotheistic deity who created ‘things’ and ‘identities’ into existence
by naming them. This view is quite different from that found in the Tao te Ching where
wu (having no name) is the origin of Heaven and Earth, and yu (having name) is the
mother of the ten thousand aspects.
The Greeks of the Axial Age were concerned with the relationships of what they
considered to be the real versus what they believed to be the apparent world around
them. Their Axial Age assumptions outline in great part the context within which
Western philosophy, science and theology developed from the Greek Pre-Socratic
philosophers of the 6th Century BCE to the 17th Century CE. It was within this context
that Vaihinger developed his theory of fictions and his philosophy of ‘As If’:
I.

There is a difference between the apparent world of our sense experience
and the essential or real world that is the source of appearances and
sensations. One does not change, the other is constantly changing. The
Greek/European tradition within which object logics arise assumes it is this real
world that is abstracted into concepts that correspond to what we call reality--matter, atoms, time, space, soul, personality, behavior, etc. This reality is
verbally expressed in our axioms and definitions. The word real comes from the
Latin res which means thing. The father of both modern philosophy and
science, Thales of Miletus, asked in the 6th Century BCE “What are things
really?” His answer was “water,” which seemed to be able to change
appearances but remain the same in essence.
Thales’ contemporary,
Democritus, believed things were composed of irreducible particles or atoms.
Pythagoras believed the essence of reality was number.

II.

Genuine knowledge is of the real, is always true and does not change, just as
the real does not change. Opinion is always related to appearances and can be
true or false depending upon verification consistent with definitions/axioms.
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III.

The human intellect or soul is in the world but not of the world. It is
inserted into the body from outside the physical realm and so is capable of
knowing things as they really are. 30 Plato believed that the soul existed prior
to coming into the body and was already possessed of innate and absolute
knowledge of the forms of reality. After the soul was born, these innate forms
would enable it to recognize and conceptualize ideas from sensations. Aristotle
in his On the Soul maintained that the mind or reasoning capacity was an
independent substance, pure thinking placed in the body by God and so was
unaffected in its reasoning by changes in sensation or body. 31

IV.

The identity of things corresponds to human concepts of things and to their
names and categories in language. This was expressed in the Greek tradition
by Parmenides of Elea who lived in the 6th Century BCE: “Thinking and the
object of thought are the same. For you will not find thought apart from being,
nor either of them apart from utterance.” 32 Thought and being are the same.

V.

All value dichotomies are based on the absolute and qualitative distinction
between ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, ‘something’ and ‘nothing’. This
qualitative distinction is applied to ‘things’, ‘thought/concepts’ and
‘language/ names/categories.’ As Parmenides of Elea suggested: “There [is]
but one word by which to express the [true] road: Is.” “Necessarily therefore,
either it simply Is or it simply Is Not. Thus our decision must be made in these
terms: Is or Is Not. Surely by now we agree that it is necessary to reject the
unthinkable un-sayable path as untrue and to affirm the alternative as the path of
reality and truth.” 33

VI.

Axioms and definitions are self evident truths. As Aristotle said, such
definitions are so true that they cannot be proved nor do they need to be proved
because they are true. 34

These assumptions are evident in Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, as well as Western
philosophical, scientific, and religious traditions since Plato and Aristotle. Thus, if two
individuals disagree they cannot both be right. The correspondence theory of truth
holds that to tell the truth is to say that what is is what it is, to tell a falsehood would be
to say that what is isn’t or that what isn’t is. This is the basis for distinctions between
objectivity and subjectivity. And it is expressed in the literalist approach to theological
texts which in Alexandria combined Greek philosophy with monotheistic theology.

30

Aristotle, On the Soul II (ii) 413b, (W.S. Hett trans.) Harvard University, 1957, p. 77
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32
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33
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The deity is now the author of names and naming---as Thomas Hobbes suggested in the
16th Century. 35
Of all the Pre-Socratic Greek Philosophers, Heraclitus would seem to have been closest
to Lao Tzu and to share a quite similar metaphysical-epistemological-ontological
synthesis in common with Taoist philosophers.
•
•
•

For example: Fragment #21 “You cannot step twice into the same river, for other
waters and yet others go ever flowing on.
Fragment #112 “To be in agreement is to differ; the concordant is the discordant.
From out of all the many particulars comes oneness, and out of oneness come all
the many particulars.
Fragment #117 “People do not understand how that which is at variance with
itself agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the bending back, as in the cases
of the bow and the lyre.” 36

It was for these and similar propositions that Heraclitus has been rejected by much of
the Western philosophic and scientific tradition and excluded from discussions of
classical categorical logics. As Aristotle wrote in his comments on Heraclitus:
Supporters of the theory of Forms were led to it by means of Heraclitus’
argument concerning truth, in which he holds that whatever is perceived by the
senses is in a state of flux. [Accepting that much of his argument these
philosophers go on to argue] that if there is to be a science of anything, there
must be other entities in nature besides those perceived by the senses, inasmuch
as there can be no science of what is in a state of flux.37
By the time of the death of Aristotle in 322 BCE, Athens had fallen to Macedonia (339
BCE). When Alexander died of a fever in Babylon in 323 BCE, many of the
independent, quarrelsome Greek cities had come under the influence of the empires and
kingdoms he left behind. In this Hellenistic period, the entire Mediterranean was a
Greek sea, with famous cultural centers outside of Greece proper at the museums of
Pergamum, Cos, and Alexandria. In matters of religion and philosophy, the Hellenistic
world fluctuated between belief in the arbitrary decisions of Tyche, the Goddess of
fortune, and the deterministic laws of fate.

35

Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, New York, Everyman’s Library Edition, E.P. Dutton Co. 1924 p., 12
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Hans Vaihinger and the 19th-20th Century

Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) was a German philosopher who began his university
studies at Tubingen in theology and Greek philosophy. He was early interested in
Plato’s ’innate ideas’ and interpreted these as basic myths.
From this early interest in what he considered the myths of philosophy, religion, and
science he constructed his own “Philosophy of As If” or fictions. He clearly saw the
utility value of fictions in all intellectual endeavors –however, the problem was that
once one has accepted fictions and myths in philosophy, religion, science, one tends to
forget that these are fictions and treats them as absolute truths. As he noted again and
again, the facts of one age are the fictions of later ages. If one can view absolutes as
useful fictions, then one can modify them or adopt others without conflict.
Before we discuss Vaihinger’s philosophy, we want to look at that amazing time in
which he lived at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th. We will
start with the historical, scientific, theological and philosophical changes and political
revolutions with which an educated individual at the time would have been aware.
Christian dogma after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and other religious conflicts
that followed in England and on the Continent had given way to a sense of religious
tolerance and skepticism. French, American, and Russian Revolutions had replaced
monarchies. The emperors of Russia, Germany, and Austria had been exiled or slain.
In international relations, the First World War, 1914-1918, had demonstrated the
destructive possibilities of modern technology.
In mathematics, Plane Geometry had become an “n-dimensional logic” and not the
science of real space. In biology, evolution had supplanted divine creation. In physics a
world of forces, particles, waves, and ultimate indescribability had replaced classical
models of causality. As the English physicist, Paul Dirac, wrote in 1933:
“The classical tradition had been to consider the world to be an association of
observable objects moving according to definite laws of force, so that one could
form a mental picture of the whole scheme. … It has become increasingly
evident, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws
do not govern the world as it appears in our picture in any direct way, but
instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture
without introducing irrelevancies.” 38

38
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Hans Vaihinger was a product of this age. Born into a Protestant family, he had a
teacher who read the Hindu Mahabharata with him and so acquainted him with the
myths of gods and rituals of Hinduism. And he began comparing these myths and gods
with those of Western monotheism looking for similarities and differences.
•
•
•

He read Herder and other historians of his time, who viewed history as a human
project without a divine plan.
He began to apply Darwin’s theories to the evolution of ideas as myths.
From Hume and Kant he realized that what philosophers call ‘reality’ is a
projected ‘fiction’, and that a ‘real world’ is unknowable.

To all of these experiences he brought his understanding of Plato whose eidos or ideas
he interpreted as fictions. He saw the fictions of science and philosophy and religion
and politics as pragmatic and useful, but also felt it was critical to see them as fictions
which reflected a way of thinking at a time – but not a fixed reality and so they could be
changed without violence if more useful interpretations emerged in time.
This idea of fictions became the basis of his philosophy of As If.

Section Three: Hans Vaihinger: The Philosophy of ‘As If’’
Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of As If’ and his analyses of scientific fictions are based on
his views of the nature of thought, thinking and mind:
Scientific thought is a function of the psyche. By the term psyche we do not
understand a substance, but the organic whole of all so-called mental actions and
reactions: these never come under external observation but have to be partly
inferred from physical signs partly observed by the so-called inner sense.
Psychical actions and reactions are, like every event known to us, necessary
occurrences; that is to say, they result with compulsory regularity from their
conditions and causes. If we would compare psychical process with some group
of external phenomena, the physical and in a narrower sense mechanical
processes are less suitable than the functions of the organism. This statement is
confirmed by the fact that so-called empirical utility is found in the psychical
functions as well as in the organic functions of the bodily sphere.
This utility is manifested here as there in a ready adaptation to circumstances
and environment; in the maintenance of a striving and successful reaction of the
physical or psychical organism to external impulses and influences; and in the
adoption and acceptance or the repulsion of new elements.
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In the psyche there takes place not merely a mechanical play of ideas but the
movement of ideas (which) fulfils to a great extent the demands of utility in its
continual modification. All psychical processes are useful in the sense
mentioned; above all the so-called theoretical processes of apperception.
Scientific thought consists in such apperception-processes and is therefore to be
considered from the point of view of an organic function. 39

Vaihinger explains this psychical aspect as more than a container into which sensations
are poured or a passive mirror that merely reflects rays according to pure physical laws.
Rather, the psyche appropriates and changes what it can use and apply to its own
processing. The word fiction comes from the Latin fictus, past participle of fingere,
which means to shape or to fashion or to feign.
Thus a fiction would be the basic mental actions and reactions which shape all
interpretations of sense stimuli, emotions and ideas of physical events. Vaihinger
emphasizes that this organic function of thought proceeds mostly unconsciously. 40
…Consciousness receives no external stimulus without molding it according to
its own nature…. The psyche is an organic formative force which
independently changes what has been appropriated, and can adapt foreign
elements to its own requirements as easily as it adapts itself to what is new.
The mind is not merely appropriative; it is also assimilative and constructive. In
the course of its growth it creates its organs of its own accord in virtue of its
adaptable constitution, but only when stimulated from without, and adapts them
to external circumstances….Just as the physical organism breaks up the matter
which it receives, mixes it with it own juices and so makes it suitable for
assimilation so the psyche envelops the thing perceived with categories which it
has developed out of itself. 41
An excellent summary of the changes in physical and social science consistent with
Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘As If” is provided by the French anthropologist, George
Devereux in this discussion of Henri Poincare’s theory of ‘explanation’:
According to Henry Poincare, if a phenomenon admits of one explanation it will
admit also of a certain number of other explanations all as capable as the first
39

Hans Vaihinger: The Philosophy of ’As if”: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious
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40
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41
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one to elucidate the nature of the phenomenon in question. I for my part specify
that in the study of Man (but not only in the study of Man) it is not only possible
but mandatory to explain behaviors already explained in one way, also in
another way, i.e. within another frame of reference. 42
In his analysis of what he calls the “Law of the preponderance of the means over the
ends,” Vaihinger suggests that while thinking and knowledge are limited to
experiencing and arise only as a means to life and survival of the body/mind
combination, both the physical and psychical natures continue to evolve in what
becomes a preponderance of means over ends where the original survival purposes or
ends are replaced and/or exceeded by evolution of the means to ends. Sports and
athletic competitions in general might be a good illustration of the physical means over
ends – which lead to both specialized developments of physical organs, muscles, bones,
and even body shapes---as well as new forms of sport-related injuries.
For Vaihinger, the mental evolution of means over ends is particularly relevant to his
analysis of science as fictions and the philosophy of as if where original questioning
related to immediate survival is replaced by increasingly abstract metaphysical
questioning as to the origins of the universe, purposes of human existence, life after
death, and nature of… questioning.
It is in the dynamic and changing attempts at answering the purpose of and nature of
questioning that ‘science as fictions’ evolves in historical times and cultural spheres in
philosophies, sciences religions, etc.
Everywhere I found evidence that an original means working towards a definite
end has this tendency to acquire independence and to become an end in itself.
Thought which originally serves the purposes of the will and only gradually
becomes an end in itself was the most obvious special case of a universal law of
nature that manifests itself in new forms always and everywhere, in all organic
life, in the processes of the mind, in economic life, and in history. 43
Questions in various language systems may still be formulated in traditional
syntactic structures; however the semantic meaning or content changes and as a
consequence questions may seem meaningless at different times and their
answers if any both true and false or neither true nor false, etc. These over time
can become the most basic metaphysical, epistemological, axiological,
ontological questions in science, religion, philosophy, etc, e.g. was there really a
big bang, do gods really exist, what is the purpose of my/human existence?

42
43
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This limitation of human knowledge seemed to me now to be a necessary and
natural result of the fact that thought and knowledge are originally only a means
to attain the Life-purpose so that their actual independence signifies a breakingaway from their original purpose; indeed, by the fact of this breaking loose,
thought is confronted by impossible problems which are not merely insoluble to
human thought … but problems which are utterly impossible to all forms of
thought as such., 44

Two examples of an awareness of this breaking loose might be found in the opening
lines of the Tao te Ching, in reference to Tao and Ming, and in the three propositions of
the Greek Philosopher Gorgias in his text Concerning Not-Being: “first that nothing
exists, secondly that even if anything existed it could not be known by men, and thirdly
that even if anything could be known by anyone it could not be communicated to
anyone else..” 45
Vaihinger stresses the practical value of the questioning and answering which poses
insoluble or relative answers for this very nature of their formulation, and asking and
answering as fictions is the basis for the further development of the psyche in all ages
and intellectual areas and disciplines.
As Physicist Bruce Gregory in his Inventing Reality stresses, “…physics is only
indirectly about the world of nature. Directly, it is talk about experimental
arrangements and observations. Given a particular experimental arrangement, physicists
can predict the outcome of certain measurements. There is nothing arbitrary about these
outcomes... Nor is there anything arbitrary about the predictions. What is not given to
physicists by nature, but rather is invented by them is what they say about these
outcomes, the language they use to talk about nature. If physicists try to step outside the
scheme of experimental arrangements and observations to envision what sort of
independent mechanism in the world ‘really’ produces these observations … they enter
a blind alley from which nobody as yet escaped.” 46
The Enumeration and Division of Some Important Scientific Fictions
Vaihinger offers an extensive list of as-if fictions that the psyche uses in the physical
and social sciences, philosophy, economics, political and juristic systems to explain and
define both sensing and the sensed world of experience, and he suggests that a
combination of generalization and isolation of aspects are frequently used in the
creating of these fictions. Symbols and languages also facilitate this process:
44
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Words are fruitful aids in the fixation of general images. They help the abstract
type which thereby gains a new kind of clarity, a sensuous support by means of
the audible word. But no perception covering, let us say, the word tree can be
shown to exist. We either perceive a green or a barren tree, a high or a low one,
etc. The word tree, on the other hand, designates something that appears in all
the perceptions of a tree but which cannot be further determined… 47
Vaihinger stresses, however, that abstract and general ideas must be distinguished from
one another. Concepts like goodness, color, smoothness, equality are abstract ideas, for
the properties in question are separated by isolation from what he calls concrete things,
but they do not constitute independent qualities of objects. On the other hand, stone,
plant, pine-tree, ship are general ideas that are formed by generalization from the
experiences of particular phenomena.
This differentiation is one of principle but only of principle, for in practice the two
operations of isolation and of generalization almost always occur together. For the sake
of clarity in exposition, however, it is expedient theoretically to keep these two types
rigidly apart.
According to Vaihinger, the fictions the psyche uses in its digestive processing of
explaining and interpreting experience are expressed in sciences, mathematics,
religions, and philosophies as analogies, definitions, axioms, tautologies, etc. “These
are syntheses of image and abstraction which are incorporated into systems of
deductive and inductive reasoning e.g.: artificial classifications, juristic fictions,
analogical fictions, fictional constructs in mathematics, ethical fictions, etc.” 48
Conclusion
As was suggested in the Forward, the 19th and 20th Centuries mark a shift in the
physical and social sciences from the axiomatic and materialistic objectivism of the
Greek philosophers of the Axial Age toward a dynamic process view of both nature and
knowledge. This is a view which is much closer to the views of many traditional
Chinese philosophers of the Axial Age. This shift has been accompanied by a
realization of the implicit necessity of accommodating the ‘mind of the observer’ as an
aspect of the ‘nature of the observed’ in the process of observation within what Wheeler
calls a participant/ spectator universe.
This shift not only challenges the mechanistic presuppositions of classical physical
science; it also requires a flexible epistemological methodology for accommodating the
47
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rapidly changing theories of nature in physical and social science. It is this flexible
methodology that can be provided by Hans Vaihinger’s “Fictions of Science and the
Philosophy of As If” that replaces absolutist and naïve empiricism with the concept of
‘fictions’ which as syntheses of minding and naturing can be molded and modified as
human understandings of perspective and aspects of experiencing evolve.
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From Globalization Waves to Global Civilization
Andrew Targowski

andrew.targowski@wmich.edu
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this investigation is to characterize the impact of Five Waves of
Globalization. These five Waves of Globalization have involved the world-wide flow of
goods, money, information, and people with scope and intensity such that the progress
of history has been altered. The waves emerged in the last 500 years and impacted the
world’s major civilization, itself a complex of compatibly interactive entities of society,
culture and infrastructure within a large frame of territory and time, usually embracing
several nations and centuries or even millennia.
As the result of these five waves, what we can label the Global Civilization is emerging
in the 21st century. Its religion, society and infrastructure will be defined and associated
repercussions noted. It is a very rare case when we can observe the rise of a new
civilization during our own lifetime. However, this is the case with Global Civilization,
a new civilization now replacing Western Civilization.
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION WAVES UPON CIVILIZATION
The 500 years of the intensive and consistent process of globalization of the world may
provide the following conclusions:
•
•
•
•

Globalization waves were triggered by a global-minded elite which is and was
able to control global economic strategy and political policy.
In the last 66 years (1947-2013) humans have been facing four different
globalizations.
Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica have been both ideologically confrontational
and globally minded.
Pax Consortia and Pax Virtualiziana have been both economically-politically
confrontational and oriented to humanity worldwide.

Some generations have been experiencing all these four globalization waves with many
challenges and all kinds of problems.
The last 500 years of Info-Communication Technology (ICT) development transformed
the global elite from a colonial to an information orientation. This should be promising
from a humanistic point of view, particularly in ideological confrontations of the single
global society (Financial Elite) and global virtual society (Meritocratic Elite).
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In Table 1, these global waves are compared and assessed.
Table 1. The Comparison of Globalizations in the Last 500 Years
WAVES

GUIDING
DIMENSION

EXECUTABLE
DIMENSION

TECHNOLOGICAL
DIMENSION

SOCIETAL
DIMENSION

I-Pax
Portuganna
1500-1837

Henry the
Navigator

Portuguese Empire
Based on the Best
Ships and Needs for
Spices and Luxury
Goods

School of Navigation
(Information
technology)

Christian
Society

II-Pax
Britannica
1837-1914

British
Royalty &
Government

British Empire
Based on the Best
Ships and Needs for
Raw Materials and
Markets for Industrial
Goods

Telegraph, Telephone,
Steamships

Colonial
Society

III-Pax
Americana
&
Pax Sovietica
1947-1989

Democratic
Minds of
American
Rulers

American
Superpower

Satellite
Communication,
Computers, Longdistance Airlines and
Ships

Middle Class
Society

IV-Pax
Consortia
19892000+++

Stateless
Consortia
Financiers,
CEOs

G8 and Party of
Devos
Off-shore
Outsourcing

The Internet,
Long-distance Airlines
and Ships

Upper and
Low Classes
Society

V-Pax
Virtualiziana
2000+++

New
Information
Elite

Global Virtual Nation
and Government

The Internet

Global and
National
Virtual
Societies

Figure 1 illustrates the 500-year long process of developing these five Globalization
Waves, resulting in the transformation of the world via the formation of two new
horizontal civilizations at the dawn of the 21st century: the Global and the Virtual
Civilization.
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Pax Consortia
2000s+++

World War II
1939-45
Pax Americana
1947-89

Global
Civilization

Enlightenment

Pax
Portugana
1500-1837

Technology as
Politics

dialectics

English/American/
French Revolutions

Virtual
Civilization

dialectics

Pax Britannica
1837-1914

small
world

Pax
Virtualiziana
2010+++
Industrial
Revolution

Pax Sovietica
1945-91
World War I
1914-18

Triumph of Humanity

Defeat of Humanity

Test of Humanity

Triumph of Humanity?

Figure 1: 500 years of transformation by five Globalization Waves

THE ENABLING FACTORS OF GLOBAL CIVILIZATION
Technological Advances In Transportation And Communications Technologies
Technologies provide the infrastructure for globalized operations. Table 2 illustrates the
decreased costs of transportation in the last 160 years (1830-1990). Table 3 shows how
the costs of communication and computers declined in the last 40 years (1960-2000).
During the first and second waves of globalization, technology provided incredible
productivity in making and moving things. Today, technology is driving the
productivity of information itself.
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Table 2. Transport Costs, 1830-1990
Year

Ocean Transport
Average Air
Transportation
Wheat,
Ocean Freight
Revenue per
Percent of
1920 = 100
Passenger Mile
Production
(in 1990 US$)
Cost
1830
79
1850
76
1880
41
1910
27.5
1920
100
1930
65
0.68
1940
67
0.46
1950
38
0.30
1960
28
0.24
1970
29
0.16
1980
25
0.10
1990
30
0.11
Sources: Baldwin and Martin (1999), World Economic Outlook, May 1997, Table 11.
Table 3. Communication and Computer Costs, 1960-2000
Year

Cost of a Three Minute
Price of Computers and
Telephone Call, New
Peripheral Equipment
York to London
Relative to GDP Deflator
(in 2000 US$)
(2000=1000
1960
60.42
1,869,004
1970
41.61
199,983
1980
6.32
27,938
1990
4.37
7,275
2000
0.40
1,000
Sources: World Economic Outlook, May 1997, Table 11, updated to 2000; U.S.
Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Masson (2001).
Info-communication Technology (ICT) triggers a shift in the postindustrial society’s
modus operandi, which is based on new key features (Bell 1981):
(1)
(2)
(3)

the shift from a goods-producing to a service economy,
the increasing reliance on theoretical knowledge, and
creation of a new “intellectual technology” based on computers and other smart
machines.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

81

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 70 [2014], No. 70, Art. 15

Comparative Civilizations Review

77

Manuel Castells observes that “what has changed is not the kind of activities humankind
is engaged in but its technological ability to use as a direct productive force what
distinguishes our species as a biological oddity: its superior capacity to process
symbols.”
ICT technology does not replace agriculture and industry but rather optimizes them. It
leads towards the informatization of the Global Society, which by connecting all of us
makes us the Global Open Society. Like the symbiosis of humans and machines, the
emerging Global Digital Consciousness provides cognition and external memory
systems that support the Global Civilization and vice versa.
Hence, the Global Digital Consciousness is composed of:
•
•
•
•
•

infosphere (computerized info-communication systems composed of databases,
applications, and networks)
cyberspace (the Internet and Web applications)
mediasphere (radio, TV, cable)
mindsphere (global ideas generated by previous global spheres)
cybersociety (using e-communication and presence).

The Globalization Index, which breaks globalization down into its most important
component parts, indicates that the “most wired” countries in the world are beneficiaries
of globalization. The Globalization Index tracks the movements of money in terms of
investments and business transactions in the era of “electronic capitalism”
.
Manufacturing Outsourcing from Western Civilization to Oriental Civilization
In the 1980s, developed countries began to outsource manufacturing to countries with
cheap labor. As a result, poor countries broke into global markets of manufacturing
goods and services. Their export of manufactured goods and services rose from 25
percent of total export in 1980 to more than 80 percent by 1998.
The most successful countries in this trend are Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Poland
and Mexico, and another 20 countries. They, with 3 billion people, reached a level of
growth 5 percent higher than developed countries.
The rest of the developing world trades less at the beginning of the 21st century then it
did in 1980, which means that 2 billion people are still marginalized (mostly in Africa),
with some countries even showing negative growth.
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In more successful, developing countries, the poverty level decreases. The total number
of poor people in rural China alone was reduced from 250 to 34 million over the years
from 1980 to 1999 (Stern et al l 2002).
Lowering Tax Barriers
The recent reduction in average tariffs has been highest in South Asia, from 65 percent
in the early 1980s to about 30 percent in 2002. In the same period, Latin America, East
Asia and the Pacific lowered tariffs from 30 percent to 15 percent; Europe and Central
Asia went from 15 percent to 10 percent, and the most industrialized economies
dropped their tariffs from 8 percent to 5 percent.
Only in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa were tariffs maintained
at consistent percentages, at roughly the 20 to 25 percent levels that existed in 1998
(World Bank 2001). Countries like Ethiopia and Uganda liberalized trade significantly,
nonetheless.
Average tariffs in rich countries were low, but they maintained barriers in exactly the
areas where developing countries have a competitive advantage: agriculture and laborintensive manufacturing. The cost of protection by rich countries -- paid for by poor
countries -- is at the level of 100 billion US$ per year, which is twice the size of aid
from the Northern to the Southern hemisphere (Stern et al 2002).
Power of Global Financial Elite
The last few decades, since the 1970s, and particularly since the 1980s, have seen the
rapid rise to prominence of the financial sector of the U.S. economy and of global
capitalism in general; the system’s center of gravity has shifted from production to
finance.
The result has been a massive growth of the financial system, one in which a debt
squeeze-out never quite occurs, leading to bigger financial crises and more aggressive
state interventions.
As this process proceeded near the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st,
more and more exotic forms of financial innovation arose. This included all kinds of
futures, options, derivatives, and swaps, along with the growth of a whole shadow
banking system off the balance sheets of the banks.
The repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, although not a major historical event in itself,
symbolized the full extent of the deregulation that had by then largely taken place. The
system had become increasingly complex, opaque, and ungovernable.
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As a result, a whole new era of dominance by financial conglomerates arose, and the
world witnessed the onset in 2008 of the Great Financial Crisis (Foster and Holleman
2010). Data from the Forbes 400 show that speculator capitalists had become
increasingly dominant in the U.S., displacing, as a class, industrial and petroleum
capitalists. In addition, the speculative basis of American and global capitalism brought
a greater risk of instability to the fore.
Some scholars argued that the dominance of the financial elite over the U.S. and, thus,
the Global Economy, has been exercised through various power elites, drawn directly
from the capitalist class itself and from its hangers-on, those who come to occupy
strategic positions in corporate and government circles. The concept of “the power
elite” was introduced in the 1950s by sociologist C. Wright Mills, and it was
subsequently developed by others, notably G. William Domhoff, author of the
controversial book, Who Rules America? For Domhoff, the power elite is “the
leadership group or operating arm of the ruling class. It is made up of active, working
members of the ruling class and high-level employees in institutions controlled by
members of the ruling class.”
Power of Global Corporations
In 1952, General Motors CEO Charles Wilson famously said that ''What is good for
General Motors is good for the country.'' During the past decade and a half, General
Motors and other global corporations have obtained much of what they claimed was
good for them. They have succeeded in obtaining trade and investment liberalization
policies that provide global firms considerable new freedoms to pursue profits
internationally. They have also persuaded many governments to take a hands-off
approach to corporate monopolies, claiming that mega-mergers are needed for firms to
compete in global markets.
Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations; only 49 are countries.
This assertion rests on a comparison of corporate sales and country GDPs prepared by
the Institute for Policy Studies in 2010. To put these facts in perspective, we would
note that Royal Dutch Shell was in 2012 bigger than Argentina; Wal-Mart was bigger
than Austria; Toyota was bigger than Pakistan; IBM was bigger than Slovakia; and
Apple was bigger than Morocco.
Global corporations in our era exercise their power in ways beyond their economic
competence. They operate strong election campaign contribution arms and are
constantly engaged in lobbying. The exact amount spent on these activities is not
known, but of the Top 200 firms, 94 maintain ''government relations'' offices located on
or within a few blocks of the lobbying capital of the world along Washington, DC's K
Street Corridor.
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Tax Avoidance As Another Symptom of the Power of Global Corporations
While company-specific data on tax avoidance inside and outside the United States does
not exist, the trend towards lower corporate tax burdens is also evident internationally.
According to the OECD, over the past two decades the share of total taxes made up by
corporate income taxes in the industrialized OECD countries has remained about 8
percent, despite strong increases in corporate profits. The non-governmental
organization attributes this decline in tax rates to the use of ''tax havens'' and intense
competition among industrialized countries as they attempt to lure investment by
offering lower taxes.
WHY GLOBAL CIVILIZATION?
The fourth wave of globalization leads towards the emergence of what can properly be
entitled Global Civilization because it meets the general criteria of civilization
(Targowski 2004). A few examples follow:
•

•
•

•

Global religion -- since Western Civilization has been transformed into Global
Civilization at the dawn of the 21st century, Christianity (Protestantism and
Catholicism) has been replaced by the global religion, which is reflected in the
belief that business is the omnipotent power and it should control society for its
benefit. What is good for business is good for society.
Human entities are composed of certain segments of societies for 8 autonomous
civilizations -- Western, Eastern, Islamic, Japanese, Chinese, Buddhist, Hindu,
and African.
Culture has a global character, which means that similar patterns of behavior are
practiced (de facto by certain segments of those societies only) in those
autonomous civilizations, for example “English” language, professional and
student dress codes, music, movies, food and drinks.
A Global Infrastructure of information via the Internet and Global Area
Networks and of material via transportation, finance, and business reaches every
autonomous civilization and integrates them into an emerging Global Society
and Global Economy. Furthermore, there are many international organizations
(for-profit and non-profit, official and unofficial) such as the United Nations,
UNESCO, GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and NATO that create the Global Infrastructure of
Regulations.

Global Civilization is not another autonomous civilization, one which can be called
vertical. Rather, it is horizontal and it penetrates autonomous civilizations, as shown in
Figure 2.
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The Emerging Global Civilization: A New Layer of the World
Civilization At the Dawn of the 21st Century

Some critics may say that the reach of Global Civilization in the least developed
autonomous civilizations is yet very modest (for example, a small number of users of
the Internet or telephones). On the other hand, this reach is observable and known in
those civilizations, whose elites are active, substantial participants in the Global
Civilization.
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HOW GLOBAL CIVILIZATION IS IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZING
OTHER CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS
Using the Comparative Approach
Figure 2 intuitively exemplifies the perceived degree of globalization taking place in
eight contemporary civilizations in the 2010s. The most globalized of these is the
Western Civilization, which has almost already transformed into the Global
Civilization. It happened because Western Civilization is the key trigger of globalization
as it attempts to achieve more growth of its saturated economy.
The Japanese Civilization is far advanced in the process of transformation into the
Global Civilization, since Japan accepted in the 19th century a strategy of modernization
à la Westernization. The Meiji Restoration -- also known as Renovation, Revolution,
Reform or Renewal -- was a chain of events that restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868
under the Meiji Emperor. This period lasted from 1868 to 1912 and was responsible for
the emergence of Japan as a modernized nation in the early twentieth century. After
World War II Japan democratized its political system and Americanized its economy,
becoming the leader of advanced manufacturing goods in electronics and cars today.
•

•

•

•

The Eastern Civilization (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Armenia,
Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia (not Greece, which is Orthodox but as
the exception belongs to Western Civilization) is modernizing and globalizing
today, depending on a given state’s policy.
However, due to political obstacles such countries as Russia and Belarus are
trying to restore the Russian Empire. They are led by strong nationalism, based
on the common enemy, which is wrongly (but purposely) perceived - the
political West or Global Civilization.
Countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia are in the process of associating
with the European Union, which is far advanced in the transformation into the
Global Civilization. Romania and Bulgaria are already members of the
European Union and westernizing/globalizing fast.
Only Ukraine is caught at the crossroads between the Eastern and Western
Civilizations. In the fall of 2013 Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovich refused
to sign a proposed association agreement with the European Union. Instead, he
opted to sign an agreement with Russia, which provided a 15 billion dollar loan
for Ukraine at specially lowered prices (RIA Novosti-12.19.2013). However,
pro-EU Ukrainian demonstrators and riot police continue to clash in Kiev, the
president of the country fled, and Russia is now annexing the Crimea. If Ukraine
stays with Russia it will deepen its nationalistic attitude against the West;
however, at the same time it will be globalizing à la “Russian Mother.”
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The Chinese Civilization is the largest beneficiary of globalization since as the
result of this process, it became the World Factory. Its young generation is
Westernizing quickly but the political leadership does not want to modernize via
Westernization. It is doubtful whether this civilization will transform fully into
the Global Civilization in the foreseeable future.
The Hindu Civilization is modernizing, Westernizing and globalizing to become
the World IT Laboratory. English is one of two official languages of this
civilization, which helps tremendously the process of obtaining economic
benefits from globalization. On the other hand, due to remarkable social and
economic inequality in this civilization, it is doubtful whether it will ever be able
to transform into Global Civilization.
The Islamic Civilization is “oiling” the process of globalization and profiting
from it. On the other hand it is refusing to modernize and Westernize, except for
its elite. Even the promising Arab Spring in the 2010s has shown, as in Egypt,
that it can be a path backward rather than forward. Some of its countries, such
as the United Arab Emirates, beat all world records in rising the most modern of
cities (such as Dubai). Qatar, with its super modern city of Doha, benefits from
global tourism and finance, but the social system is extremely far from Western
Civilization’s policies.
The Buddhist Civilization is strongly religion-driven, although its religion tends
to support a secular lifestyle. It has such intellectually meaningful dogma that
many Westerners switch to Buddhism. It is very doubtful that Buddhist values
will be replaced by values of global business ever.
Finally, the African Civilization has its elite educated in Western/Global
Civilization but due to colonialism in past centuries, it is the victim of
Westernization and of contemporary globalization, a new colonialism.
Nowadays, Africa is a battle ground between Christianity and Islam, being in the
meantime taken by Chinese businesses and their values driven by Chinese faiths.
Therefore, today Africa is tempted by globalization but it is not able yet to
transform into Global Civilization.

Table 4 compares contemporary civilizations and their abilities to globalize and
transform into Global Civilization.
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Table 4.
The Comparative Status of Contemporary Civilizations in Terms of Their Ability
to Become Participants in Global Civilization in this Century
CIVILIZATION
Western

Globalization
Impact

Key Factor

IT triggers
Globalization

Global financier

Japanese

IT triggers
Globalization

Global
Corporations

Eastern

Depending on
Country

Business and/or
De-Sovietization

Chinese

IT triggers
Globalization

Business

Hindu

Strong

Business

Islamic

Weak

Oil Export

Buddhist

Very Weak

Tourism

African

Confused

Natural
Resources

Status of Global
Civilization

Global Civilization
Dominates Western
Civilization
Global Civilization
is Second Layer
over Japanese
Civilization
Rather Globalization
than Global
Civilization ever
Rather Globalization
than Global
Civilization ever
Rather Globalization
than Global
Civilization ever
Globalizing Elite
Globalizing services
for visitors
Globalized as byproduct of Global
Business’ Activities

REPERCUSIONS
Economic Decline
and Possible
Correction
Economic
Stagnation and
Possible Correction
Status Quo
Controlled
Globalization
Spontaneous
Globalization
Arrested
Globalization
Anti-globalization
policies
Confused policies

As it is shown in Table 4 Global Civilization is essentially what might be labeled
Western Civilization 2.0. It is accepted today by the Japanese and Hindu Civilizations.
What is the future of Global Civilization? Is it limited to being Western Civilization
2.0? Or, due to several profoundly negative changes that it carries, such as a
diminishing middle class and a technological assault upon the labor force, will it shift
into reverse gear? Or is it really good for the World Civilization to break with diversity
and move to one and only one kind of a civilization? The near future should provide
several substantial answers to these questions.
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GLOBAL CIVILIZATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
At the end of 2nd Millennium, two civilizations -- the “Western-West” and the Japanese
--were at the level of saturation. This pushed them to external expansion, leading to the
creation of the Global Economy. From the end of World War II until 1973, the United
States experienced sustained economic growth. But at the beginning of the 21st century,
the U.S. with a saturated national economy began to depend on outsources in order to
assure sustainable growth.
Outsourcing provides growth to the American national economy without the creation of
new jobs. This process is being copied by other states of the Western-West Civilization.
Of course, the reaction of the victims of globalization is strong and loud. It looks like
workers of the Western-West Civilization are not satisfied with the rise of Global
Civilization, but stateless consortia and some developing countries are.
Almost every product or service market in the major economies of the World
Civilization has foreign competitors. Increased foreign competition is in itself a reason
for a business to globalize – in order to gain the size and skills to compete more
effectively (Yip 1995).
The global competitors today are mainly Americans, Europeans, Japanese and Chinese.
Therefore, the Global Economy is only possible because it is supported by Global
Infrastructures. These infrastuctures support:
•
•
•
•
•

global communication (the Internet, Global Area Networks),
global transportation,
global finance activities,
global scientific knowledge (principles, rules, and laws defined in a given
science/technology) creation and dissemination, and
global management practices, even global peacekeeping (with less success).

The architecture of the Global Civilization is shown in Figure 3. Global Civilization
today is controlled by an invisible power, a force composed of global financiers and
banks, stateless corporations, outsourcing CEOs, the G7, the IMF, the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization and global religion, culture and infrastructure.
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Global Infrastructure
Global Culture
CHINESE CIVILIZATION

JAPANESE CIVILIZATION

Global Religion
WESTERN CIVILIZATION

EASTERN CIVILIZATION

Global Society

BUDDHIST CIVILIZATION

GLOBAL CIVILIZATION

HINDU CIVILIZATION

ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION

AFRICAN CIVILIZATION

Figure 3 The Architecutre of Global Civilization
Global Civilization can be defined as follows:
Global Civilization is a large Global Society living in integrated horizontally whole or
partial spaces of contemporary, autonomous civilizations as a fuzzy reification
(invisible-visible) which is not a part of larger one and exists over an extended period of
time.
It specializes in inexpensive labor and differentiates from other civilizations by
developing its own advanced global cultural system driven by electronic
communication, a global business religion (super-consumerism, wealth & powerdriven), and a sharing of the same knowledge (principles, rules, and laws defined in a
given science or technology plus wisdom (good judgment and choice).
It is a system that relies upon complex urban, agricultural infrastructures, and others
such as industrial, information ones. It also progresses in a cycle of stages such as
rising, growing, declining and falling.
However, at the dawn of the 21st century it is in the rising stages of that cycle.
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CONCLUSION
At the dawn of the 21st century, the IVth Wave of Globalization has been transforming
Western Civilization into Global Civilization. Thus, Christianity has been replaced by a
Global Religion (under the form of business religion), while Global Information and
Transportation Infrastructures have become very popular solutions to global
communications as well as moving materials, goods, and people.
Eventually the Global Society is becoming a visible, strong entity developing Global
Culture as distinctive similar patterns of behavior are increasingly practiced around the
world.
This worldwide transformation is reflected quite visibly in rising huge financial
inequality among globally specialized businessmen and workers (without college
degrees in Western Society, structurally unemployed and unlikely to be re-employed
unless they get good professional degrees).
For example: In the U.S. out of 155 million members of the labor force, about 120
million will likely not be able to pursue the so-called American Dream. Furthermore,
their plight supposedly is their own fault.
In addition, the mass media and political leaders continue to maintain that what is good
for business should be good for society.
The number of people attending church, Christians in Western Europe particularly, is
declining dramatically. Average Westerners are more attracted by consumerism. All
the values related to this transformation are provided by business. Some state that
business does not possess overwhelming power and it can be controlled by the
democratic process of politics. However, practice shows that, through its lobbyists,
business opposes any regulations planned by politicians and required by the electorate
against the interests of big business.
Global Civilization is of an integrative and horizontal character. It penetrates formerly
autonomous civilizations either entirely (like Western Civilization) or partially (like
Japanese, Chinese, Eastern or Hindu Civilizations). At the beginning of the 21st
century, we have seen Western Civilization almost totally transformed into Global
Civilization, while traditional Western Civilization declines.
The Japanese and Hindu Civilizations today are modernizing through Westernization,
becoming Globalized or Westernized 2.0., but they still retain their strong traditional
civilization character. Civilizations such as the Chinese (financed through being the
World Factory, the largest outsourcer) and the Eastern (financed through oil export) are
modernizing very impressively and refusing being Westernized. Nonetheless, they are
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globalized through intensive trade development reaching all corners of the world. Their
traditional civilizations and values, much like the Japanese and the Hindu, are retained,
however.
Some insist that globalization and Global Civilization is a long-awaited solution
enabling the diversified human race to grow as One Family with One Government.
However this view neglects the new golden rule: diversity when united can lead to a
totalitarian, ineffective, and corrupt world government.
Global Civilization is not stoppable, in my judgment, since it is driven mostly by the
very strong desire felt by the new Global Elite to increase its wealth and via the drive to
improve the economic condition of undeveloped and developing nations. In addition,
the relatively free flow of ideas and people are both welcomed by the new Global Elite
composed of media, intellectuals, and some politicians who control the global mindset
of people.
One reason that there are no obvious signs of a slowing down the process of
globalization is that the anti-globalization movements are too weak to threaten the
Global Elite.
However, in the long-term Global Civilization will not prove sustainable, since it
consumes strategic resources (oil, gas, uranium and color metals) in an accelerated
manner. Eventually the human race will not be at the level it has attained today. One
must hope that mankind’s ability to develop more effective knowledge and technology
will help solve social problems that we face today. But it is evident that technology
alone cannot solve huge, looming problems of overpopulation and planet degradation.
Only human wisdom is capable of that.
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Karl Renner on Stability, Change, and Service in Entire Legal Systems
Joseph Drew

josephdrew4920@verizon.net
A century ago this year, World War I broke out, and one of its most dramatic results
was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Onto the world stage burst a social
theorist and lawyer named Karl Renner, the first Chancellor of the democratic Republic
of Austria. Then, after World War II, he almost singlehandedly re-created a newlyfreed Austria as a democratic country; for his labors, he was elected the first President
of the new Central European democracy. Today, Renner is known widely as the father
of the country. His bust is found in front of the parliament, and the location is called
Dr. Karl Renner Ring (Street).
Renner should also be known as a pioneering expert on the theory of law and as the man
who was able to adapt and modernize legal theory and practice, reconciling democratic
socialist and advanced capitalist views of law. He enabled us to see that law could
serve as an instrument of human betterment and that socialists, democratic socialists,
could thrive and lead in an anti-communist Western world.
The comparative study of law and legal systems across civilizations owes much to his
pioneering work. Both in his reformulations and applications of legal analysis and in
his systematic generation of a theory of the development of modern society, Renner
ranks among the greats in the history of social science-based jurisprudence.
In addition, he developed theories of past, present, and future class structures, means of
domination and conflict, and the levels of integration and conflict of norms and
institutions in a series of works fundamental to modern European social thought. And
he made both the ideas of Legal Positivism and socialist sensibilities workable and
compatable within a completely democratic framework.
In scholarship he helped bridge the gap between widely varying positions, just as in
politics he led Austria into a restructured social and political system totally based on
freedom and amenable to Western traditions and cultures yet accepted by almost all
political parties.
The scholarly Renner can be seen as two writers.
•
•

The “young Renner" concentrated on the exegesis of socialist theory and was
concerned particularly with the relationship between law and society.
The “later Renner" brought forth, long before Mills, the concept of the "service
class" and maintained that the peaceful evolution of this class as a “working
class" would culminate in a harmonious, almost one-class society.
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The theoretical, young Renner dealt with the relationship of law and economics. The
intellectual father of socialism, Karl Marx declared as a fundamental principle of
socialism that law was one of the elements of the "normative superstructure." As such it
merely reflected the “material base” of society, which is to say, economics. This was
where Renner’s thought began. The principal work of Dr. Renner dealing with the
subject, and the only one of his major works available at present in the English
language, is called The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Social Functions.
The original German language work, published in 1929, is entitled Die Rechtsinstitute
des Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion.
Renner Was Grounded In Marxian Thought …
Thus, his early works should be seen as a critique of the basic writings of Karl Marx.
Marx, like many capitalist theoreticians of today, claimed that economics underlies all
other visible parts of life; it constitutes the motor of history.
Marx famously asserted in the Preface to A Contribution to The Critique of Political
Economy that “the economic structure of society (is) the real foundation on which rise
legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness.”
Further, Marx stated in the same passage that “the distinction should always be made
between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which
can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political,
religious, esthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological -- forms in which men become
conscious of the conflict and fight it out.”
Starting from this view of the basic relationship between one part of the superstructure,
law, and its “real foundation”, economics, Renner began to develop his systematic
analysis. But, as a lawyer in Central Europe, he was also a Legal Positivist. Law was a
long-lasting coherent entity.
In the end, Renner wound up breaking new ground, finding for socialists and democrats
a set of solutions that Marx himself might not have greeted happily but which worked.
Today, vast numbers of Europeans and others are social democrats; their views of law
owe much to the reformulation of socialist thought as cast by Karl Renner.
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But He Changed The Implications of Marxist Thought on Law and Society

Renner did not blindly accept all of Marx’s ideas, especially the theoretical Marxian
notions concerning the relationship between property and class conflict. Property since
the Middle Ages has constituted a basic institution of law and it is central to how
individuals relate to one another. Marxist theory maintained that property was a basis
of conflict between adversarial classes, most recently, between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat.
Renner, however, felt that in the century or so since the “bourgeois revolution,” the
class structure of European society had changed a great deal, becoming more
complicated than Marxism had anticipated and necessitating an innovation in Marxist
thought.
The new social structure of Europe in the post-feudal world “puts alongside the
capitalist, who owns and functions, the other one who owns but does not
function…what is more, it also produces the non-capitalist who exercises
capitalist functions, who, therefore, does not own but (who) functions as a
capitalist.”
(From Renner, Die Wirtschafals Gesamtprozess und die
Sozialisierung.)
Ralf Dahrendorf, the late eminent German-British social philosopher, was a Free
Democrat German political leader, head of the London School of Economics, Member
of the British House of Lords, and author of the monumental work Class and Class
Conflict in Industrial Society.
He studied the thoughts of the young Renner, a man whose career was similar in many
ways to his own. He observed that by labeling the controlling manager as a capitalist,
Renner had separated successfully class conflict from its Marxian root. Thus,
Dahrendorf pointed out, private property and the assertion that a society based on
communal property is a classless society lose their traditional meanings. (Ralf
Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 84.)
This, I think, informs much of the contemporary analysis of elite leadership and the
significant sociological question of “who rules?” in advanced industrial society. In a
sense this development has been viewed by an entire succession of theoreticians, from
the Industrial Revolution on. Writers from Comte and Saint-Simon to Weber, from
Pareto and Mosca to Michels and Schumpeter and Pirenne, form James Burnham to
Raymond Aron and T.B. Bottomore, from C. Wright Mills to William Domhoff, to
Digby Baltzell and to Suzanne Keller. All have worked in the vineyard that Renner
ploughed so productively, enabling analysis of an old query in a reformulated and more
productive vein – old wine in a new bottle.
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And in many ways, Renner changed permanently the meaning of socialism, certainly for
Europe. What, he asked, is socialism? Socialism, in his definition, was “an urgent
demand for a human society that acts in freedom and in full consciousness, that creates
its norms in complete independence.”
Renner wrote that in modern times what he called “complementary institutions” were
displacing “principal institutions.” That is to say, property -- private property -- has
been supplemented in the modern era “by complementary institutions which take over
its real (I would say, original) functions.” (Renner, p. 295.) Moreover, complementary
institutions of public law had forced private institutions of law into the background.
To Renner, “private law,” meant that which is being transformed, addressing thus the
ownership of land and movable property, contracts, mortgage and leases, and marriage
and succession. By contrast, “public law” referred to that type of law dealing with the
organization of the state or of local governmental bodies.
Renner argued that the state is moving ahead to administer and to regulate these new
and formerly private areas, so that “new norms are made year by year in increasing
numbers in the form of statutes, orders, and instructions of the administrators of the
state.” (Renner, p. 297.)
Thus, increasingly, “owners” were being deprived of the technical disposal over their
property. Did the owner of a railway station have the right to deny potential passengers
access? Or stop trains leaving “his” station for some destination? No. The common
will had now, from the point of view of the law, subjected property, and other
institutions of private law, to its direct control via the government.
By this analysis Renner shattered Orthodox Marxism’s view of “the real foundation”
and “superstructure” and he also departed from traditional Marxian notions of the
institutions of private law. The “general will of society” had become the new ruler,
taking the place of the "full capitalist" who formerly had prevailed with an iron hand,
part of a dominant class in the earlier days of industrial society. Renner argued that the
law was gradually becoming objective, following the norms of society as a whole and
not of a ruling class. The revolution, therefore, recedes in Karl Renner’s thought into
the background, melts away. Rational, objective government -- serving the will of the
people -- makes it unnecessary.
"The general will defines the aim for society and thereby for the economy, and
all functionaries pass over from the service of a master to the service of the
whole.”
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So, Renner found that “economic democracy supplements political democracy.”
Dahrendorf says that “this, of course, is Rousseau versus Marx -- a contest that produces
some fascinating results... from the separation of ownership and control, the extension
of citizenship rights and quality, the institutionalization of class conflict, and the
emergence of the ‘new’ middle class.”
Renner infers the arising of two large and non-antagonistic social classes: a service
class and a working class. As a result, “Renner’s theory of class structure has many
traits which appear well compatible with the changed realities of post-capitalist society
and which it will therefore be useful to bear in mind.” (p. 95.)
Renner Also Modified the Ideas of Legal Positivism
As a lawyer from a poor family born, raised, and trained on the European Continent,
Karl Renner was educated in the positivist school of law; he was to become in his adult
life also a significant modifier of it. The school of thought known as Legal Positivism
developed in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Continental Europe. It was, as
Friedman writes in Legal Theory, “a jurisprudential reflection of the age of liberal
capitalism.” (Friedman, pp. 148-9.)
Legal positivism asserts that there is a logical consistency to the system of laws as a
whole. There is one immutable body of legal norms; it exists sui generis, constituting
what Durkheim would call “a social fact.” It is almost impossible to eliminate social
facts. For example: the Roman Catholic Church exists as a social fact, even though no
one present at the founding of the church still remains in it. A social fact is like a hotel;
people come in and people go out, but the structure remains permanently.
The existence and content of law of course depends on man’s social existence – law is
socially constructed ab initio. But whether or not a given norm is legally “valid,” and
thus whether it forms a legitimate part of the law of that system, depends on its sources,
not its merits, said Renner. As a legal positivist, he had to emphasize the stability of
legal forms. But he also saw and described the greatly changing economic and social
conditions of post-Industrial Revolution Europe, changing much more rapidly than
feudal Europe ever had. How to square this circle?
As a legal positivist he could declare the legal norm (of property, for example)
continually existing but he could also, in an innovative break, note that this norm
existed “ indifferent to its social function.” It could, in fact, serve new functions, new
purposes.
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Renner thus agreed with legal positivism’s basic assertion that the forms of law don’t
change, but he concluded that their functions did. Therefore, the economic effect (is)
extraneous to the definition of a legal concept. “Institutions such as property, contract
succession by inheritance, are “neutral, ‘colorless,’ and ‘empty frames.’ They are
neither ‘feudal’ nor ‘capitalist' nor ‘socialist.’ Their juridical analysis cannot teach us
anything about their social or economic effect.” (Renner, Introduction, p. 2.)
As the famous nineteenth century English jurist and expert on legal positivism, John
Austin, said, “the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether
it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or not be conformable to an assumed
standard, is a different enquiry.”
A later British jurist, Oxford’s Professor of Comparative Law, Otto Kahn-Freund, noted
in a discussion of the role of legal positivism in Renner's writings that “The absence of
major legislative regulations which affected the economic system engendered an
atmosphere in which the normative framework of society appeared to be stable and its
conceptions fixed.” But then:
“The First World War administered a mortal blow to the conceptual Utopia. The
events that followed, inflation and catastrophic unemployment, gave it the coup de
grace.”
“The concepts of property and of contract were thrown into the melting pot, when
the institutions of private law, like their counterpart, the laissez-faire economy,
proved unable to safeguard the life and expansion of society.” (Renner, p. 37.)
Legal positivism did not develop in or dominate the Anglo-Saxon schools of law.
Rather, as Max Weber noted in Economy and Society, it was a form of rationalization of
the law which, since the rise of Romanist university education, had remained a
characteristic of thinking in Central Europe.” (Renner, p. 15. From Weber's Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft, p. 509.)
In Continental law, the thought processes were influenced by natural law and oriented
toward a systematic structure of rights and duties. We may say, wrote Renner, that it
rested upon general principles. In Anglo-Saxon law, we deal with “a method of
argument whose primary preoccupation is with remedies, not with rights; with
procedural form, not with juridical substance.” (Renner, p. 15.)
Renner nonetheless modified this Continental legal positivism: While in Anglo-Saxon
countries a change in legal norms might occur and then be followed by judges' altering
of rigidities in the law to meet the new norms, on the Continent such had not been the
case. There was only one answer for legal positivists: legislative relief.
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Karl Renner greatly admired the work of the American Supreme Court justice, Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Holmes, writing in The Common Law, said that the growth of law is
logical in form. “The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically
from existing precedents.... The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret roots from which the law draws its juices of
life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community
concerned.” (From Holmes, pp. 35-36.)
This is Holmes's celebrated “paradox of form and substance in the development of the
law” and one which Renner followed.
How did Renner square the second circle, the one between Marxist dogma and legal
positivism? How, given all the profound social, economic, and political changes he
observed in Europe, could he explain away the fundamental Marxist assertion that it is
the economic foundation that is central; law is a mere part of the superstructure that
reflects economic reality?
Easy. He argued that there is a time lag between the transformation of the underlying,
foundation, the (economic) system, and the development of changes in the law (the
superstructure). During the lag “norms which at an earlier period of history may have
been a true mirror of social relations, “may cease to be an adequate expression of factual
conditions.” Renner concluded that the state should not legislate morality, as we would
call it today, for vast changes in the legal system would not bring about revolution in the
substructure or in the way we live. To Renner, only evolution could do this.
Marxism is based on a “dialectical” approach to the movement of history, a
development built on Hegelian thoughts and methods. This involves the clashing of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The so-called "dialectical" method that the innovative
Marxist Renner said he employed in his analysis, however, was actually based on at
least two levels of sophistication.
•

First, he utilized the notion of a “factual substratum” and a “normative
superstructure.” This for him "probably represents the Marxian method,"
Dahrendorf drily observed.

•

Second, as a legal positivist, he worked with a “discrepancy between the
normative content of the law (which is static) and its social and economic
function (which is dynamic).” (Renner, p. 7.)
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Prof. Kahn-Freund observed that for Renner "the legal institution is (seen as) a rigid
abstract … of crystallized imperatives …” and as Renner wrote in his works, there are
few disappearances of institutions of law. Legal institutions do not fade away, losing all
their functions totally. Rather, they experience a transformation of functions.
This is the heart of Renner’s legal, jurisprudential innovation.
Renner wrote of the impact of economic forces and consequent social changes upon the
functions of legal institutions. He asked: How it is possible that a legal institution, for
example “property,” can mean the same thing in 1750 as it does in 1900, and yet, in the
latter year, it can produce economic and social effects almost opposite to those it did
back in 1750?
How can one account for the functional transformation of a norm which remains stable?
he asks, in essence. “What, in particular, is the technique used by a developing
capitalist society in order to adapt precapitalist and early capitalist legal conceptions to
the needs of high capitalism without changing these conceptions themselves?”
“How does society use the institutions of the law, what does it ask of them, how does it
group and re-group them? How does it put them to new services without transforming
their non-native content? How has property been able to become the legal framework of
a capitalist economy?" (Renner, p. 1.)
Renner’s Reformulation of Continental Law
Renner started his study of law and its change with history. “It will be our task,” he
wrote, “to show that the historical development of the law, and the growth of individual
laws and their decay, flows from the disparate development of legal and economic
institutions; also, that the change in the social functions of legal institutions takes place
in a sphere beyond the reach of the law and eventually necessitates a transformation of
the norms of the law.” (Renner, p. 52.)
A legal institution “regulates the factual relationships of living beings and successive
generations; it regulates facts which are in a constant state of flux and it is, like law in
general, nothing but one aspect of the subject matter which it governs.” (Renner, p. 53.)
The special work of legal institutions is “to serve as cogs in the mechanism of the
production, consumption and distribution of the social product.”
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Yet society and law evolve. Are legal institutions like natural phenomena and subject to
the laws of nature? The Western World had experienced the advent of Darwinian
science within his lifetime, although I have not read of Renner acknowledging this. But
he surely did ask himself, basically, what forms of law were best adapted to the new
social environment.
At first, says Renner, we might think that there is an analogy between the laws of nature
and the rules of law; the former control the relations among natural objects, the latter
regulates the affairs of men. Both seem to operate as superhuman powers. The world
“would seem to be divided into a realm of reason and a realm of nature, the first
governed by rules of law (side by side with the rules of morality) and the second by
laws of science.” (Renner, p. 45.)
Yet, says Renner, when we switch from a discussion of natural to human legal systems,
we note that the indicative voice changes to the imperative.
“Every norm in its indicative form assumes a fetish-like character, akin to a law of
nature, transcending the individual, superhuman, even divine. If the norm is
resolved into imperatives directed to the individual and telling him ‘you ought’ ‘you
ought not,’ ‘you may’ ‘you can,’ … it appears immediately less unnatural, though
still not acceptable as self-evident.
The analogy between the law of nature and the legal system is now meaningless, for
nature knows neither controlling common will, nor an individual will that is
controlled.” (Renner, p. 46.)
Renner grandly surveys history. “The ancients usually spoke in direct imperatives when
they recorded their norms in stone and metal, on papers and parchment, e.g., the codes
of Hammurabi, the Mosaic Decalogue, and the Twelve Tables of Rome.”
“Such imperatives are the elements of the legal order. They are addressed to the
individual and claim his obedience. Aiming at the will, they limit or enlarge, break
or enhance the individual will and hence confront it as an extraneous will.”
“This relation of will is fundamental to the law; there is no mystery about it, nothing
metaphysical, supernatural or divine. From the psychological and physical aspect,
the highway robber who attacks the wayfarer in the wood with the alternative
command of ‘your money or your life,’ attempts to impose his own will upon that of
another person in the same way as the law seeks to impose its own authority, with its
instant readiness to apply civil sanctions or with the threat of punishment and
criminal sanctions.”
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How the authority of another person (the “heteronymous will”) is imposed upon the
wishes of an individual (the “autonomous will”) is a matter of common experience.
“There is, however, this mysterious difference: that in modern times all law is laid
down, in the name of all the citizens, by the state, conceived as an entity. Instead of one
man’s will prevailing over the will of another, the common will is regarded as imposed
upon that of the individual. How the common will arises -- for it is clearly not the
volonté générale-- is one of the fundamental problems for jurisprudence.” (Renner, p.
47.)
He uses this conundrum to vitiate, attenuate, or simply put, to alter dramatically, the
most fundamental Marxist dogma about the “superstructure” within which law resides,
and about the movement of history.
As Man Changes, Law Changes
Some formerly felt, however, that legal institutions are given per se, that they remain
unchanged, even if man and matter continually undergo change. Renner responds to
this Scalia-like “originalist” objection.
At first, the answer seems to be in the affirmative, for “right must always remain right.”
For centuries, the law was considered divine, immutable and constant, like the deity
itself. The mere idea that man should engage in an attempt to change the law was
considered blasphemous. Even one who came into this world to change the whole
order of humanity believed himself in duty bound to say that he had come not to
destroy the law but to fulfill it.
For thousands of years all change in the law was carried out in the belief that men
had at last arrived at the right interpretation.
The thesis that man can create the law has gradually been accepted, at first in the
form of state parliamentarianism within the narrow confines of the various
countries.
Today, every school child knows that parliament exists in order to make laws. But
we can still not explain satisfactorily how it is possible that parliaments can obtain
a right to legislate; if it is accepted that parliament makes all laws by virtue of the
constitution, the question remains, who gives them the right to legislate?
Indeed, these are most controversial questions. Parliament exercises its rights to
make laws in the name of the community. It is a mere organ, it is argued, through
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which society expresses itself. But it is still obscure exactly how society makes its
new laws. (Renner, p. 54.)

Renner explains.
“We can only develop a complete theory of the law if we supplement positive, legal
analysis with an investigation of the two adjoining provinces, the origin and the
social function of the law. These three, together, form the whole of legal science."
(Renner, p. 54.)
If legal institutions are not related to the rules of nature and they do not remain rigid
over time, to what, then, is their real content related? Legal institutions have a two-fold
nature, Renner believes, according to their constituent norms on the one hand, and to
their social significance on the other.
“Both can and must be taken into consideration. From the lawyers' point of view
legal institutions are norms or imperatives molded into assertions, printed or written
on paper, more or less adequately expressed. Their existence compared with that of
men of flesh and blood is as insubstantial as that of railway shares compared with
the permanent way or rolling stock of a real railway, or that of treasury notes
compared with real bars of gold.” (Renner, p. 52.)
Renner argues that social life is complex in character. “It is not so simple that we can
grasp it, open it, and reveal its kernel like a nut, by placing it between the two arms of a
nutcracker called cause and effect.” (Renner, p. 56.)
The economic and the social functions of legal institutions make up a single process.
According to Renner, “a legal institution is a composite of norms. If in the change of
economic systems it has remained constant, but its functions have increased,
diminished, changed, or disappeared, then we speak of a change in the functions.”
(Renner, p. 75.)
For example: “Let us consider the vestals that had to keep the fire ever burning on all
the hearths of the community. We may well imagine that as long as they existed, the
sum total of the laws relating to them remained unchanged and the relevant norms
remained constant. With the discovery of flint and steel, however, all economic
functions of the vestals were taken over by a substitute. Here we should be entitled to
say that an economic revolution -- the discovery took place in a sphere outside the law - deprived the legal institution of its social function, made it redundant, and led to its
final abolition.” (Renner, p. 75.)
The reverse can be true, as well.
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We may imagine that a legal institution retains its function and economic
significance, though the norms which make it up have been transformed.
Imperatives may have been added, taken away or altered, yet the essence will
have remained of what was commanded. This, too, is neither unthinkable nor
unhistorical.” (Renner, p. 75.)
We can see in legal development the transformation of the legal norms and thus
of the functions. But the function is, nonetheless, necessary for society.
However much the functions of legal institutions may change, no function can
remain unfilled permanently without involving the destruction of society itself.
If a function is no longer served by one legal institution, another must be
substituted for it; there is no vacuum in the legal system.... Legal institutions
can, within certain limits, take each other’s place. As a rule, however, new
institutions are required. (Renner, p. 76.)
And this is central for comparative law and civilizational studies: “The organic
character of the legal order is the fact that the totality of legal institutions existing at a
given time must fulfill all general functions. This means that the law is an organized
whole determined by the needs of society. Every legal institution, as part of it, is more
or less closely related to all others; and it is its function, not the content of its norms,
which makes for this connection.” (Renner, p. 76.)
The line of argumentation, I think, is quite like the Functionalist school of American
sociology, the articulation of whose elements arose at Harvard and Columbia a half
century later.
Four Theses on Change in a Legal System
In his sociological analysis of functional change Renner develops four theses on the
relationship between law and economics, i.e., societal development. We see how far he
has moved Marxist thought from A Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy
in these four theses.
Renner believes that he has shown -- in his analysis of the legal institution par
excellence, i.e., property, that “while there have been extensive alterations over a short
period of time,” this “drastic transformation” has not been accompanied by “noticeable
modifications of its legal structure.” Hence, he generates the first thesis:
Fundamental changes in society are possible without accompanying alterations
of the legal system. (Renner, p. 252.)
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Next, the existence of society depends upon a determined, historically conditioned legal
order. This legal order does not cause social change but neither does it prevent changes
in the underlying infrastructure, either. The essential character of the social process as
preservation and reproduction of the species undergoes continual change while the form
of the law is constant.
Thus, the second thesis:
It is not the law that (usually) causes fundamental economic (or social)
development. (Renner, p. 252.)
Third, Renner argues that we might feel ready to conclude that the legal superstructure
is absolutely independent of its economic foundation or that changes in the legal system
come from non-economic sources. This is not quite true, Renner argues, and hence the
third thesis:
Economic change does not immediately and automatically bring about changes
in the law. (Renner, p. 253.)
The fourth and final thesis is the basis for much of the theory he later developed more
extensively and for which he was so vilified by many orthodox Marxists. Functions of
legal institutions, he has shown, change only gradually, and imperceptibly, “like the
growth of grass, according to the law of all organic development. Thus, the change of
functions can be recognized only at an advanced stage and only by historical
comparison. It can be recognized only when it has matured.”
This thesis, then, is:
Development by leaps and bounds is unknown in the social substratum, which
knows only evolution, not revolution. (Renner, p. 253.)
How very far had mainline, once revolutionary, socialist thought progressed in the near
century from Marx to Renner, in the period during which the many peaceful, gradual
solutions to the age-old clash of property with labor became evident.
Renner does not believe that the law can, ipso facto, command new behavior. Any valid
law can be changed, he says, yet it does not itself change society or bring about social
evolution. There are external limits to the "efficacy" of norms -- laws can only
command people, not nature. Also, laws can be addressed to individuals, not groups.
Finally, the law can express its commands only through the instrument of human
beings. Law aims at “the control of the organic texture of nature, of the
interconnections among men, and between men and matter.” (Renner, p. 256.)
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A final example of social change is given. Renner considers the reward to public
servants in the early Middle Ages. A vassal then was given an office and land. Later
on, in the Middle Ages, trade and money became more important, so salaries were paid.
The office became less important and was abolished (i.e., “the nobility”) in the
bourgeois revolution. In the course of time the intention of the original norm “is no
longer achieved. In fact, the trend of development due to economic laws which are
inherent in the substratum is more powerful than the power of the law.” (Renner, p.
259.) So Renner warns against what he calls the “Archimedes law of the Lawyer.”
This translates as: “give me the lever of legislation and I shall move the world.”
(Renner, p. 259.)
Why? Because legislation cannot totally change reality. In the following sentences it
seems like he is directly disabusing Marx of the latter’s dogmatic rigidity.
Even if the dispossessed classes ran a successful revolution today, he argues, tomorrow
the same individual would have the actual detention of the goods. Were the state to
abolish all private ownership, he says, property would retain all its functions and it
would still have the same social effects as private property had generated. “So, the new
law would have failed and the faith in legislation would be shattered as an illusion. The
agrarian constitution of contemporary Russia is an irrefutable proof of this argument.”
(Renner, p. 260.)
Thus, Renner has shown that the functions of the law and of legal institutions have
changed quantitatively and qualitatively over time. What is needed now is simply for
social scientists to examine the place that legal institutions occupy in society.
Renner writes: “A lawyer may be interested in it during his leisure hours, but he must
not allow this interest to intrude upon his work anymore than the botanist as such may
be concerned with the economic use to which others put the plants he studies under the
microscope.” (Renner, 2.) Questions of the social effect of legal norms transcend the
legal structure. However “interesting these social repercussions may be to the lawyer as
a sideline, they are the province of the economist and the sociologist.” (Renner, p.248.)
The “job for jurisprudence today is to investigate the political and economic forces
which make laws and become norms, i.e., the practical, sociological causes of
them.” (Renner, p. 297.)
Renner sums up his work on this matter. “The legal expert who has accompanied us in
our observations will have made the surprising discovery that law and economics,
though appearing to be indissolubly bound together, if considered as static at any given
moment, yet undergo unequal development in the course of history. Contradictions and
contrasts emerge, and their mutual relations are seldom reversed.
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Thorough examination of the vast field presented by civil law for inductive
investigation soon leads to the discovery of common characteristics within this
dialectical development. It thus becomes possible to read its laws from these facts.”
(Renner, p. 251.)
So what Renner did was to transform increasingly obsolete socialist thought about law
into a set of concepts thoroughly acceptable to democratic people – a much more
accurate formulation, I think, than both (a) outdated orthodox, rigid Marxian and (b)
Andrew Ure-type high capitalist statements about the relations between the economic
foundations of society and the legal reflections of them.
He showed that the structure of law is such that countries cannot easily legislate what
societies have not yet accepted. The practices generated by society precede the
codification legal institutions provide; a social fact, the institutions remain, but just as
hotel guests come in and go out, so, too, the service the institutions of law provide
changes over time.
In a sense, Renner modernized, vindicated, and legitimated socialism for the West by
making it a more true reflection of reality; underlying social causation exists, he argued,
and law only reflects that supposed foundational reality. But on the other hand, it is also
Marxism stood on its head, because at the level of superstructure legal institutions
persist even in spite of changes in the basic underlying, causal foundation (whether it be
a Weberian “ideational” or a Marxian “material,” economic one, or both). One might
ask: which is foundation and which is superstructure? And does economics really form
the basis of history, the pattern and meaning of our times? Or is Max Weber correct –
do both “ideas” and “material factors” – plus other considerations – move history? And
why must there be a social revolution when evolution will better serve the needs of the
entire population?
Renner the politician led his country from monarchy through to a republic based on
democratic socialism which would meet the dreams of the people yet be thoroughly
compatible with Western democratic ideals; much of Austria's enormous economic
success in this post-war era came as a result of his prodigious efforts. Much of the
European Union’s success, likewise, arises from this reformulation of democratic social
thought.
Not long after the Nazis were finally destroyed, Renner was able to convince all allied
occupying powers, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to accept Austrian “neutrality” and
withdraw from the country, way before this was the case in Germany. So, too, in his
intellectual life he led the way from conflict-based Marxist starting points to more
widely accepted conclusions; he directed his political theory to the development of
classes, now social classes, that would not be antagonistic but instead cooperative; and,
finally, he provided a much admired theoretical basis for understanding the changing
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nature of law and its relationship to society, offering an advance on the fundamental and
rather static assumptions of both Marxism and Legal Positivism.
With good reason, textbooks on law and society rank Renner alongside Durkheim and
Maine. This eminent thinker surely is worthy of attention by comparativist scholars in
their attempt to understand the complex relationship between law and society both
worldwide and through the years since mankind surrendered the hunter/gatherer way of
life and adopted civilization.
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Kaplan, Robert D., The Revenge of Geography:
What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate
Random House, 2012
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
It is apparent when one looks at a map of the world that geography matters. The
people who live in the oxygen-thin altiplanos (the Himalayas and the Andes) have a
different relationship with their natural world than those who live in jungles or deserts.
Island natives have a different relationship with the sea than those who have never seen
great bodies of water. However, the modern world is divided by man-made boundaries
into nation states that, if they have geographic integrity, are easier to govern than those
cobbled together out of often-contrasting geographies. We are learning this to our pain
in today’s conflicts.
Robert Kaplan, a journalist-historian, has a constitution that permits him to travel,
often on foot, across the globe in some of the world’s least savory territories. In one of
his books, From the Ends of the Earth, he began a trek from West Africa, living on
quinine and bottled Coca Cola, all the way to the borders where China meets Central
Asia. He walked, hitched rides from truck drivers, talked to urban cabbies, and asked
questions based on his keen curiosity.
This man knows the geography of the earth---on the ground---probably better than
any other geographer alive today. His book is a summary of what he has learned from
his many treks and voluminous reading. Kaplan is also one of the world’s best geopolitical experts; his suggestions and advice are taken seriously by political and military
planners.
In this book, Kaplan demonstrates how geography plays an enormous role in
explaining current conflicts, conflicts that those ignorant of history do not recognize as
not new at all. Beginning with the great Greek historian and traveler, Herodotus,
Kaplan provides us with summaries of the most influential geographers, masters of an
art that has somehow declined from its heights in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Kaplan is no geographic determinist. He never claims that geography is the only
factor in how human beings organize their lives; there are always powerful individuals,
cultures and religions, and the effects of earth-bound events (volcanic eruptions,
tsunamis, prolonged droughts, sudden global cooling), and the effects of choices, often
bad ones, that human societies make.
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However, geography is always there as a backdrop for human history. To ignore it
is to make decisions that can doom actions to failure.
Scholars and Visionaries
The Revenge of Geography reviews in some depth the scholars and visionaries who
enriched the scholarship of history with the addition of geography: W. Gordon East
(1902-1998); Nicholas J. Spykman, who wrote in the 1940s); John Keegan ,who noted
that America and Britain could champion freedom only because the sea protected them
from the land-bound enemies of liberty; Herodotus, the great geographer of ancient
Greece; William H. McNeill; and Marshall G. S. Hodgson, who made geography an
important part of history. Hans Morgenthau, a practitioner of geopolitics, defined
realism for the present age.
Kaplan’s discipline is the intersection of geography and politics. In its negative state
it treats geography as the only determinant of politics. Sir Halford J. Mackinder wrote a
single essential article, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical
Journal, London, 1904. His thesis is that Central Asia, forming the Eurasian Heartland,
is the pivot on which the fate of great world empires rests. Mackinder’s point is that out
of that heartland, traveling both west and east, the grasslands people affected both
European and Chinese history. “Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large
measure controls.”
Nicholas J. Spykman, who founded the Institute of International Studies at Yale in
1935, said that history is made in the temperate latitudes where moderate climates
prevail. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Southern Cone of South America matter today, but
they cannot have the effect on world issues that the northern zones have. The Nazis
distorted this view to equate racial mental ability with geography.
Europe
Kaplan’s book next explores the geographic realities of Europe and explains why
the various regions have had such different historic experience. This very elaborate
interface between land and water, and the fact that Europe is protected from---and yet
accessible to---a vast ocean has led to maritime dynamism and mobility among
Europe’s peoples, and contributed to an intense range of landscapes inside Europe itself.
Although Europe is a mélange of strikingly different human communities with a history
of outbreaks of power politics from antiquity to almost today, Europe is also an idea.
Geography explains much. When the Warsaw Pact broke up, the former captive
countries advanced economically and politically almost exactly according to their
positions on the map: Poland and the Baltic states, Hungary, and the Bohemian end of
Czechoslovakia performed best. Balkan countries did the worst. Despite the Nazi and
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Soviet impacts, the legacies of Prussian, Habsburg, and Byzantine and Ottoman rule are
still relevant.
Russia
Russia is a case in which geography looms very large indeed. Russia comprises a
vulnerable landmass that has suffered catastrophic invasions from its very beginnings,
leaving its rulers understandably paranoid.
Russia is the world’s preeminent land power, extending 170 degrees of longitude,
almost halfway around the globe. Russia’s principal seacoast is in the north, unusable
for most of the year. Russia is insecure, as all land powers are. Forever dissatisfied,
Russia needs to expand or risk being conquered instead. Russia’s flat expanse has no
natural borders and affords no protection.
Russia’s geography is more important than its history. Russia, severely cold, lies
north of the 50th parallel (Canada is at the 49th). “Harsh seasonal cycles, a few, distant
rivers, and sparse patterns of rainfall and soil fertility controlled the lives of the ordinary
peasant; and the ebb and flow of nomadic conquerors often seemed little more than the
senseless movement of surface objects on an unchanging and unfriendly sea.” This
made for a landscape of anarchy, in which every group was permanently insecure.
China
Unlike Russia, which is a giant land power with little access to oceans, China has
the Pacific Coast, as well as land access to central Asia. (The US has three oceans.)
While Russia lies north of 50 degrees north latitude, China lies to the south of it, as does
the U.S. China’s various latitudes equal those of the U.S. (from Maine to the Florida
Keys).
In the U.S., rivers run north to south, early opening much of the country in those
directions. China’s rivers run west to east. Until the Chinese built a north-south
connecting canal, they couldn’t fully develop their country; the canal made it possible.
The US east-west transcontinental railroads had a similar effect, an illustration of
human effects on geography.
China, a demographic behemoth with the world’s most energetic economy for the
past three decades, is, unlike Russia, extending its territorial influence much more
through commerce than coercion. They have already extended into Mongolia (both
Inner and Outer) in the quest for vast natural resources. The Han population is already
moving in and may overwhelm the natives.
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China’s next extension lies in the Russian Far East. China will move into that area
if it can, and as Russia loses population, this seems inevitable.
India
India’s geographical dilemma is that it is a pivot state, a Rimland Power, according
to Spykman. Located in the center of the Indian Ocean littoral, it is critical for the
seaward penetration of both the Middle East and China. What is essential for the U.S. is
to understand India’s highly unstable geopolitics re: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China.
India has a geographical logic, framed by two seas and by the mountainous Burmese
jungles to the east and the Himalayas and Hindu Kush to the north and northwest. India
is internally vast, but it lacks a singular nursery of demographic organization (such as
the Wei Valley and lower Yellow River in China).
The Ganges does not provide enough of a platform for the expansion of a unified
Indian state. India’s various other rivers divide not unite it. The Ganges is Hindispeaking; the others are not.
We cannot overlook the role of hot tropical climate on ambition and the need for
organization of resources, unlike the temperate zones of China and Europe. India has
been subject to perennial invasions, much rarer in China, and lacks the cultural unity of
China.
Pakistan
Pakistan is home to four ethnic groups, mutually hostile: Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi,
and Pashtun. Islam technically unifies it, but in reality does not. Without the Punjabdominated army, Pakistan could not exist as a polity. Being Muslim is not enough to
keep ethnic hostilities at bay. India has handled such problems better.
India is the birthplace of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Zoroastrians,
Jews, and Christians also have lived in India for millennia! India accepts this reality and
celebrates it; Pakistan does not. This is why India is stable and Pakistan is not.
Afghanistan
With a life expectancy of 44 years, literacy rate of 28 percent (much less for
women), and with only 20 percent having access to potable water, its urbanization only
30 percent, Afghanistan does not have much going for it. Out of 182 countries,
Afghanistan ranks next to last on UN Human Development Index.
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Kaplan compares the relative success of our occupation in Iraq and the obvious
relative failure in Afghanistan, which has much to do with geography and sociogeography. Afghanistan could disappear from the maps of the future with the Pashtuns
having either a country of their own or a larger Pakistan. Then the rest of Afghanistan
might return to its roots as eastern Iran.
The Iranian Pivot
William McNeill noted that India, China, and Greece all lay “on the fringes of the
ancient civilized world, protected by mountains, deserts, and sheer distance.” They all
suffered invasions, but not enough to disrupt their innate cultural character. The
invaders were largely horsemen and because they were culturally less developed than
the ancient civilizations, they were ultimately absorbed.
In the space between these great civilizations was the parched temperate zone of the
Afro-Asian landmass, from North Africa to the margins of western China, the Nile-toOxus. But this area has a pivotal influence on each of these civilizations.
The Iranian Plateau has only one country, Iran. 74 million, 2-1/2 times that of Saudi
Arabia. Population growth is well under control. Turkey has the same low population
growth and a higher literacy and a stable agricultural economy and is more
industrialized than Iran. Turkey does not have oil; Iran is No. 3 in the world.
Arab World
The Middle East is characterized by a disorderly and bewildering array of
kingdoms, sultanates, theocracies, democracies, and military autocracies. This is one
densely packed axis of instability. The region contains 70 percent of the world’s proven
oil reserves and 40 percent of its natural gas reserves. These states are prone to
pathologies of extremist ideologies, crowd psychology, overlapping missile ranges, and
profit-driven mass media. Except for Korea, nuclear proliferation is more of a factor in
the Middle East than in any other area. There is also a youth bulge with 65 percent
under the age of 30. Between 1995 and 2025, the populations of Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Oman, Syria, the West Bank, Gaza, and Yemen will have doubled.
If the Iranian Greens ever take power, Iran, because of its strong state and dynamic
idea, would have the means to shift the whole groundwork of the Middle East away
from radicalization, thus providing political expression for a new bourgeoisie with
middle class values. Despite all its advantages, the suffocating clerical rule of Iran
hinders its international progress. Iranian Technicolor has been replaced by grainy
black and gray.
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If the Shah had not been toppled, Iran could by now be like South Korea. The
Shah’s regime was open to reform; the Ayatollahs are not. Iran could indeed become a
major empire of sorts, doing good in the world, if the ayatollahs disappear.
Turkey (Former Ottoman Empire)
The Iranian plateau is a major pivot in the Greater Middle East (and is completely
one country); the Anatolian land bridge is likewise, and is also completely one country,
Turkey. One would have to go from Egypt to the Atlantic to equal in power Iran and
Turkey together, with a population of 150 million, more than all 12 of the Arab states.
Both countries are agricultural and industrial, with tech know-how. Both could
produce nuclear weapons if they wanted, which the Arabs cannot. Turkey, like Iran, has
an enormous cultural influence in the Balkans, the Black Sea coast, Ukraine, southern
Russia, the Caucasus, and the Arab Middle East. And it seems stable.
The aggressive energy that characterizes the leaderships of Turkey and Iran has for
decades been absent in the Arab world. But as time passes, the geographies of Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and other countries will reassert themselves. Tunisia and
Egypt are ancient clusters of civilizations. Libya and Yemen are but vague geographies,
whose statehoods were not established until the 20th century.
Iraq
Iraq has never been left alone. Mesopotamia cuts across one of history’s bloodiest
migration routes, pitting man against man and breeding pessimism. Mesopotamia was a
constant victim of occupation from as early as the third millennium BCE. From Persia
to the Mongols and the Ottomans, Iraq has been a tragic victim. Its geography is also
fragmented. The fragility of the social order has always been part of Mesopotamia.
Only a ferocious dictator could manage it.
Syria
Geography and history tell us that Syria, population 20 million, will continue to be
the epicenter of turbulence in the Arab world. Aleppo in the north is a bazaar city with
greater historic links to Mosul and Baghdad than to Damascus. When Damascus is
down, Aleppo prospers. Aleppo’s souks are dominated by Kurds, Turks, Circassians,
Arab Christians, Armenians, and others. Damascus, however, is the world of Sunni
Arabs.
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Today Syria is a ghost. After Syria breaks up, there might be a new Alawite ministate (with part of Lebanon). It will become the target of Islamists (wanting revenge).
What could save Syria would be a world of multiple ethnic and religious identities
united by commerce, such as Aleppo already has.
A weakened Syria could mean emergence of Beirut as the cultural and economic
capital of Greater Syria. But with the Shiites of Lebanon and the Sunnis of Damascus,
Greater Syria could become far more unstable.
America’s Future
Kaplan believes America pays far too much attention to the Middle East and China
and not enough to Mexico, our nearest neighbor. He has long contended that what is
south of us is far more important than what is across the world. The only danger comes
from ignoring danger from the South (Mexico and South America), as Rome ignored
the north, the Germanics.
“Truly, Mexico registers far less in the elite imagination than does Israel or China,
or even India. Yet Mexico could affect America’s destiny more than any of these
countries.” Mexico, together with the United States and Canada, comprises the most
crucial of the continental satellites hovering around Mackinder’s World-Island.
Conclusion
Kaplan certainly makes his case that foreign policy must not overlook geography if
we are to understand the nature of a country and its geopolitics. We could have avoided
some of the mistakes we made in trying to occupy both Iraq and Afghanistan, both
terribly different from our occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II.
America will also do well to consider his geopolitical advice on not overreaching and
not ignoring our need to help Mexico. We need a successful country on our border,
which he thinks will eventually result in a country made up of the U.S., Mexico, and
Canada.
Kaplan has done what I as a woman could not do: he has walked, hitched rides,
traveled on rickety busses, across some of the most uninviting backwaters of the world,
suffering only from his malaria medicines and too much bottled Coca Cola. However,
he has almost never talked to women in such places. I think Kaplan has been traveling
in such places too long: his remarks about Israel appearing sterile and too orderly upon
coming there from Jordan reflect the danger of going native. Order and cleanliness are
not sins. But Geography still lives.
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Charles Trautmann, India: Brief History of A Civilization
Oxford University Press, 2011
Reviewed by John Grayzel
Charles Trautmann’s India: Brief History of A Civilization, is a relatively short (223
modest-sized pages) book that succinctly presents a chronological account of Indian
history from the first appearance of urban civilization in the Indus Valley through the
creation of the modern nation of India. It is written with clarity and a clear logical flow
of events. Trautmann’s background as both a historian and anthropologist is reflected in
his smooth weaving of historical occurrence with accompanying commentary on the
social and religious beliefs and practices of the different times, places and groups.
There is a small number of accompanying black and white illustrations of maps, items
and persons that give a minimalistic visual awareness of the subject matter under
discussion. Though few in number, they are important, as the book is particularly suited
as a text for those knowing little or nothing about Indian history.
All in all, it is an appealing introductory text and could deservingly find a significant
place as not only an introduction to, but also a reference for, a larger course. Since
Trautmann says he specifically wrote the book for his students in an introductory course
this is not surprising and he has largely succeeded in what he set out to do. There is
nothing startling, no grand theory, and no controversial claims, only a clear presentation
of distilled and well-connected information.
There are, however, two significant gaps in the work. The first is the absence of
significant discussion of Dravidian culture per se and its ongoing impact on the larger
Indian “Hindu” civilization. This is surprising since Trautmann has written on the
Dravidians, so it must be presumed he is well informed as to the past and present
importance of the presently over 225 million Dravidian speakers stretching from the
South of India into Pakistan and across to Sri Lanka and to the West into the present
State of Maharashtra. That he so neglects them and starts with the Indus Valley mainly
as a background to the invading Aryans, Turks, Mughals, Hun, and Europeans, follows
the pattern of classic Indian studies that has long personified the adage that it is the
victors who write history.
In fact, Trautmann’s account brought to my mind a long forgotten book by the wellknown Indian writer Nirad Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe. In that work Chaudhuri,
in a rather severe fashion reminiscent of V.S. Naipaul’s India: a Wounded Civilization,
basically looks upon India as a wastebasket filled by successive European invaders who,
like Ulysses’ sailors lured by the call of the sorceress Circe onto her island only to be
subsequently transformed into pigs, were attracted by the Indian sub-continent only to
be turned into degenerates by the realities of its environment. Chaudhuri, who can’t
find enough nasty to say about almost everyone, is far more entertaining but far less
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consistent and credible than Trautmann, and one would be warned not to take too
seriously everything he says. His work is anything but an appropriate introduction to
India, yet it has one thing Trautmann lacks – a true flavor of India. And it is here that
one must question the appropriateness of Trautmann’s title: A Short History of Indian
Civilization.
Trautmann gives two definitions of civilization, one a “quality” of a group, the other
“a way of life.” What Trautmann’s book provides is a chronology of events
accompanied by selective insights into the concurrent “ways of life.” What he almost
entirely neglects is the qualitative aspect that really gives each civilization its
uniqueness.
To cite just one example: Trautmann briefly describes the Hindu Kingdom of
Vijayanagara. Vijayanagara existed for several centuries in South Central India and
was an important military power and a center of trade between the Portuguese and
Tamil India to the east. However, every empire and every civilization has trade, rulers,
war, religion and an economy. Neither these elements nor how they unfold are its
civilization. Its civilization is as much a matter of “flavor” as “facts”. Thus
Vijayanagara’s capital is today known as Hampi and is a UNESCO World Heritage site.
Its preservation is unique, as the Kingdom was betrayed and the capital deserted in a
day, and its ruins remain frozen in time. If you look down upon them from the
surrounding mountains you see magnificently planned expanses with buildings made of
the surrounding stones in an array of structures that seem to emerge from their
immediate geomorphic surrounding. If you descend into the remains you can sense the
dynamic that must have been “Vijayanagara” life as you view the stretch of structures,
markets, palaces, temples, strung as beads on parallel pulsating cords.
In fact, if you go to the main temple and hit one of its mighty columns it produces a
clear vibrating note. Then you discover each column produces a note different from the
others. Suddenly you realize that the entire structure is actually a musical instrument.
You suddenly realize the building is actually a polyphone. You wonder what type of
civilization would produce so extraordinary an instrument? The answer that springs to
mind is: “only Indian civilization.”
So it is with Indian civilization past and present. It is a civilization of the senses:
sights, sounds and colors. Colors, like the spectrum of people that run through streets
during Holi all tinted fluorescently from dyes that have been thrown at each other; or
like the weave of its saris, the music of its sitars, the hours of speculation of its
philosophers, the pungent aromas and spices of its food. These, far more than its
history, are what makes something Indian, rather than French or Chinese or Polynesian,
and these are what Trautmann unfortunately neglects.
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One cannot understand Indian civilization solely as a monochrome. You understand
more of the deep essence of Indian civilizations watching the finger motions of Balinese
dancers or the story of the Ramayana as portrayed by Javanese shadow puppets than by
looking at a map with names of political entities on the Indian sub-continent or pictures
of assorted historic figures.
Exactly why Trautmann so ignores the aesthetic of India is a mystery. One might
surmise it was from a desire to keep his work short but this isn’t the case. In fact, I was
originally attracted to the book to see how anyone could write a history of Indian
Civilization in so few pages. Yet Trautmann finds pages of space to write extensively
of Islamic history, not only in India, but also in Arabia. Thus, he finds space to give a
miniature exposé on the chronology and trajectory of the Middle East from the time of
Mohammed through the Abbasid dynasty. All interesting details, but all largely
irrelevant to Indian civilization.
In the end what Trautmann has written is a fine short introduction to North and
Central Indian History from the Indus valley civilization to the present. It is an
admirable work for that purpose. At the same time, it is not an introduction to Indian
civilization as a civilization nor to all that has been the wonder of that civilization, from
before the Aryans to the present, let alone the possible emerging future. Trautmann
presents the outline of the rainbow of India but the work itself is a little too
monochromatic to deliver on everything the title promises.
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James DeMeo, Saharasia,
The 4000 BCE Origins of Child Abuse, Sex-Repression, Warfare and Social
Violence in the Deserts of the Old World,
Revised Second Edition
Natural Energy Works, 2011
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman

This book is a brave attempt to do a big-picture study of human history that
addresses a question: do the violent, oppressive cultures that stretch in a belt from North
Africa through the deserts of Central Asia derive from a drastic climate change? This is
a geographer’s question, and DeMeo is a geographer. He proposes that a great climate
change that we know happened, the great desiccation of 4,000 years ago that came with
a returned Ice Age, created havoc for the human societies living in that swath of the
earth.
We already know that the Arabian Peninsula was once a great watered grassland
with rivers and teaming with game; we know that the Sahara Desert was an inland sea,
and we know that what would be today’s Asia Minor, Persia, and Afghanistan were
forested. Central Asia was a vast grassland that was host to herds of wild horses.
People who live in such fruitful places are not in a daily struggle for survival.
What happens to the societies that had been living in such lands of plenty when
almost overnight (in geological terms) these regions become desiccated, setting
communities fleeing for their lives? Could such a thing have happened and could this be
responsible for some of the most oppressive human societies ever devised, even today?
In the 1950s, a psychiatrist, Immanuel Velikovsky, tracked ancient mythology
around the world and controversially proposed that the earth had experienced an
enormous astronomical cataclysm (a near collision with Venus) that left us forever
traumatized. Velikovsky’s work is fascinating but as yet not accepted scholarship
because there is no solid proof for his idea of a “collective unconscious.” DeMeo is
also an outlier in the world of academic scholarship, but his huge book, now further
enlarged with new archeological findings, is provocative, and he provides a continuing
stream of new findings about the prehistoric world.
Deserts are not a comfortable habitat for human beings. Tribes must keep on the
move to find food and water, and they are in constant conflict with other tribes, fighting
over these scarce resources. Life under such duress requires the fierceness of male
unquestioned leadership. These societies are harsh and uncompromisingly nasty, as we
see today in this same great desert crescent.
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The most provocative argument in DeMeo’s work is that before the great
desiccation, human beings lived in more humane groupings, often led by women; that
they were more egalitarian; and that they were more sexually permissive. This is an
idea that has great currency today within feminist groups, and while it may be true,
there is no evidence that such matriarchal groups were always so benign.
Anthropologist Margaret Mead was deceived by Samoans into believing this, although
it was not true. Polynesian society was not benign.
DeMeo is correct that the societies living in the great deserts today have customs
and behaviors that are among the worst of all human arrangements. They are
authoritarian, male dominated, belligerent, wedded to vengeance, violently suppressing
of women, child abusing, and practitioners of violent surgical practices inflicted on
children of both sexes. (Think of Tribal Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chad as examples of
the worst.)
DeMeo notes that this testosterone-poisoned desert culture had an effect throughout
the world, particularly in the treatment of women and children. But nowhere was it ever
as severe as in the desert regions, and nowhere else has it remained as resistant to any
remedy.
It is difficult for us to look into the distant past and see exactly how it was. We
often romanticize or demonize the past, but perhaps as we understand better the flood of
current archeology, we might find some important answers to why some cultures have
chosen the paths that they have.
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Peter Benjamin Golden, Central Asia in World History
Oxford University Press, 2011
Reviewed by Connie Lamb

For many in the West, Central Asia is a relatively unknown region. What are the
boundaries? Who lives there? What is its history? These are questions Peter Golden
attempts to answer in this book. Although little is known about this area, it has played a
significant role in the world’s history because of its position as a crossroads of trade,
migration and conquest. For millennia it has been a bridge between East and West,
between China, India, Iran and the Mediterranean lands. In modern times, Russia has
greatly influenced Central Asia. It is the meeting ground of many religions - shamans,
Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims, among others - as well as
multiple languages and peoples that over time created an ethnic mosaic. Its shifting
racial, linguistic, political and cultural borders encompassed two interacting yet
fundamentally different life ways, each inhabiting different ecological niches: the
settled folk of its oases and the nomads of the steppes.
The title of the introduction, “A Layering of Peoples”, provides the theme of the
book. The history of Central Asia is complex. Two quotes from the introduction
present the enormity of the project to write the area’s history. “Historically, Central
Asians had no all-embracing term for the region or its peoples. The ties of clan, tribe,
status, locale or religion were the primary components of Central Asian identities, and
these were often multi-layered. For its large nomadic population, political delimitations
were of little consequence. Control over people brought control over territory” (1). “As
the history of Central Asia amply demonstrates, medieval and modern ‘peoples’ are
often the product of many ethnic and linguistic layers mixed over time and brought
together with no small measure of political calculation, especially in modern times” (7).
Central Asia occupies approximately one-seventh of Earth’s landmass, some eight
million square miles. Today, Central Asia covers the land from the Caspian Sea on the
west and extending into some parts of Mongolia and China on the east and from
Kazakhstan on the north to the borders of Iran and Afghanistan on the south. The
author covers the entire history from when people first moved into the Central Asian
area (about 40,000 years ago during the ice age) to the present time, all the ethnic and
religious groups involved, and the continuous flux of migrations. It is a massive area
and timeframe to cover, hence a great challenge for the author. For those not too
familiar with the region, the writing is a little difficult to follow because Golden seems
to jump back and forth some, although the book is essentially organized
chronologically. In sum, however, Golden does an admirable job of writing from both a
global and local perspective.
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Golden’s book is a volume in The New Oxford World History series, which is
divided into three categories: chronological volumes, thematic and topical volumes, and
geographical volumes. This book is in the geographical section along with eight other
works, some of which also refer to the Central Asia area. This new series is intended to
“offer readers an informed, lively, up-to-date history of the world and its people” that is
comprehensive, and “emphasizes connectedness and interactions of all kinds – cultural,
economic, political, religious and social - involving peoples, places, and processes.” So
the series “presents local histories in a global context and gives an overview of world
events seen through the eyes of ordinary people.” (Editor’s preface)
The author, Peter Golden, is an obvious expert on the topic. He is a Professor
Emeritus of History, Turkish, and Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University. He
also served as Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program from 2008-2011. He
earned both his Master’s and Ph.D. at Columbia University. Golden is the author of a
wide array of books, book chapters, articles and book reviews on Turkic and Central
Asian Studies.
Much of what we know about the area of Central Asia comes from archaeological
excavations and accounts from settled societies who recorded not only their own
activities but also the primitive way of life of the nomads. Chapter one provides an
explanation for the evolution of pastoral nomadism and its adoption of low and high
technology as circumstances required. The domestication of the horse was a turning
point for the nomads. Horses were used for food, their hides were used for clothing and
dwellings, and their strength was harnessed for carrying burdens. Another stage of
development came with the invention of the compound bow, which revolutionized
warfare of the steppe. The nomads were organized into clans, tribes, and sometimes
confederations as peoples moved, merged and conquered others. Warfare became their
business, a topic discussed at length in chapter two. As commerce and trade developed,
a few cities arose, especially along the Silk Road that crossed the Central Asian region.
Products flowed across the steppes from east to west and back to the east, with cities
along the route later contributing goods themselves.
Chapter two emphasizes the third-century emergence of a new power on the
Mongolian steppe, the Xiongnu, and the Chinese response. The Han rulers of China
were aggressive toward their northern neighbors. They initiated the construction of the
Great Wall and established an era of Han-Xiongnu conflict and diplomacy. China not
only traded across the region but also began its own western expansion. To its west,
two nomadic powers emerged with important global consequences--the Kushan Empire
(derived from the Yuezhi nomads who conquered the Graeco-Bactrian state) and the
Huns. The Kushans promoted Buddhism, which subsequently spread across Central
Asia into China, while the Huns advanced toward Europe, pushing back the Germanic
tribes. Later, Turkic groupings came into the steppe where they joined with other tribes
to finally form a new tribal union (33).
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Chapter three speaks of the Turks and their successors. It is a time of much violence
and conquest; many groups came and went or merged, producing a variety of ethnic and
religious groups. Following the fall of the Xiongnu and the Han dynasty of China, the
Turkic nomads built new states that stretched from Manchuria to the Black Sea.
Although they adopted sedentary administrative structures and were empowered by the
silk trade, pastoral nomadism remained important to the Turkish economy and
horsepower remained the key to their military might (43). While Turkish armies
controlled trade routes, the Sogdians, who were vassals of the Turks, served as
middlemen, buying, selling and moving the goods.
Chapters four and five discuss the significance of the silk trade in Central Asia and
the arrival of Islam. The focus is on the social and cultural history of the region as it is
transformed once again with new peoples, religions, and languages alongside the old.
Islam accompanied the Arab wars of conquest in the seventh and eighth centuries,
meeting with Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, and shamanism. Following the
collapse of the Turkic Empire, waves of Turks migrated westward to the borders of
Irano-Islamic Transoxiana where many became military slaves of the Abbasid caliphs in
Baghdad. By the mid-eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks, who had embraced Islam,
overthrew their Abbasid overlords and “formed the ethnic building blocks of the Turkic
peoples of modern Central Asia” (63).
Chapter six covers once again the story of nomadic steppe tribes joining forces to
establish dominance over both settled and pastoral Central Asia with the climax of the
“Mongol Whirlwind”. The Mongols swept across the region from the east, conquering
and “uniting” various tribes, which at first produced considerable destruction but then
led to a space where peaceful intercultural exchange could flourish. Mongols not only
facilitated and were active in the great cross-cultural highway but they also acted as
filters in the wider exchange process. Chapter seven highlights the preeminence of the
Turkic language and Islam in Central Asia, and depicts Tamerlane (Timur-the-lame) as
“the last of the trans-Eurasian great nomadic conquerors” (95).
In the early sixteenth century, Central Asians found themselves increasingly wedged
between competing empires on their borders. The nomads, who had relied on their
skills in horsemanship, archery, and military strategy for mastery in warfare, could not
compete against the new “gunpowder empires” that surrounded them. The Ottomans
built a Near Eastern empire, the Safavids conquered Iran and made Shiite Islam its state
religion, and the Uzbeks transformed Transoxiana into Uzbekistan. Russia advanced
into the regions on both the west and east sides, and the Manchus advanced into
Mongolia, Siberia, and the borderlands of Muslim Central Asia, eventually dominating
the region. New maritime trade routes affected trade in Central Asia in that the types of
commodities changed from luxury goods to agricultural products (along with slaves and
horses), and the routes shifted from east to west to north to south.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014

125

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 70 [2014], No. 70, Art. 15

Comparative Civilizations Review

121

Central Asia ultimately became a Russian link to China. Cultural stagnation
accompanied political fragmentation, and Central Asia, once the great center of Islamic
learning, became increasingly caught up in tradition and rigid legalism (115).
The last chapter, titled “The Problems of Modernity,” discusses the change brought
to Central Asia through Russia’s mass colonization with agriculturalists and its policy to
create artificial “nationalities” in their republics. In the 1930s, the Soviets completely
transformed Central Asian society through collectivization and sedentarization, killing
millions in the process. Although liberated from Soviet rule the new countries of today
struggle with ethnic unrest, pollution, economic hardship, and the attempt to establish
stable governments. China took over the Uighur area with a claim that it is an ancient
possession of China and, like the Soviets, instituted mass migrations, but separatist
movements continue in the area today.
Golden’s book features various aids for the reader including a pronunciation guide,
a chronology, notes, further readings, websites, acknowledgements, and a good index.
Maps are scattered throughout the book and are helpful, but even more maps would
clarify visually what the author presents in writing. The pictures and photos are
interesting and add to the text. One suggestion is to include a glossary, because there
are so many names of places, people, and groups that are scattered throughout that,
rather than try to find the term’s previous use, it would be valuable to have a glossary
for reference.
There are other books on Central Asia but probably none so comprehensive in time
frame, territory or topics. Rather than a conventional national history, Golden places
Central Asia into its appropriate historical context as a region of shifting ethnic,
linguistic, political and cultural borders. The subject matter of this work is immense
and Golden has done a remarkable job in explaining the “layering of peoples” including
the tribes, life ways, religions, languages, and movements. He places the entire history
of this vast area in a global context. This is a highly scholarly and valuable book for
those who wish to learn more about Central Asia.
Note: Some of the text in the paragraphs summarizing chapter content is based on a
review of the book by Mary Jane Maxwell in World History Connected, vol. 9, no. 1,
Feb. 2012.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15

126

Review: Full Issue

122

Number 70, Spring 2014
William F. McCants,
Founding Gods, Inventing Nations: Conquest and Culture Myth
from Antiquity to Islam
Princeton University Press, 2012
Reviewed by Tseggai Isaac

William F. McCants’ book is a solid scholarly work. It integrates theological,
philosophical, mythological and scientific sources to recount the development of
“culture myth” driven by political, religious, and military interactions in the Near East.
The book is small, but it is hard-hitting, rich in details and based on an encyclopedic
knowledge of what the author calls “culture myth.” Culture myth is defined as “the
origin of arts and sciences.” The author defines arts and sciences as “the disciplines that
are learned, that alter humanity’s relationship with nature, and that are commonly
associated with complex urban societies” (pp. 3-4). The key components of arts and
sciences are philosophy, medicine, and the “exact sciences.” Their utilitarian and
aesthetic values constitute elements of civilization, expressed in “carpentry tools, cities,
clothing manufacture, farming practices, government, metallurgy, weaponry, musical
instruments, religious practices, medicine and astronomy, sports, and transportation.”
All had their origin in what the author categorizes as “human inventors” and “divine
benefactors.” Collectively they are the foundation of human wisdom and civilization.
The author’s approach to his topic can be analyzed from the perspective of two
concepts that he introduces: Protography and its Arabic meaning, Awail. The author
defines “Protography” to mean “writing about firsts.” He gives its Arabic rendition as
awail, meaning the first inscriptions and documents of historical records.
The geographical focus of the study is civilization in the context of its origin in
Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Iranian, Greece, and Hebrew traditions. Protographical
material explains the pre-Islamic civilizations via the supporting documents McCants
deploys. Awail refers specifically to protographical documents written by Iranian and
Arab scholars to address the founding of Islamic Civilization.
The emergence of Islamic civilization necessitated identifying the “founding” of the
Near Eastern civilization and the antecedent civilizations that had influenced them.
Who can be credited with “founding” their divine origin and “inventing” their political
formation as nations and empires of dominant stature? McCants answers this question in
five well-documented chapters.
The introduction gives highlights and summarizes the evolution of civilizations.
The time period is the first three hundred years after rule by the Greeks and Romans
over the Near East. The beginning of wisdom is to be found in the “myths” and cultural
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“lore” believed by societies to be authentic. The sources from which the author
generates his data and references are the myths that provide the ancient narrative of each
of these civilizations. “The Mesopotamian myth survived in poems and medicinal texts
inscribed in clay tablets, Egyptian myth in paintings and inscriptions adorning funerary
structures and other monuments, and Iranian myths in oral traditions” (p. 11).
Chapter 1 (“Gifts of the Gods: The Origins of Civilization in Ancient Near Eastern
and Greek Mythology”) discusses stories of civilizations as gifts from gods to mankind.
The ancient Mesopotamians, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans and
the Arabs each had their own myths and cultural beliefs they believed to be uniquely
their own, given by their specific gods, who communicated the knowledge to humans.
However, when their records and “protographical material” are studied, what each
group had considered as theirs alone can be found instead to have been embedded as
elements of previous civilizations.
Chapter 2 (“The Beneficent Sky God: Cultural History in the Qur’an”) addresses the
prominent role of spirituality in the Quran.
The protographical sources state that the development of “exact science” is
contested by the Egyptians, the Mesopotamians, the Persians and the Greeks. Chapter 3
(“Who was First?”) discusses the debate and, in general, credits the Egyptians with
origin of numerous discoveries that evolved to become the basis for exact sciences. The
Mesopotamians are equally credited with their own vast creativity. The Greeks, the
Romans, and the Persians each recount their claim to validate the rich overflow of their
specific civilizations, after acknowledging their debt to Hermes, Noah’s grandson from
Mesopotamia.
The answer to the question "Who was First?” occurs to Herodotus during his visit to
Egypt in 430 BC.
During his trip, he (Herodotus) noticed a number of Egyptian religious practices
and beliefs that were similar to those in Greece. He concluded that Greece must
have borrowed these from the Egyptians, a conclusion encouraged by the native
priests he spoke with (p. 61).
Chapter 4 (“Inventing Nations: Post-conquest Native History of Civilization’s
Origins”) is devoted to the ways in which ancient Persian and Greek scholars imparted
nationalist spins to their accounts of civilizations.
Chapter 5 (“’The Sciences of the Ancients’”) discusses the Arab civilization and its
equivocal position between faith and a secular outlook. The early Arabs are reticent
about attributing knowledge and science to mankind. Instead, they argue that the awail
(primary knowledge) came from Allah as a gift to man through the words of the Quran.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol70/iss70/15
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This is similar to the Hebrew and Christian view of sciences, which the Muslims
inherited, except that the Muslims also added a heavy dose of local lore and mythology
to form the totality of Islamic Civilization. The awail sources provide a mixed
reformatory-and-revolutionary history of Islam.
The “all beneficent Allah” is the giver of all knowledge, but that cannot be
translated into material facts articulated in the tangible and visible realties of the
Arabian Peninsula where Islam was founded. The Arabs’ gift to the world of
civilization is Islam in its orthodox form, unadulterated by the worldly rationalizations
of sciences.
The author explains the scientific illiteracy of classical Islam as follows:
The Greeks and the Romans came to the Middle East with learned high culture
and the native elites contested it, adapted it or modified it. But the conquering
Arabs had no comparable learned culture; consequently, the conquerors and the
conquered argued over the next three centuries about the content of not only
‘Islamic’ identity, but also ‘Arab’ identity and scholarship.
As this book demonstrates, the orientation of early Islamic culture was not fixed
toward Arabia, and its content drew as much from pagan learning and
mythology as it did from religious scriptures. What we know today as Islamic
culture is the product of a contested process of self-legitimization in the first
three centuries of Islamic era – a process reflected in the mythmaking of the
period and whose protagonists drew heavily on the lore of non-Arab and pagan
antiquity.” (p. 2)
When the Arabs stormed the Near East and brought their religion, how did they
adapt to the civilization that had existed before their arrival? The Arabs were conflicted
between religious orthodoxy in the dictates of the Quran and endorsing science as
defined by those societies on whose lands they settled through conquest.
Before the Islamic conquest, the Persians claimed their civilization was given to the
Persian people. The Persians perceived themselves as qualitatively gifted, ordained to
create, facilitate, and administer governmental systems in accord with heavenly order.
The Hebrews claimed that arts and sciences were given to man, the embodiment of
God. Ever since Adam was driven out of the Garden of Eden, man was commanded by
God to make his living by the sweat of his brow. In his efforts to till the earth, Adam
and his descendants adapted the culture of tool making and crafting of instruments to
harness the earth and its bounties. Christians, who were also Jews at the beginning of
the foundation of Christianity, accepted the Jewish view of science and God.
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The pre-Abbasid Arabs remained conservative traditionalists with deep skepticism
about non-Islamic ideas. Their conquest of vast lands and ancient civilizations exposed
them to cultural and civilizational practices without which they could not maintain their
empire. The conquerors divided into two camps over the origin of philosophy,
medicine and the exact sciences. Those who had unflinching dedication to the Arabian
founding fathers could not be reconciled to culture myths based outside the Quran. By
contrast, the Abbasid Dynasties incorporated Persian, Greek and Christian methods of
rationality and attempted to harmonize Islam with culture myths rooted in science. The
Abbasid Dynasties were positioned in the heart of a cosmopolitan culture that had
fostered an environment of enlightenment, intellectual and scientific activity.
The Abbasids succeeded in accomplishing a fusion of Persian and Byzantine exact
sciences and sciences of governance. They were thus able to reconcile the sacred and
the secular bases of science. “The new dynasty, the Abbasids, styled themselves as
model Iranian kings, and since being a good Iranian king meant supporting the
translation of scientific texts, they patronized the translation of Greek scientific texts
into Arabic (p.120). Abbasid efforts paid off, creating an Islamic Civilization that could
articulate its own awail.
Even though McCants’ book is about the emergence of ancient and classical
civilizations, its research focuses strongly on Islamic Civilization, drawing heavily upon
ancient Islamized Persian philosophers at the Abbasid court. The author elaborates the
extent to which Islamic Arabs contributed to Islamic Civilization and the degree to
which Islamic Civilization owes its civilizational material to other civilizations before it.
Islam, being the last of the revealed faiths, inherited culture myths from the rest.
However, Islam faced the dilemma of acquisition, incorporation, and rejection. To
accept culture myths that were not based on the Quran represented heresy. To reject
rational science was also a point of concern with respect to faith and secularism. For
this reason, Islam was unable to solve the dilemma until the Iranians abandoned their
stellar civilization based on their ancestors and accepted Islam in its Bedouin garb,
modified it at the Abbasid Court, and attempted to become its champions, with little
success. They paid dearly for conforming to the faith of their enemies, the Sunnis, by
jettisoning the far superior civilization of their forefathers.
The answer to the author’s question: “Who was first?” is an unsettled debate. It
depends upon whether a Greek, a Roman, or an Islamic scholar is the oracle, showing
intellectual and scholarly confidence and loudly claiming the superiority or
predominance of his or her civilization.
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What appears to be conclusive is the repeated consensus among Greek, Persian, and
Abbasid scholars and philosophers to give deference and preference to Egypt as a
primary founder and giver of the social and “exact” sciences.
As for the mathematical sciences, classical Greek authors after Aeschylus
believed these originated in the Near East, mainly in Egypt. Aristotle, echoing
Isocrates, claimed all of them originated in Egypt because the priestly class
there was allowed the leisure to pursue them. Herodotus believed that
geometry developed out of Egypt land surveying; later authors were only split
on whether it was Thales or Pythagoras who had brought it to Greece (p.124).
Founding Gods, Inventing Nations is solid scholarly work that will serve as a useful
source for research and study. Its detailed footnotes include Arabic, German, and Latin
sources, providing added value to scholars with eclectic interests on the “founding” of
civilizations.
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44th Annual Conference of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations
June 11-14, 2014
Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA

Call for Papers
Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization?
Jonathan Lear, in his book Radical Hope (2006), wrote:
“We live in an age of deep and profound angst that the world itself, as we know it, is
vulnerable and could break down…We are confronted with global warming, nuclear
conflagration, weapons of mass destruction…and even the demise of civilization
itself…events around the world – terrorist attacks, violent social upheavals…have
left us with an uncanny sense of menace. We seem to be aware of a shared
vulnerability that we cannot name.” (p. 7)
What is the way out of this deep sense of contemporary crisis?
What exactly is “wisdom” and how can wisdom be promoted on a global level to deal
with a number of serious crises now facing the future of civilization?
What have been some different definitions of wisdom? This is an ancient topic, but how
can it be specifically applied today?
What, if anything, can be done to solve these problems collectively?
Some applications may be (but are not limited to) the following questions:





What exactly is human nature and how is this relevant to civilizational futures?
What are some possible solutions to overpopulation and the related problems of
over-industrialization, resource-depletion and environmental degradation?
What are some possible solutions to the problem of inequality, economic and
otherwise?
Why do a few have so much while so many have so little? Do rich nations have
any responsibilities to the poor ones?
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Is capitalism really working today? What did the “occupy” movements signify?
Why are many Western economies currently floundering?
How have technological advances (especially increasing automation)
contributed to the current jobs crisis?
Does material accumulation really bring happiness? Why/why not?
Is humankind naturally prone to conflict or cooperation? How are organizations
like the United Nations faring with regard to international responses to regional
problems?
What is a Utopia? Dystopia? How are these terms relevant today? What roles do
utopias and dystopias play for the future of society?
Have our leaders run out of inspiration? Is fear now the main rhetoric?

In the 20th century, humanity saw the rise of several grand ideologies: communism,
fascism, liberalism, etc. We also saw the dismantling of many of the institutions built on
these grand visions. Have today’s leaders given up on grand visions? Is narrow selfinterest and small scaled-down retraction now the trend? If so, what are the implications
of this? Is this ‘realpolitik’ or just the politics of disillusionment?
And of course, papers concerning all questions relevant to civilizational studies are also
welcome!
These could include:
•
•
•

Studies of great civilizationalists, e.g., Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Quigley, etc.
Analyses of particular civilizations and/or comparative studies of civilizations.
Decline and progress of civilizations.

Please send abstracts via email by May 1, 2014 (300 words) to:
Prof. David J. Rosner
Metropolitan College of New York
ISCSC President and 2014 Program Chair
drosner@mcny.edu
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Membership Information
If you are not a member if the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $50
yearly membership fee members receive a one year subscription to this
journal, are invited to attend the annual conference, receive the ISCSC
Newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues. Membership is
open to all interested in civilizations. Visit www.wmich.edu/iscsc for
further information and to join the Society.

To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Soft cover issues of this journal may be purchased from Amazon.com,
bn.com or from other Internet booksellers. CD and other electronic
copies of this issue may be obtained from the H.W. Wilson web site at
www.hwwilson.com or the ProQuest website at www.proquest.com.
Coming soon to EBSCO Electronic Journals Service.
This issue, and all previous issues, may be accessed, searched by
keyword or topic, and read at the following web URL:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR.
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service for
free to all who are interested in the topics our journal covers.

Upcoming 2014 ISCSC Conference
The 44th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilization will take place June 11 to June 14 at Monmouth

University, West Long Branch, New Jersey. The major topic this year will
be: “Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization?”
Please see conference information and the Call for Papers on Pages 127 to 128.
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